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HER OWN GOOD NAME: TWO CENTURIES OF
TALK ABOUT CHASTITY
LISA R. PRUITJT*
ABSTRACT
Since the earliest days of U.S. legal history, women have sought
legal redress for statements about their sexual behavior or otherwise
about them as sexual beings. These female plaintiffs have typically
employed defamation law to sue on the basis of communications that
undermined their reputations for sexual propriety, which the law re-
ferred to as chastity. In this Article, Professor Pruitt tracks women's
use of defamation law from the earliest recorded cases to the turn of
the twentyfirst century, noting how changing society and evolving
legal doctrines have altered judicial responses to these claims.
Defamation law was historically highly responsive to injuries
resulting from such communications, but the ways in which the me-
dia portray and undermine women are constantly shifting. Professor
Pruitt focuses in particular on late twentieth-century defamation
cases related to chastity and sexual portrayals. She observes that
courts still recognize injury to a woman's reputation from a straight-
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forward assertion of adultery, prostitution, or certain sexually "devi-
ant" behaviors. Contemporary defamation fails, however, to
acknowledge or provide redress for many other statements that ridi-
cule and demean women in relation to their sexuality. Professor
Pruitt's analysis illustrates how constitutional doctrines associated
with defamation law, such as the fact-opinion dichotomy and the
related protection of rhetorical hyperbole, defeat women's legal claims
and obscure the dignitary injuries they suffer.
As a solution to this legal oversight, Professor Pruitt argues for
recognition of a new tort for technically false statements that demean
or ridicule. She explains how such a tort is consistent with first
amendment jurisprudence, and she discusses how it is preferable to
defamation law in terms of its candid characterization of injury as
one to dignity, rather than to reputation. While she acknowledges
that her proposed solution is not foolproof (and risks continuing le-
gal regulation of women's sexuality), Professor Pruitt argues that it
is nevertheless preferable to provide a remedy that women may invoke
rather than to leave them entirely without the option of legal redress.
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Our society has long been preoccupied with women's sexual pro-
priety, and that preoccupation has naturally led to talk. For several
centuries, women in the United States have turned to defamation law
when seeking legal redress for injuries caused by such talk, whether by
neighborhood gossips or the mass media.
Historically, defamation law was highly responsive to lawsuits
brought by women on the basis of statements that undermined their
reputations for chastity.' These cases frequently arose from straight-
forward assertions of adultery and other "improper" sexual behavior,2
and female plaintiffs frequently won their defamation actions.' In re-
cent decades, however, the type of statement giving rise to chastity-
related defamation suits has changed, as has the law's response.4
While contemporary women sometimes still sue on the basis of
statements that allege or imply inappropriate sexual behavior,5 other
defamation cases arise from statements that ridicule women in rela-
tion to their sexuality or otherwise portray them in sexually degrading
ways.6 Such contemporary portrayals are the basis for what I call the
"new chastity" cases. In contrast to those suing based on a straightfor-
ward assertion of sexual misconduct, a plaintiff bringing a new chastity
claim seldom succeeds. The new chastity plaintiff is thus often left
with no relief.
Using the label "new chastity" for these cases is admittedly a mis-
nomer because the statements that give rise to them are hardly, if at
1. See Lisa R. Pruitt, "On the Chastity of Women All Property in the World Depends": Injury
from Sexual Slander in the Nineteenth Century, 78 IND. L.J. 965, 984 (2003) (noting that due to
the permissive nature of the per se standard, women frequently won sexual slander cases
based on allegations of unacceptable sexual conduct); see also, e.g., Walmsley v. Kopczynski,
195 N.Y.S. 699, 700 (App. Div. 1922) (holding that a statement that a woman was a whore
was defamation per se justifying a verdict for the plaintiff); Emmerson v. Marvel, 55 Ind.
265, 267 (1876) (upholding a verdict for the female plaintiff where the defamation in-
volved words intended to suggest the unmarried plaintiff had engaged in improper sexual
conduct).
2. See AndrewJ. King, Constructing Gender: Sexual Slander in Nineteenth-Century America,
13 LAw & HisT. REv. 63, 74 (1995) (examining representative cases from Indiana and New
York and concluding that most slander cases brought by female plaintiffs were based on
implications of sexual misconduct).
3. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 1018 (discussing the increase in victories by female plain-
tiffs in sexual slander cases due to the per se standard).
4. See infra Part IV (noting a trend of media defendants in modern sexual defamation
suits and plaintiffs' diminished success in court).
5. Such behavior includes adultery, prostitution, the contraction of a sexually trans-
mitted disease, or the procurement of an abortion, among others. See infra Part IV.C.1
(describing contemporary cases based on traditional sexual slander claims).
6. See infra Part IV.C.2, .3 (discussing contemporary cases that explore non-traditional
forms of sexual defamation). For specific examples of sexually degrading portrayals, see
DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER INEQUALITY 73-76 (1997).
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all, about chastity. They are about portrayals that demean and de-
grade, inflicting a dignitary injury. Nevertheless, I refer to them as
"new chastity" cases because a plaintiff who brings one usually claims
her reputation was damaged by an offending statement that implied
sexual impropriety. I also use the phrase because the content of the
offending speech is sexual, and its power to demean and degrade de-
rives in part from that sexual content. Finally, I use the phrase "new
chastity" because it reflects the theory of recovery I craft to respond to
this injury.
I argue in this Article that the law should provide redress in some
of these new chastity cases, and that contemporary constitutional law
provides an opportunity to do so. In particular, I argue that when
offensive statements are technically false, they are unprotected by the
First Amendment, thereby permitting states to grant redress for the
profound dignitary harm they inflict without implicating constitu-
tional protections of free speech.
As a prelude to my discussion of the new chastity cases, I consider
the evolution of the female plaintiffs use of defamation law to redress
communicative injuries caused by statements that imply inappropriate
sexual behavior. The outcomes in both traditional chastity cases and
the new chastity cases are problematic. Both types of decisions rein-
force women's collective association with the private sphere of life, in
particular with sex. Traditional chastity cases do this by recognizing
an injury when a woman is said to fall short of society's expectations of
a "good woman." While the availability of this remedy may have been
helpful to the individual women who have successfully sued, the law's
adjudication of these claims has negatively reinforced society's expec-
tations of what constitutes women's "proper" sexual behavior. The
new chastity cases reinforce-or attempt to re-create-women's asso-
ciation with the private sphere by failing to recognize an injury when a
woman has been involuntarily depicted in a sexually hateful and
demeaning way. Thus, in both types of cases, tort law's normative
power perpetuates women's historical alignment with the private
sphere, and specifically with all things sexual.
Not only do new chastity cases symbolically relegate women to the
private sphere, they fail to provide a remedy for, and frequently do
not even acknowledge, the profound injury to the individual women
who are depicted in these sexually demeaning portrayals. While that
injury is not expressly recognized in contemporary defamatory law,
theories of self-determination, identity, and privacy support the provi-
sion of a legal remedy to these women.
2004]
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Historically, the statements that spawned the vast majority of wo-
men's defamation suits were referred to as indicating a "want of chas-
tity."7 The early prevalence of this type of defamation case no doubt
stemmed from nineteenth-century social norms that relegated most
women to the domestic sphere of life where they worked as wives and
mothers or, as single women, awaited those roles.' By the late nine-
teenth century, the vast majority of states had responded to the
proliferation of sexual slander suits by designating statements that im-
pugned a woman's chastity to be slander per se.9 Doing so obviated
the need for a plaintiff to prove special damages, thereby greatly in-
creasing the likelihood of her success.' °
As women gradually moved into the public sphere of life in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they took on quasi-pub-
lic roles as teachers, nurses, and "shop girls" in greater numbers." Yet
7. See, e.g., Sandifer v. Electrolux Corp., 172 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1949) (stating
that, generally, the plaintiff need not prove actual damage where the words spoken "plainly
and falsely charge ... adultery or a want of chastity"); Haynes v. Phillips, 99 So. 356, 357
(Ala. 1924) (statement that a woman was a "public whore" imputed a "want of chastity");
Roby v. Murphy, 27 111. App. 394, 1888 WL 1911, at *2 (1888) (finding that the word "slut,"
in its common meaning, does not charge a crime or indicate a want of chastity and there-
fore is not slanderous); Thormann v. Gormby, 1 Ky. Op. 461, 1867 WL 7024, at *1 (1867)
(stating that the defamatory language did not impute a "want of chastity" or other offense
for which an "action would lie"); Shilling v. Carson, 27 Md. 175, 185-86 (1867) (explaining
that a plaintiffs reputation for "want of chastity" would mitigate her damages); Nealon v.
Frisbie, 31 N.Y.S. 856, 856-57 (Sup. Ct. 1895) (holding that, on their face, the words spo-
ken did not necessarily allege a "want of chastity" and therefore were not necessarily ac-
tionable per se); Jones v. Brinkley, 93 S.E. 372, 373 (N.C. 1917) (making the following
statement about the test for slander: "to charge a woman falsely of a want of chastity is
slanderous and libelous, though such matter is not a felony."); Copeland v. State, 300 S.W.
86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (citing Texas criminal libel statute criminalizing language
that "falsely and maliciously, or falsely and wantonly, imputes to any female a want of chas-
tity"); State v. Clifford, 52 S.E. 864, 865 (W. Va. 1906) (noting that "[w]ords imputing want
of chastity to a woman are slanderous . . . per se"); RESTATEMENT (FIRsT) TORTS § 574
(1937).
The cause of action has also sometimes been referred to as sexual slander. See, e.g.,
King, supra note 2, at 67-71; Pruitt, supra note 1, at 965.
8. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 971 (observing that the only expectation of women was
that they would marry, thereby completing their expected role in society).
9. See King, supra note 2, at 71-81 (discussing sexual defamation cases under New York
and Indiana law, and noting the trend toward a per se standard reflected in numerous
other states); Pruitt, supra note 1, at 98 (noting the movement in sexual defamation cases
to the per se standard).
10. For a discussion of various state statutes adopting a per se standard, see Diane L.
Borden, Reputational Assault: A Critical and Historical Analysis of Gender and the Law of Defama-
tion, 75 JOuRNALNSM & MASS COMM. Q. 98, 102-03 (1998); see also King, supra note 2, at 71-81
(discussing statutory and judicial adoption of the slander per se rule for statements about
women's chastity).
11. SeeDixon v. Allen, 11 P. 179, 179 (Cal. 1886) (teaching); Wertz v. Lawrence, 179 P.
813, 813 (Colo. 1919) (teaching); Wright v. Hilo Tribune-Herald, Ltd., 31 Haw. 128, 129
[VOL. 63:401
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statements about a woman's sexual conduct, more than any other sub-
ject, continued to be the basis for the great majority of defamation
actions by female plaintiffs. 12 In cases brought before the mid-twenti-
eth century, female plaintiffs were generally successful in their use of
defamation claims to gain redress for their communicative injuries. 3
Judges proved highly responsive and sympathetic to the injury, often
indulging in paternalistic expressions of outrage on behalf of all wives
and daughters.1 4
Women have moved into public life in far greater numbers in the
latter part of the twentieth century. 5 As women have taken roles in
the commercial, political, and other public realms, they have contin-
ued to suffer communicative injuries related to that which is quintes-
sentially private, their sexual personhood. a6 Women today represent
only a small fraction of all defamation plaintiffs. 7 However, many fe-
male plaintiffs who bring defamation actions continue to base their
lawsuits upon statements about them as sexual beings.1" Thus, women
have been left straddling the public-private divide; increasingly players
(1929) (nursing); Copeland v. State, 300 S.W. 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (nursing); see
also Borden, supra note 10, at 100-01 (noting generally women's movement into the public
sphere during this time period).
12. See Diane L. Borden, Patterns of Harm: An Analysis of Gender and Defamation, 2 COMM.
L. & POL'Y 105, 126-27 (1997) (stating that defamation cases brought by women between
1897 and 1906 predominantly concerned their private sexual lives).
13. See id. at 133-34 (calculating that women plaintiffs won 27 out of 42 (64.3%) sexual
slander actions during the period 1897-1906).
14. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 967 n.2 (citing King, supra note 2, at 67 (characterizing
judicial action as paternalistic and giving examples of such paternalistic judicial language
from Beggarly v. Craft, 31 Ga. 309, 315 (1860))).
15. Borden, supra note 10, at 100 (recognizing the trend of women leaving the home
to assume positions in the public sphere in increasing numbers as the twentieth century
progressed); see also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 142 n.t (1989)
(citing statistics demonstrating the increasing numbers of women participating in the
workforce and therefore not remaining solely in the private domain).
16. See infra Part IV.C (describing contemporary sexual defamation cases); see also Bor-
den, supra note 12, at 134 (noting nine cases brought by women centered around their
private, sexual, non-public lives during the period 1967-1976).
17. Borden, supra note 12, at 120. In his 1987 book, Professor Bezanson reported that
only eleven percent of defamation plaintiffs were women. RANDALL P. BEZANSON ET AL.,
LIBEL LAW AND THE PRESS: MYTH AND REALITY 7 (1987). While more recent statistics are
unavailable, it seems unlikely that this percentage has more than doubled in the past fif-
teen years.
18. According to one study, between 1967 and 1976, half of the defamation actions
brought by women were based on statements related to morality, while half were related to
them as professionals or employees. See Borden, supra note 12, at 134 (noting nine cases
that were based on allegations of immortality and nine that were based on business or
professional concerns during this time period); see also infta Part IV.C (citing cases from
the last forty years).
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in the public sphere, they are nevertheless symbolically pulled back
into the private realm by talk about their sexuality."
Increasingly, contemporary "talk" about chastity has really been
talk about sex. It has taken the form of degrading and sometimes
pornographic depictions of women. Although individual women
targeted by such communications have sought redress in defamation,
they have rarely won.2" These failures are attributable in part to par-
ticular legal doctrines of the constitutional era of defamation law that
protect communications that do not assert verifiably false facts, or that
are not likely to be interpreted literally.2'
My discussion proceeds in five parts. Part I includes some rudi-
mentary information about the tort of defamation, including its theo-
retical foundations. In this part, I also discuss some of the gendered22
characteristics of both the tort's doctrines and its foundational prem-
ises. In Parts II and III, I describe the chastity-related actions women
brought in the United States during two consecutive periods, roughly
1800-1890 and 1890-1960. While these eras are somewhat arbitrarily
delineated, the parameters of the latter correspond at one end with
women's entry in increasing numbers into the public sphere, as well as
the rise of press sensationalism known as yellow journalism. 3 The
end of that period corresponds roughly with the beginning of the con-
stitutional era of defamation law and what has been called the second
stage of the women's movement. 24 These events represent appropri-
ate bookends for defining periods that might signal women's chang-
ing use of defamation law. In Part IV, I discuss the sex-related uses
women have made of defamation law since about 1960, the period I
call the contemporary era. Here I focus on three types of statements,
19. Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman has discussed a similar phenomenon with respect
to street harassment. Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization
of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 526-27, 530 (1993).
20. See infra Part W.A.
21. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (holding that
statements cannot lead to a finding of defamation unless they are false); Pring v. Pent-
house Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982) (taking into consideration the likeli-
hood that the allegedly defamatory statements would be taken literally by a reader).
22. By gendered, I refer to what Susan Moller Okin has called "the deeply entrenched
institutionalization of sexual difference." MOLLER OKIN, supra note 15, at 6.
23. Borden, supra note 10, at 99 (noting women's greater involvement in the public
sphere); Lawrence M. Friedman, Name Robbers: Privacy, Blackmail, and Assorted Matters in
Legal History, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1114-15 (2002) (discussing yellow journalism).
24. See Borden, supra note 10, at 99, 104 (discussing two periods of women's rights
movements-one in the end of the nineteenth century and the other in the middle of the
twentieth century-and noting that a monumental change in defamation law took place
between these two periods). This period has been titled the "constitutional era" of defama-
tion. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 979.
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each related to a woman's sexual propriety, or in which she is derided
in relation to sex: a straightforward assertion of improper sexual be-
havior, a sexually hateful epithet or invective, and a portrayal of an
individual woman that demeans or ridicules in relation to sex. Analy-
ses of these statements implicate several constitutional doctrines,
which I discuss and critique in greater detail in this Part.
Having established in Part IV defamation law's failure to redress
injuries arising from statements in the new chastity cases, I discuss in
Part V alternate theories of relief. I conclude with a proposal for rec-
ognition of a new tort that would respond to the injury identified, and
I explain how that tort is consistent with existing constitutional protec-
tions for speech.
I. A GENDERED PERSPECTIVE ON THE LAW OF DEFAMATION
Defamation is a cause of action aimed at protecting an individ-
ual's reputation.25 Including the twin torts of libel and slander, it was
historically recognized in both civil and criminal law, though the latter
has barely survived in the twentieth century.26 The cause of action
provides redress for unprivileged false statements that are communi-
cated to a third party, whether by the media or an individual, which
hold a person up to obloquy, ridicule, or contempt.27 Judicial opin-
ions and commentary historically expressed the key concept of defam-
atory meaning in terms of causing a person to be shunned by her
community, regardless of whether the community was "right-think-
ing."'28 Traditionally, the inquiry was not so much whether the state-
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976); BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at
1.
26. See Copeland v. State, 300 S.W. 86, 90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (citing a Texas stat-
ute criminalizing language that "falsely and maliciously, or falsely and wantonly, imputes to
any female a want of chastity" as constituting criminal libel); I.M.L. v. State, 61 P.3d 1038,
1038 (Utah 2002) (abrogating Utah's criminal libel statute as unconstitutional); BRUCE W.
SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY § 4.14 (2d ed. Supp. 2003).
27. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 559 provides: "A communication is defamatory if
it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the
community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." One of the
most comprehensive definitions offered in case law is from a 1933 New York decision,
which declared that reputation is injured by
words which tend to expose one to public hatred, shame, obloquy, contumely,
odium, contempt, ridicule, aversion, ostracism, degradation, or disgrace, or to
induce an evil opinion of one in the minds of right-thinking persons, and to de-
prive one of their confidence and friendly intercourse in society.
Kimmerle v. New York Evening Journal, Inc., 186 N.E. 217, 218 (N.Y. 1933).
28. See Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 190 (1909) (finding that a statement is de-
famatory if perceived as such by a significant segment of the community, regardless of
whether they are right-thinking); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733, 735 (2d Cir.
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ment should have caused the plaintiff to be shunned and avoided
because she had done something contrary to prevailing social
norms, 29 rather, it was whether or not the statement would in fact
likely cause the plaintiff to be shunned and avoided."0 The law has
evolved in such a way, however, that a finding of defamatory meaning
now implies that the person has done something blameworthy or im-
moral and thus deserves to be shunned or avoided. A statement that
one has a contagious disease, for example, is no longer defamatory.
31
Once a standard example of a defamatory statement, it no longer is
because it does not impute blameworthy behavior.3 2 A false statement
1945) (holding by Judge Learned Hand that the "right-thinking" segment of the commu-
nity is irrelevant to a finding of defamation); cf Connelly v. McKay, 28 N.Y.S.2d 327, 329
(Gen. Term 1941) (noting that some groups are so wrong-thinking that courts will not
utilize their viewpoints in defamation cases); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt.
e (1977) (articulating the standard that a statement is defamatory if it will prejudice the
plaintiff in the eyes of a "substantial and respectable minority" of the community).
29. False communications that previously might have caused a person to be shunned
even though the person had done nothing blameworthy are now rarely redressed in defa-
mation law because they do not necessarily assert that the woman has done anything
blameworthy or immoral. Instead, such false statements are, in the last several decades,
more often redressed by the tort false light invasion of privacy. See Douglass v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1128 (7th Cir. 1985), discussed infra notes 520-533 and
accompanying text (arising from unauthorized publication of plaintiffs photographs);
Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1084 (5th Cir. 1984), discussed infra notes
535-540 and accompanying text (involving unauthorized use of plaintiffs' photos in Hus-
tler). See also infra notes 496-519 (providing further discussion of the distinction between
defamation and false light).
30. 1 intentionally use the word "would" rather than "did" because until the constitu-
tional era of defamation law, courts did not require proof that a statement in fact caused a
plaintiff to be shunned. Indeed, historically, many types of statements were accompanied
by a legal presumption that the plaintiff had been injured. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF
DEFAMATION § 7.9 (2d ed. 2003). This has changed to some extent in the constitutional
era of defamation law because damages are now rarely presumed. Thus, in order to prove
damages, plaintiffs sometimes present evidence of what hearers of the offending statement
believed it to mean.
The failure to consider the reader or hearer's perception of an allegedly defamatory
communication is the subject of an article written from the perspective of both a lawyer
and a linguist. Randall P. Bezanson & Kathryn L. Ingle, Plato's Cave Revisited: The Epistemol-
ogy of Perception in Contemporary Defamation Law, 90 DICK. L. REv. 585, 586-87 (1986).
31. See Cox Enters. v. Thrasher, 442 S.E.2d 740, 742 (Ga. 1994) (indicating that a dis-
ease-related communication is by itself insufficient to support a defamation action).
32. The exception to the rule is for statements that indicate the plaintiff has contracted
a sexually transmitted disease, if the circumstances lead the reader to conclude that the
plaintiff acted in a sexually, immoral manner and therefore was blameworthy. See Cox En-
ters., 442 S.E.2d at 742 (holding that the newspaper article stating that a married woman
had contracted chlamydia did not imply that the plaintiff had engaged in sexually immoral
behavior).
Another example of a statement that does not impute blameworthiness and therefore
is not defamatory was adjudicated in Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988). The Cox
court held the publication of a photo that plaintiffs had consented to take with Orrin
[VOL. 63:401
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that someone committed a criminal act, on the other hand, remains a
prototype of defamatory meaning because it does imply blameworthi-
ness or immorality." My analysis of women's chastity-related cases im-
plicates the finer points of a defamatory meaning analysis, and I
therefore revisit the issue below.
Perhaps more than any other tort, common law defamation fea-
tures an enormously complex set of rules involving various aspects of
the tort, including privileges and damages. 4 Constitutional doctrines
have further complicated the common law rules, beginning with New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan 5 in 1964. Collectively, these rules have
made it far more difficult for any defamation plaintiff to prevail.36
Several common law and constitutional defamation law doctrines
are gendered in that they have a disparate impact in the types of defa-
mation actions that are often brought by women.37 Others are
gendered in the sense that they were crafted to respond to the sorts of
communicative injuries typically suffered by men.3 Few of these
gendered aspects are explicit, but one is: the gender double-standard
regarding sexual slander. Most U.S. jurisdictions have considered
statements that impugn a woman's chastity to be slander per se for as
long as they have been litigating the issue.39 The majority of states
explicitly made such statements slander per se only with respect to wo-
men,40 although none of the other traditional per se categories is gen-
Hatch did not defame them when later used in his campaign. Id, at 562. The court noted
that it might embarrass and offend them, but it was not defamatory. Id The court ob-
served that both the Democratic and Republican parties were mainstream. Id.
33. Cox, 761 P.2d at 562 n.5; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 cmt. d (1938).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1976) (defining defamation); RESTATE-
MENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 569 (1938) (providing a cause of action for defamation per se).
35. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See David A. Logan, Libel Law in the Trenches: Reflections on Current Data on Libel Liti-
gation, 87 VA. L. Rv. 503, 519 (2001) (citing data collected by the Libel Defense Resource
Center and noting that the volume of libel litigation has fallen dramatically in the past
twenty years, especially when compared to other types of tort litigation). But see generally
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS 3-25 (1986) (discussing the proverbial "thinning
American skin" and the proliferation of litigation against the press); Rodney A. Smolla, Let
the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American Law of Libe4 132 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 1-2
(1983) (discussing the increase in libel suits against the media) [hereinafter Smolla, Let the
Author Beware].
37. See Borden, supra note 10, at 103 (suggesting that the inclusion of the want of
chastity defamation claim in state laws causes a discrepancy between defamation suits avail-
able to men and those available to women).
38. Borden, supra note 12, at 125 (noting that the results of a study showed that defa-
mation suits brought by men tended to arise from profession-related statements, and not
from statements involving sexuality or their homes).
39. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 968.
40. Borden, supra note 10, at 103.
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der-specific. 41 One nineteenth-century court explained the need for
the gender-specific rules on sexual slander by noting its different im-
pact on women than on men:
The nature of the charge is calculated to destroy her charac-
ter, cut her off from virtuous society, prevent her from form-
ing that connection in life in which are centered all her
hopes and affections, and consign her to dependence, un-
happiness and misery, or competency from infamous prosti-
tution. Such a charge, in its extent and influence upon
character, and in its consequences, is vastly more injurious to
a female than to our sex.
4 2
Interestingly, the court identified itself as male, referring to "our sex,"
while expressly labeling women the "other."4
41. Historically, only four categories of defamatory statements were actionable per se.
These categories were (a) a criminal offense; (b) loathsome disese; (c) improper conduct
of a lawful business; and (d) a woman's chastity. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAw
OF TORTS 798-803 (1941). Some states have moved away from the per se designations in
recent years. For example, in Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991), the
court noted the trend toward limiting the per se category of slander. Id. at 1024 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 571-74 (1977)). Instead, the court noted, the per se
designation should be used to refer to publications where the defamatory character is "ap-
parent from the publication itself without reference to extrinsic facts." Id. Many states,
however, still abide by these four categories, seemingly unthinkingly. See Padilla v. Carrier
Air Conditioning, 67 F. Supp. 2d 650, 663-64 (E.D. Tex. 1999) (retaining per se categories
to analyze statement calling the plaintiff a "she-dog" who "slept around with a lot of men");
French v. Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 32 (Alaska 1996) (considering a sex-related statement
defamatory per se); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 311 (Mo. 1993) (holding
statements "actionable [per se] insofar as they impute adultery and unchastity" and citing a
Missouri statute); Borden, supra note 10, at 103 (noting that Georgia's use of the per se
standard specifically for defamation cases arising from statements of criminal conduct and
dishonesty in addition to chastity-related cases brought by women).
42. Sexton v. Todd, Ohio (Wright) 316, 320-21 (1833) (providing part ofjury instruc-
tions in a case where the defamatory language stated in many forms that plaintiff had a
"bastard child"). The court continued: "When believed, it places a female beyond the pale
of society. Seldom seen, they can neither fly from, nor outlive the disgrace, but must pine
and wither, and live under it, a loathed and filthy weed, whose touch is contamination."
Id.; see also McKean v. Folden, 2 Ohio Dec. Reprint 248, 1859 WL 5285 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1.
1859). In this case, the defamatory statement charged a man with bestiality. Id. at *1. The
court observed: "To charge a man with adultery, may exclude him from the society of
some, and not from that of others. The rule, thus modified, is no rule certain and fixed,
since each court must settle, in each case, what will, or will not, tend to exclude one from
society." Id. at *2, discussed in King, supra note 2, at 103.
43. Sexton, Ohio (Wright) at 320-21. In the case of Wilson v. Robbins, Ohio (Wright) 40
(1832), it was held not actionable to charge a man with adultery, though it was to charge a
woman with adultery, because of the tendency of such a charge to exclude her from soci-
ety. Id. at 40. This case asserts that there is a difference in the odium attached to the
slander where the charge of want of chastity is made of a woman, and when made of a
man, and that consequently there is a difference in the legal consequences that attach to
one making such a charge. Id at 40. Later courts have not always concurred. See Le
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Defamation law is also gendered in more subtle ways. One of
these relates to the public-private dichotomy that feminist scholars
have employed to help explain law's disparate treatment of, and im-
pact upon, the lives of women.44 More pervasive and long-standing
than the feminist critique of this dichotomy has been the perception
that public and private spheres of society are distinct, an idea that "is
imbued in legal philosophy and informs legal policy."45 In discussing
the divide between public and private, I focus on the different
spheres-sometimes called the public and the private, sometimes the
market and the domestic-that men and women, respectively, have
historically inhabited. 46  This dichotomy is also, to a lesser degree,
Moine v. Spicer, 1 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 1941) (acknowledging that "the charge must be
treated the same as if the plaintiff were a man instead of a woman; that there can in law be
no differentiation because of sex"); Morris v. Barkley, 11 Ky. (1 Litt.) 64, 1882 WL 943, *2
(1882) (holding that a charge of fornication is defamatory per se for both men and
women).
44. Philosopher Carole Pateman has said that "the dichotomy between the private and
the public . . . is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is all about." Carole Pateman,
Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE 281
(S.I. Benn & G.F. Gaus eds., 1983). This is related, of course, to the feminist mantra,
"'[t]he personal is political[,]' [which] is the central message of feminist critiques of the
public/domestic dichotomy." MOLLER OKoN, supra note 15, at 124; see also Ruth Gavison,
Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1992) (arguing that the pub-
lic-private dichotomy perpetuates gender inequalities).
45. KATHERINE O'DONOVAN, SEXUAL DIVISIONS IN LAw 8 (1985); see also HESTER EISEN-
STEIN, CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST THOUGHT 15-26 (1983) (examining the origins of the dif-
ferent spheres); NGAME NAFFINE, LAW AND THE SEXES 1-23 (1990) (discussing historical
male-oriented law); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women's Subordination and the
Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 151 (David Kairys ed., 1990)
(considering the different spheres of public and private and the oppression of women);
Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARTv. L.
REV. 1497 (1983) (discussing the political origins of the public-private dichotomy).
46. See Linda K. Kerber et al., Beyond Roles, Beyond Spheres: Thinking about Gender in the
Early Republic, 46 WM. & MARY Q. 565, 18-31 (1989) (considering the early construction of
gendered societal spheres); Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman's Place:
The Rhetoric of Women's History, 75J. AM. HIST. 9, 9-10 (1988) (noting early writings detailing
the separate spheres).
Any area in or upon which the law operates is or becomes "public" to some degree. In
this sense the public defines the private as that remnant of society with which it declines to
deal. Olsen, supra note 45, at 1509 (noting society's avoidance of regulation of family-
private life). The line is one between the regulated and the unregulated, and often also
one between grievances for which the law provides redress and those for which it does not.
Many scholars have acknowledged the definitional ambiguities associated with the public-
private dichotomy. See id. (discussing problems of the public-private sphere distinction);
O'DONOVAN, supra note 45, at 8 (noting that the dichotomy's existence relies on a societal
choice); Nicola Lacey, Theory into Practice? Pornography and the Public/Private Dichotomy, 20
J.L. & Soc'v 93, 103 (1993) ("[T]he private should be defined ... as that aspect of his or
her life and activity that any person has a right to exclude others from. The private in this
sense is . . . what the individual chooses to withdraw from public view.") (quoting IRIs
MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 119-20 (1990)).
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about the division between what the law considers within its purview-
regulated-and what it does not-unregulated.
Like many other feminists, I challenge this dichotomy, even while
embracing a concept of privacy and recognizing each individual's
need for personal privacy.17 In short, "privacy" has many connota-
tions. I argue that women's alignment with the private sphere under-
mines and limits them, and I criticize the ways in which the law
reinforces that association. At the same time, I argue that recognition
of a "right to privacy," particularly as that right is conceptualized and
manifested in tort law, is critical to solving a problem I identify in the
chastity-based defamation litigation: the law's normative relegation of
women to the private sphere.4 8
Because defamation law seeks to restore to the defamed individ-
ual something immensely personal and intangible, the person's repu-
tation, one might initially assume that defamation is a rare instance
where the law redresses a wrong within the private sphere or makes
private actions public. More careful consideration reveals that this is
not the case. Rather, the dominant conception of reputation views it
as a form of property and links it to a person's standing in the public
realm of society, the marketplace.49 Men have historically been pre-
sent in the marketplace in far greater numbers than women.5" This
The public-private dualism arises in many legal contexts, and its connotations vary.
One of these contexts relates to the free speech doctrine that distinguishes between public
discourse and private discourse. See David Kairys, Freedom of Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAw:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 45, at 265 (noting the relationship between free
speech and the public-private dichotomy). Another related context is the tort of privacy,
with its over-arching concern to protect from public disclosure or exploitation that which
invades the individual's personality or psychic space. RicHARD F. HlXSON, PRIVAcy IN A
PUBLIC SOCIEY. HuMAN RIGHTS IN CONFLICT 26-51 (1987). Interestingly, the two public-
private contexts noted here were considered compatible by the initial proponents of pri-
vacy law. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote in their germinal 1890 article that the
right of privacy did not prohibit publication of matters of "public interest," as the latter
concept was central to First Amendment philosophy. Id. at 34 (discussing Samuel D. War-
ren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890)). This compatibil-
ity is similarly reflected in the contemporary law of invasion of privacy. With respect to the
publication of private facts, the publication of so-called "newsworthy" items is exempt from
liability. See Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983).
47. See MOLLER OKIN, supra note 15, at 127-28 (noting also the work of Carole Pateman,
Linda Nicholson, Mary O'Brien, and Anita Allen).
48. In a similar vein, Bowman has observed that society has an expectation of women's
association with the private or domestic. Accordingly, men are less likely to challenge or
harass women when they are in places associated with women and their domestic responsi-
bilities. Bowman, supra note 19, at 526, 530.
49. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitu-
tion, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691, 693-99 (1986). For a perspective from an earlier era see Carroll
D. Clark, The Concept of the Public, 13 Sw. Soc. Sci. Q. 311 (1933).
50. Borden, supra note 10, at 99 (noting men's prominence in public life).
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sphere is not only a commercial marketplace, but also the realm of
public discourse, where democratic self-governance and shared politi-
cal destiny is debated and where decisions tend to be made based
upon commonly available facts and news.51
This prevailing conception of reputation, which Professor Robert
Post has written about as the property theory of reputation,52 is thus
not about the "private" at all.5 ' By protecting a person's reputation,
defamation law protects a form of intangible property, his stature in
the marketplace and the broader public sphere.54 Defamation law
treats an individual's reputation like the goodwill associated with a
business, seeking to protect it as property that the individual has
worked to develop or earn.55
51. Clark, supra note 49, at 316.
52. Post, supra note 49, at 693-99. Post also discusses the dignity and honor theories of
reputation, which are less prevalent in contemporary defamation jurisprudence. Id. at 699-
719.
The property-based concept of reputation is almost surely the most "masculine" con-
cept of the three that Post discusses. Some feminists have commented on the association
of property with men and masculine values, as well as the law's neglect of emotional inju-
ries that are associated with women. Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Struc-
tures in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 463, 469 (1998). That association is manifest also in
defamation law.
53. Defamation has not, for example, been commonly regarded as a remedy for the
thin-skinned, to protect them from a vague or uncertain psychic injury. SMOLLA, supra
note 30, § 1:4. Emotional distress damages, however, have long been available when at-
tendant to damages for reputational harm. After Time, Inc. v. Firestone, emotional distress
damages are available in defamation suits, even absent proof of reputational harm. 424
U.S. 448, 460-61 (1976).
54. Post, supra note 49, at 716-17. As I have discussed elsewhere, the reputation-as-
property concept is also evident in nineteenth-century sexual slander rhetoric. Indeed,
courts seemed to see women as competing in a market to marry, viewing their reputations
for chastity as critical capital in that market. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 971.
Professor Diane Borden has advanced a somewhat related thesis. She has argued that,
as between the twin torts of libel and slander, slander has always been more associated with
women:
[H]istorically, reputational harm for women has been manifested most frequently
in oral communications-slander-rather than written communications-libel.
In addition, because slanderous statements are presumed heard by relatively few
persons and are transitory in nature, the penalties for slander have traditionally
been less rigorous than those for libel, an offense viewed as more serious because
the message gets disseminated into the public realm of business and government.
In other words, the law of libel exists to address reputational harm in the public
sphere and thus exists mainly for men. The law of slander exists to address
reputational harm in a more limited private setting and thus, research suggests,
has existed mainly for women.
Borden, supra note 10, at 101 (footnotes omitted).
55. Like the law of trespass, for example, which also represents public regulation of
interaction between individuals, it provides a remedy when another causes damage to the
'chattel" that is the plaintiffs community (marketplace) standing. Without restoration of
good reputation, a person's valued ability to get the benefit of what he has worked for
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Although this property theory of reputation indicates that defa-
mation law evolved to respond to public sphere injuries and therefore
primarily to men's needs, defamation law has not been irrelevant for
women. Because a woman historically functioned almost exclusively
in society's private or domestic realm, her reputational concerns were
different.56 A woman's association with the private or domestic
sphere also meant that she was associated with that which was natural,
sexual, relational, and emotional. 7 Society historically sentimental-
ized women and valorized their roles as wives and mothers, valuing
them primarily, if not exclusively, on the basis of those roles.5" Society
defined a woman with her sexual virtue arguably being her most im-
portant attribute. 59 When a woman's reputation for chastity was im-
pugned, judicial rhetoric often reflected the property metaphor.
Nineteenth-century judges spoke of the injury with regard to her
"marriageability," envisioning a different market-that is, a private
one for marriage-in which a woman's reputation for sexual propri-
ety was her "stock in trade."6 ° As discussed further below, even at the
turn of the twenty-first century, defamation jurisprudence continues
to endorse the notion that a woman's sexual virtue, if no longer her
sole important attribute, still comprises a significant component of
her worth.61
would be damaged. Post uses the image of the craftsman who labors to achieve a good
reputation for quality workmanship. Post, supra note 49, at 693.
56. See Borden, supra note 10, at 101 (suggesting that, historically, women's reputa-
tional issues rested primarily in the private sphere).
57. See id. at 100 (discussing women's accepted role in the domestic sphere as accompa-
nied by views of women as embodying virtues associated with the home, and considering
the societal myth that women are best suited to family life). Men, on the other hand, were
and are associated with that which is rational, intellectual, economic, and physical.
MOLLER OKIN, supra note 15, at 110-11; see alsOJUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVEs BEFORE THE LAW:
CONSTRUCrING A FEMINISTJURISPRUDENCE 52-55 (1999) (critiquing the sameness-difference
debate that reinforces the public-private dichotomy); Chamallas, supra note 52 (discussing
gendered dichotomies in tort law, including economic and non-economic injuries, physi-
cal and emotional injuries, and property and relational injuries).
58. See King, supra note 2, at 66-68; Pruitt, supra note 1, at 971.
59. See King, supra note 2, at 66 (noting that a woman's chastity was essential for mar-
riage in nineteenth-century America).
60. Pruitt, supra note 1, at 971-72. Professor Post has also observed that while the com-
mercial marketplace is the model or prototype for reputation as property, the concept
finds application outside business relationships. That is, defamation law redresses harm to
character in other contexts that are not strictly related to business relationships because
the reputation as property concept views character "as 'the fruit of personal exertion"' and it
seeks to protect the investment, if you will, that one makes in his or her character. Post,
supra note 49, at 694.
61. See infra notes 293, 302-319 and accompanying text.
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Also echoing the divide between public and private spheres is the
defamation law dichotomy between public figures and private figures.
A product of the constitutional era of defamation law, this dichotomy
developed in the wake of the 1964 Supreme Court decision in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,62 which dictated a new fault requirement for
public officials.63 The new fault standard, called "actual malice," re-
quired proof that the defendant had published the statement either
with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for it.6 4 The Supreme
Court extended the requirement to public figure plaintiffs a few years
later.65 The Supreme Court reasoned that in order to give adequate
"breathing space" for the widespread circulation of ideas and truthful
speech the freedom of speech must protect some falsehoods.66 With-
out some protection of falsehoods, would-be critics of official conduct
might self-censor true statements to avoid lawsuits.
67
A private plaintiff remains free of the heavy burden of proving
actual malice. She still is obliged to prove some degree of fault by the
defendant, however, typically negligence with respect to the truth or
falsity of the statement.68 The Court's justification for distinguishing
between public persons and private persons rests in the belief that a
public figure has better access to the media to achieve "self-help," that
is, to get a false statement corrected and to get exposure for his or her
version of events, and because such a person arguably has assumed
the risk of greater media scrutiny.69
Deciding whether a defamation plaintiff is a public figure or pri-
vate figure is a complex inquiry with an unpredictable outcome. Most
courts require, as a threshold matter, that a public controversy exist
and that the plaintiff be involved in that controversy for the plaintiff
to be deemed a public figure.70 Other factors considered include the
extent to which the controversy existed prior to the defamatory
62. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
63. Id. at 264.
64. Id. at 288.
65. Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 154-55 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker,
389 U.S. 28, 28 (1967).
66. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 313 (1983) (quoting New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at
272).
67. Id.
68. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), discussed in Zimmerman,
supra note 66, at 314.
69. See Silvester v. Am. Broad. Cos., 839 F.2d 1491, 1496 (11th Cir. 1988) (noting pub-
lic figures' greater access to the media).
70. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 2.22.
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speech and the degree to which the plaintiff was voluntarily involved
in the controversy and his or her prominence in it.71
Although no perfect alignment exists between those functioning
in the private sphere and private plaintiffs who bear a lower burden in
proving their defamation cases, there is some correlation. To the ex-
tent that it does exist, courts have viewed many women plaintiffs in the
last forty years as private figures and, on that basis, have had to prove
only the defendant's negligence with respect to truth or falsity of the
offending statement.72 A few women have been deemed public
figures based primarily on their relationships with well-known men.73
Others have been more legitimately deemed public figures based on
their significant and voluntary involvement in a matter of legitimate
public concern.7 ' These female public figures have, of course, faced
71. Id. §§ 2.26, 2.30, 2.43.
72. Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (ignoring actress' possible
stature as a public figure); Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982)
(neglecting to discuss public status of a Miss America pageant participant); Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 448 (1976) (stating that wife of the heir to the Firestone fortune
was not a public figure for purposes of seeking divorce).
73. See Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1240 (5th Cir. 1980) (plaintiff
was Elvis Presley's former "No. 1 girl"); Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 209-10
(7th Cir. 1976) (finding that Johnny Carson's wife, like him, was a public figure simply
because she was married to him); cf Krauss v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 674 N.Y.S.2d 662, 662 (App.
Div. 1998) (finding that the ex-husband of Joan Lunden was not a limited public figure for
purposes of a story about their marriage and divorce).
In other cases, courts have quite correctly held the following female plaintiffs not to
be public figures: the employee at an amusement park who fed a swimming piglet from a
bottle, Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 249-59 (5th Cir. 1984); a nurse being investigated by
the state licensing authority, Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 987-98 (Utah
1992); a public school teacher who was accused of being "disorganized, erratic, forgetful
and unfair," Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Va. 1987); the former
wife of a university professor, even though she had written a guest editorial about men who
"unilaterally divorce their wives" and initiated a public confrontation with her former hus-
band as he was preparing to speak to a pro-choice group, Maguire v. Journal Sentinel, Inc.,
605 N.W.2d 881, 887 (Wis. App. 1999). See also Diane L. Borden, Invisible Plaintiffs: A Femi-
nist Critique on the Rights of Private Individuals in the Wake of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 35
GONZ. L. REV. 291, 294 (1999) (critiquing the way in which the public figure-private figure
dichotomy reinforces women's alignment with the domestic sphere); Ruth Colker, Pub-
lished Consentless Sexual Portrayals: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 35 Buw. L. REv. 39, 69-
74 (1986) (arguing that women are often incorrectly held to be public figures).
74. See Street v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981) (white prosecu-
trix in Scottsboro rape case, a racially charged prosecution from the civil rights era, was
public figure for purposes of a documentary made about the case several decades later;
court had no difficulty concluding that the case was a public controversy, calling her the
"pivotal character in the most famous rape case of the twentieth century"); Oaks v. City of
Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 (S.D. Ala. 1981) (librarian sued city library board, re-
ceived widespread press coverage both regionally and nationally, granted interviews on
request, and spoke at conferences about the conflict); Moffatt v. Brown, 751 P.2d 939, 939
(Alaska 1988) (finding that physician who sought appointment to state medical board was
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the greater burden of the actual malice standard.75
Other gendered observations regard the defamation law doc-
trines of truth and the fact-opinion dichotomy. I discuss these below,
in closer proximity to the cases that illustrate how they play out in the
context of women's chastity-oriented defamation suits.
II. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: ALL ABOUT CHASTITY
Until about the turn of the twentieth century, the vast majority of
women who turned to defamation law did so to get redress for state-
ments that impugned their chastity.76 A few female plaintiffs sued
based on statements that accused them of criminal behavior,77 but wo-
men-more often single than married 7 -most frequently sought to
a public figure). But see Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680, 680-81 (N.J. Super. 1988)
(finding that a college administrator was a public figure for purpose of advertisement that
suggested she could be reached at a "whoreline"); Montandon v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc.,
120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975) (finding that a minor television personality
who had written a book on "How to Be a Party Girl" was public figure for purposes of a
statement that she was a call girl); James v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 840 (N.Y. 1976)
(finding that a belly dancer was a public figure because she had welcomed the public to
her performances); Luper v. Black Dispatch Publ'g Co., 675 P.2d 1028, 1028 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1983) (public school teacher considered a public figure).
75. See supra notes 62-67 (discussing the actual malice standard required by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny where a public figure sues for defamation).
76. This was also true as long ago as the early days of colonial America. Mary Beth
Norton, Gender and Defamation in Seventeenth-Century Maryland, 44 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 9
(1987). Among the sexually hateful epithets targeted at women during that time were
"burnt Arse whore" and "ould Bawd," whereas those directed at men included "cheating
old knave" and "perjured rogue." Id. Norton argues that men were most concerned with
statements that impugned their integrity and trustworthiness in business, while women
brought actions based on allegations of sexual promiscuity. Id.
Shakespeare refers to sexual slander-in particular an allegation of adultery-as that
'whose sting is sharper than the sword's." WILL1M SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER's TALE act 2,
sc. 3, quoted in Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002).
77. See Stewart v. Howe, 1855 WL 5500, at *1 (Ill. 1855) (nine-year-old girl called "a
smart little thief"); Heller v. Howard, 1882 IL 10671, *1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1882) (statement
accused woman of stealing a parasol from merchant's shop); Fowlie v. Cruse, 157 P. 958,
959 (Mont. 1916) (female hotel owner accused of theft); Shaw v. Bender, 100 A. 196, 197
(N.J. 1917) (statement accused plaintiff of stealing a sign out of a window, a chair, a range,
and a gaslight); Douglass v. Tousey, 1829 WL 2282, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829) (offending
words were "you are a thief, you stole my wife's dress"); Coleman v. Playsted, 36 Barb. 26,
1861 WL 5339, at *1 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1861) (woman said to have "taken" tea, coffee, and
calico); Watkins v. Lawson, 81 S.E. 623, 623 (N.C. 1914) (words stated that plaintiff had
stolen from neighborhood stores); Briggs v. Byrd, 34 N.C. (12 Ired.) 377, 1851 WL 1206, at
*1 (N.C. 1851) (statement implied that woman stole biscuits, a felony); Thalhimer Bros. v.
Shaw, 159 S.E. 87, 88 (Va. 1931) (female shop girl accused of theft).
78. See King, supra note 2, at 73-74 (discussing New York and Indiana cases where a
majority of female plaintiffs were unmarried at the time of the slander). When married
women sued, it was often because the statement at issue charged them with having an
extra-marital affair. See Paschal v. Georgian Co., 158 S.E. 372, 372-73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931)
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rehabilitate their reputations for sexual virtue. Many judges believed
that maintaining the ideal that all "good" women-as opposed to
those who had "fallen"-were chaste was so important that chastity
was generally presumed.79 When a defendant attempted to prove the
plaintiff's "unchastity," courts considered this issue irrelevant to the
truth or falsity of the statement and therefore to liability."s Rather,
such arguments typically served to mitigate damages.8 " A "less chaste"
(newspaper reported extra-marital affair as reason why plaintiffs husband stabbed man);
Barker v. Green, 130 S.E. 599, 599 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925) (plaintiff was said to be the wife of
two men); Good v. Johnson, 83 N.E.2d 367, 367 (11. App. Ct. 1949) (statement that plain-
tiff had been sleeping with another man while her husband was in the army); Colby v.
McGee, 48 Ill. App. 294, 1892 WL 2480, at *1 (111. App. Ct. 1892) (statements that a mar-
ried couple's first child was that of another man charged with adultery); Young v. Fox, 49
N.Y.S. 634, 639 (App. Div. 1898) (publication "tended to show meretricious relations be-
tween a married woman and some other person than her husband"); Sheridan v. Sheridan,
5 A. 494, 495 (Vt. 1886) (defendant, plaintiff's husband, alleged adultery by stating: "[a]sk
your mother when she had the double shotted children [meaning twins], what strange bull
came along").
One libelous statement about the wife of a wealthy and well-known Toronto merchant,
to the effect that she had eloped with another man, apparently gave rise to suits against
multiple defendants, with the litigation extending over a number of years. See Smith v. Sun
Publ'g Co., 50 F. 399, 401 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1892) (statement reported "in a sensational and
somewhat jeering manner" that married woman had eloped with a man with whom she
had previously been openly intimate); Smith v. Sun Printing & Publ'g Ass'n, 55 F. 240, 240
(2d Cir. 1893) (wife of a well-known Toronto merchant was said to have eloped with an-
other man); Smith v. Matthews, 46 N.E. 164, 165 (N.Y. 1897) (reinstating $4000 jury ver-
dict, in part because of determination that defendant was grossly negligent in not
investigating truth of statement before publishing it); Smith v. Matthews, 47 N.Y.S. 96, 97
(Spec. Term 1897) (permitting the defendants, publishers of the Buffalo Express, to present
evidence of any past relations between the plaintiff and Rutherford, with whom she was
said to have eloped); Smith v. Matthews, 27 N.Y.S. 120, 121, 124 (Spec. Term 1893) (deny-
ing defendant's motion for a new trial based on the defendant's claim of a good faith
belief in the truth of the article). Just as contemporary defamation scholars have observed
that affluent persons are more likely to pursue defamation actions, the same was surely
true in the nineteenth century.
79. See Shilling v. Carson, 27 Md. 175, 188 (1867) (stating that "[e]very woman is pre-
sumed to be chaste and every man honest, until the contrary is shown"); Krulic v. Petcoff,
142 N.W. 897, 898 (Minn. 1913) (stating that in chastity actions, "[p]laintiff's character was
presumed to be good, and she did not need to allege that such was the fact"); Buckley v.
Knapp, 48 Mo. 152, 1871 WL 7709, at *5 (1871) (upholding jury instructions that stated
plaintiff was presumed innocent of the charges made against her). See also Bowman, supra
note 19, at 566 (discussing nineteenth-century notions of women as "chaste and delicate");
Borden, supra note 10, at 104-05 (discussing Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 49 N.E. 769,
770 (N.Y. 1898) (recounting Judge Bartlett's description of the defamatory language sug-
gesting that the plaintiff was a dancer on Coney Island as placing her in the "lowest clas-
ses . .. of fallen women").
80. See King, supra note 2, at 79 (describing courts' policies of allowing evidence of the
plaintiff's general character, but not allowing any specific evidence about the plaintiffs
chastity).
81. In Shilling, for example, the court noted that if the plaintiffs "general character"
had been undermined by the offending statement, the "defendant is not entitled, for the
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woman was viewed as deserving less compensation for the damage to
the property represented by her pre-slander reputation, 2 but she al-
most always won something. 3
Not only did a nineteenth-century woman benefit from the pre-
sumption of chastity, mostjudicial opinions placed her in a proverbial
gilded cage. The judicial language of the time tended to romanticize
a woman's traditional role as wife and mother.8 4 For example, in up-
purpose of diminishing the damages, to offer evidence of particular instances of miscon-
duct, because the plaintiff is required to be prepared only to maintain his general reputa-
tion." Shilling, 27 Md. at 176. However, because the "the subject matter of the suit be the
reputation of a woman for chastity she must be expected to be ready to vindicate her
character in that particular in which it is impugned. General reputation for a want of
chastity would certainly be admissible in mitigation of damages." Id. at 185-86; see also
Lanpher v. Clark, 44 N.E. 182, 183 (N.Y. 1896) (granting new trial so defendant could
present evidence of "specific acts of lewdness ... or ... of immorality" by the plaintiff);
Lanphere v. Clark, 29 N.Y.S. 107, 110 (Gen. Term 1894) (upholdingjury verdict and dam-
ages award, following remand, so that the defendant could offer evidence that impeached
the plaintiffs character for "truth and veracity, for sobriety and chastity" as relevant to the
question of damages).
In Smith v. Matthews, 47 N.Y.S. 96 (Spec. Term 1897), the court permitted the defen-
dant newspaper publishers to present evidence of any past relations between the plaintiff, a
married woman, and Rutherford, the man with whom she was said to have eloped. Id. at
99. The court noted that, by suing, the plaintiff had not opened "the door for an examina-
tion of all her past intercourse with every one, but she does invite an inspection of her
relations with Rutherford." Id. at 98. The court also noted if the plaintiff is "pure and
honorable" the defendants will suffer from offering this testimony, but "[i]f discreditable
and wanton, she ought not to be conspicuously exalted as a chaste woman and faithful wife
by a large verdict." Id. at 99-100; see also Regnier v. Cabot, 7 Ill. (2 Gilm.) 34, 41 (1845)
(stating that the court below allowed the defendant to prove the plaintiffs general bad
character for chastity in mitigation of damages); Hanners v. McClelland, 37 N.W. 389, 391
(Iowa 1888) (stating that "evidence of the real character of plaintiff for chastity was mate-
rial only as it affected the amount of her recovery"); Dinslor v. Fresh, 2 Ky. Op. 566, 1866
WL 5992, at *1 (1866) (stating that newly discovered evidence that plaintiff was pregnant
prior to marriage was relevant only to mitigation of damages in a case based on a statement
she was a "whore"); Krulic, 142 N.W. at 898 (stating that "[t]he bad character of a plaintiff
in a libel action may be shown in mitigation of damages") (quoting Lydiard v. Daily News
Co., 124 N.W. 985, 987 (Minn. 1910)).
82. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of reputation
as property).
83. See Redfearn v. Thompson, 73 S.E. 949, 950 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912) (affirming a ver-
dict of $500 in favor of plaintiff in a suit for slander despite evidence of general bad
character).
84. Indeed, courts were sometimes downright prudish in discussing the details of such
cases. The Georgia Court of Appeals wrote in Redfearn that it was "purposefully omit[ting]
any reference to the loathsome details of the very voluminous testimony in the case" and
stated only that the alleged defamation reported that plaintiff had committed both adul-
tery and murder. Id.
Speaking of motherhood, nineteenth-century courts were mixed on whether a state-
ment that a woman had procured an abortion was actionable, and the decision often
turned on whether abortion was legal in the particular jurisdiction. See Hatfield v. Gano,
15 Iowa 177, 1863 WL 145, at *1-2 (1863) (holding that because having an abortion was
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holding a defamation verdict against a newspaper that falsely charged
a married woman with eloping, the New York Court of Appeals char-
acterized it as "attack[ing], without the shadow of justification, the
good name of an innocent wife and mother, charging her, in effect,
with unfaithfulness to her marriage vows, and the abandonment of
her children." 5 Other judges were still more emphatic, and some-
times even poetic, in their proclamations of the imperative to protect
feminine virtue. One characterized the injury thus:
A female against whom the want of chastity is established is at
once driven beyond the reach of every courtesy and charity
of life, and almost beyond the portals of humanity. By com-
mon consent, such an imputation is everywhere treated as
the deepest insult and vilest charge that could be given or
inflicted upon the victim or her friends, and the bowie knife
or the cord must wipe out the stain, and punish the
offender.8 6
Until the turn of the century, a female defamation plaintiff rarely
worked outside the home. She was generally a wife and mother whose
reputation within her family, church, and community had been called
into question by the offending statement.8 7 The social circle at stake
for such a plaintiff was generally rather small, as she truly was a private
not itself a crime, a pregnant woman could not pursue a defamation action against the
person charging her of engaging in such conduct); Abrams v. Foshee, 3 Iowa (3 Clarke)
274, 1856 WL 201, at *1-2 (1856) (noting that allegations that a woman "takes medicine
and kills her children" were not per se actionable because "producing an abortion, before
the child is quick, is not now a crime in Iowa"); Widrig v. Oyer, 13 Johns. 124, 124 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding that statement that a woman had procured an abortion was
actionable).
85. Smith v. Matthews, 46 N.E. 164, 166 (N.Y. 1897).
86. Dailey v. Reynolds, 4 Greene 354, 355 (Iowa 1854) (emphasis omitted).
87. See Hardin v. Harshfield, 12 S.W. 779, 779 (Ky. 1890) (female plaintiffs marital
engagement was broken as a consequence of defamation); Olmsted v. Miller, 1 Wend. 506,
506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828) (young woman was charged with lewdness, which allegedly caused
her to be shunned by family and friends); Moody v. Baker, 5 Cow. 351, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1826) (marital contract broken as result of slander against plaintiff); Bradt v. Towsley, 13
Wend. 253, 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (slander against the plaintiff-calling her a prosti-
tute-resulted in a public scandal); Malone v. Stewart, 15 Ohio 320, 320 (1846) (court
stated that calling a female a hermaphrodite causes her to be shunned by society). But see
Fuller v. Fenner, 16 Barb. 333, 334 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1853) (slander against female plaintiff
affected her ability to earn a living as a "tailoress"); Wendt v. Craig, 17 N.Y.S. 748, 748 (Sup.
Gen. Term 1892) (plaintiff alleged that her business, running a hotel and restaurant, suf-
fered when she was accused of unchastity); Ross v. Fitch, 58 Tex. 148, 148 (1882) (husband
and wife alleged that statement impugning wife's chastity caused loss of customers from
their boarding house, as well as loss of students at school the wife was planning to start);
Kidder v. Bacon, 52 A. 322, 325-26 (Vt. 1902) (teacher alleged to have committed adultery
lost her employment and her home as a result).
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person. 8 She typically functioned entirely within the domestic sphere
of life, apart from the commercial marketplace, and it was the impact
of the offending statement on these "private relationships" that consti-
tuted her injury.89 Furthermore, such a woman usually sued on the
basis of a spoken rather than a written defamatory statement.9" The
offending statement was often attributed to what might be called a
neighborhood gossip 9' or to a former lover, estranged husband, or
someone associated with him.92 It was, however, rarely attributed to
any media source.
88. Certainly they were not public figures in the sense of that term's meaning in the
constitutional era of defamation law. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the defamation law dichotomy between public and private figures).
89. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 991-96 (discussing cases in which courts identified pecu-
niary injury on the basis of a woman's rejection by her family and social circle in the wake
of a defamatory statement).
90. Borden, supra note 10, at 101. Borden also notes that penalties for slander tended
to be lower than those for libel because the range of potential publication was smaller for
spoken words. Id.
91. See, e.g., Jackson v. Williams, 123 S.W. 751, 752 (Ark. 1909) (woman told neighbors
that female plaintiff was guilty of fornication); Wallace v. Dixon, 82 Ill. 202, 202 (1876)
(female plaintiff accused of having an illegitimate child); Iles v. Swank, 105 Ill. App. 9,
1902 WL 2259, at *1 (1902) (male defendant was said to have gossiped about the plaintiff
being "a lewd and unchaste woman" in the presence of a man who worked for the plain-
tiff's husband); Lovejoy v. Cooksey, 39 S.W. 514, 514 (Ky. 1897) (defendant said to "divers
and sundry persons" that he saw plaintiff and another "in the very act" and that he saw her
"putting down her clothes"); Williams v. Noel, 8 Ky. Op. 834, 1875 WL 11666, at *1 (Ky.
1875) (defendant "peeped through the keyhole" of plaintiffs house and saw her having
"illicit" sexual intercourse together with another person and then told many people in the
same town); Moberly v. Preston, 8 Mo. 462, 1844 WL 4000, at *1 (Mo. 1844) (defendant
claimed that he heard slanderous words from another); Miller v. Gust, 127 P. 845, 846
(Wash. 1912) (defendant, the former wife of man who purportedly committed adultery
with the plaintiff, made statements concerning the plaintiff in a previous divorce
proceeding).
92. See Veazy v. Blair, 72 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952) (plaintiffs friend's hus-
band stated that plaintiff was "running around with married men, waving at them, and
dating them on every occasion possible, and that she was a public whore"); Ivester v. Coe,
127 S.E. 790, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925) (prior to making his slanderous statement defendant
tried to kiss the plaintiff); Randall v. Randall, 225 Ill. App. 560, 1922 WL 2514, at *1 (1922)
(slanderous words calling plaintiff a "dirty whore" were spoken by former wife of plaintiffs
husband); Krulic v. Petcoff, 142 N.W. 897, 897 (Minn. 1913) (after plaintiff refused to
marry defendant, he threatened to ruin her reputation and told others that she was a
"whore" and "had been used by men many times"); Pier v. Speer, 64 A. 161,163 (N.J. 1906)
(after plaintiff refused defendant's "improper proposals," he threatened to "get even with
her").
Sometimes the offending statements were uttered to the plaintiff's husband, rather
than by him. See Schultz v. Sohrt, 201 Ill. App. 74, 1915 WL 2749, at *2 (1915) (defendant
stated to husband that plaintiff and husband were "whor[ing] around" before husband's
first wife was dead); Hammond v. Stewart, 72 Ill. App. 512, 1897 WL 2764, at *1 (1897)
(defendant told woman's husband that her last child was not his, but was the child of
another man); Dinslor v. Fresh, 2 Ky. Op. 566, 1866 WL 5992, at *1 (1866) (defendant
called plaintiff a "whore" and then proceeded to tell her husband that she "had to get a
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As already noted, early nineteenth-century courts spoke with a vir-
tually unanimous voice in expressing their outrage on behalf of sexu-
ally slandered women.9" Often a judge expressed his indignation
even more emphatically when he found himself unable to justify a
verdict or award for the plaintiff due to her failure to meet some legal
requirement, such as satisfaction of the special damages element.94
In spite of their frequent expressions of disappointment and out-
rage when a woman plaintiff lost her defamation suit, other judges'
assessments of defamatory meaning were sometimes the prime instru-
ment of the failed cause of action. In short, judges were sometimes
puzzlingly obtuse and excessively literal when it came to interpreting
allegedly defamatory statements. In Hemmens v. Nelson,95 for example,
the New York Court of Appeals found that, as a matter of law, it did
not "charge unchastity" in a woman to say "she 'entertained gentle-
men company at all hours of the night; that young men had been seen
leaving plaintiffs sleeping room at different hours of the night."'
96
The court opined that "a call upon a lady, at a later hour than that
prescribed by conventional rules, by gentlemen relatives or friends,
may be entirely innocent."97 The New York Supreme Court was simi-
larly quite narrow in its interpretation of a late nineteenth-century
statute that made statements imputing unchastity slander per se.98
The court once maintained that it did not follow, from a statement
that a woman was "not a lady" and worked as a cook in a "low" hotel,
doctor to cure her twice" meaning that she had two previous abortions); State v. Willers, 27
La. Ann. 246, 1875 WL 7074, at *1 (La. 1875) (defendant wrote to plaintiffs husband
charging her with adultery); Yencho v. Kruly, 197 N.W. 752, 752 (Minn. 1924) (defendant
was said to have "pour[ed] poison into the ear of plaintiffs husband").
93. For example, the Ohio Supreme Court in Malone v. Stewart in 1846 ridiculed the
common law in its protection of the reputation of a tradesman who was damaged to the
extent of a "few dollars and cents" while failing to respond to the "deepest wound" to the
feelings of a young woman. 15 Ohio 320, 321 (1846). Thejudge wrote that his decision to
treat sexual slander as actionable per se "reflect[ed] that same delicate and profound re-
spect for female character and feeling, which constitutes the proudest and dearest charac-
teristic of our people." Id. at 321-22.
94. See Pruitt, supra note 1, at 987 (discussing a New York judge's regret in not having
the power to provide justice for a female plaintiff charged with lewdness). These cases
were, of course, prior to the recognition that statements impugning a woman's chastity
constituted slander per se. Many such cases were decided in New York, where sexual slan-
der was made slander per se only in 1871. See also King, supra note 2, at 73.
95. 34 N.E. 342 (N.Y. 1893).
96. Id. at 346, 347.
97. Id. at 347.
98. Brown v. Moore, 35 N.Y.S. 736 (Gen. Term 1895). The relevant law discussed in
Brown v. Moore was Section 1906 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Chapter 219 of the Laws of
1871. Id. at 736-37. For a discussion of the jurisprudence leading up to the adoption of
this statute, see Pruitt, supra note 1, at 984-86, 990-1013.
[VOL. 63:401
Two CENTURIES OF TALK ABOUT CHASTITY
that she was unchaste.99 Ignoring the innuendo of unchastity that
other judges might have enthusiastically embraced in such a context,
the court said that "[w]ords in these actions are things, and, where
they are actionable per se, they must make a clear statement of the
actionable charge, and the court and jury will not guess and surmise
what might have been intended by the words that is not borne out by
the words themselves."100
Most courts were less dense when examining for defamatory
meaning statements that arguably impugned a woman's chastity. For
example, in Kedrolivanksy v. Niebaum,'0 t the plaintiff was called a "bad
woman" because she had not lived with her husband for two years
prior to his death and was said to have caused his death by virtue of
having "driven him to drinking."10 2 The woman to whom these words
were spoken, who knew that the plaintiff had an infant, testified that
she took these statements to mean that the plaintiff must have "been
untrue to her husband, or this little nursing child would not have
been around."0 3 The plaintiff argued, supported by such testimony,
that the defendant's statements signified and had been understood by
the hearer to mean "that the plaintiff had deserted her husband, and
had, prior to his death, led a dissolute and unchaste life."10 4 The
plaintiff also argued that the defendant's statements indicated she
"had become enciente [sic] while living apart" from her husband and
that "such bad conduct on the part of plaintiff drove her husband to
drinking and caused his death."'0 5 The court, recognizing the diffi-
culty inherent in the issue of defamatory meaning in chastity cases,
wrote, "The words are somewhat ambiguous, but charges of unchaste
conduct are seldom made in plain and direct words. They are usually
made by indirection or insinuation, and, however made, are slander-
ous when they convey to the minds of the hearers the meaning that
the woman was unchaste. 1
0 6
99. Brown, 35 N.Y.S. at 737.
100. Id.
101. 11 P. 641 (Cal. 1886).
102. Id. at 641. In addition, the defendant reported that the plaintiff's husband had
fallen while drunk and was killed. Id.
103. Id. at 642.
104. Id. at 641.
105. Id. "Enceinte" is French for pregnant. COLLINS ROBERT FRENCH DICTIONARY 362
(6th ed. 2002). It is not clear from the case report whether the plaintiff or the court
invoked this French term.
106. Kedrolivansky, II P. at 642. This case illustrates innuendo, a doctrine associated with
defamatory meaning. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 4:18. Innuendo refers to the use of infor-
mation beyond the statement itself (called colloquium) that makes the statement defama-
tory. Id. Statements defamatory on their face, without reference to additional
2004]
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Statements that gave rise to nineteenth-century sexual slander
suits were sometimes based upon assertions that the plaintiff was a
"bitch" or a "whore." The accusation that a woman was a "bitch"
wrought differing assessments of meaning from courts, with some
viewing the word as implicating unchastity and others not.1" 7 One
court said that while a statement that the plaintiff was a "damned
bloody bitch" was "reproachful and offensive," it did not "import[ ] a
charge of the want of chastity or an accusation of any offense."'10 8 An
allegation that a woman was a whore, on the other hand, was almost
information, were called libel per se; those defamatory only by reference to other informa-
tion were libel per quod. Id. §§ 7:22-23. The former enjoyed a presumption of damages,
while the latter had to be accompanied by proof of special damages. Id.
A number of years later but in the same vein, the Alabama Supreme Court in 1914
observed that when speaking about matters of sexual impropriety, people were rarely di-
rect. Allen v. Fincher, 65 So. 946, 947 (Ala. 1914). Arguably reflecting the refined sensibil-
ities associated with the American South, the court wrote: "The average man . . . in
speaking of an act of adultery, clothes the act in language which, while not so direct [as in
describing larceny or murder] is nevertheless rarely misunderstood." Id. at 948. Accord-
ingly, the court read a statement that a person saw a man and an unmarried woman "en-
gaged in a very dirty act or in a very black act," to mean that the person saw them in "an act
of sexual intercourse." Id.
In sharp contrast, a Florida court seemed especially dense about defamatory meaning
in a case that had arisen a few years earlier. In Hulley v. Hunt, 57 So. 607 (Fla. 1912), the
defendant and president of John B. Stetson University, expelled the plaintiff, a university
student, and told others that the reasons for her expulsion were "serious," and that if she
and her parents wanted the matter "kept quiet" they would not sue him. Id at 608. Fur-
thermore, the defendant stated that the plaintiffs parents knew that she "was not all right,
because she had trouble in a St. Augustine school, right under their eyes." Id. The defen-
dant also said that the plaintiff would be "ruined for life" if he told what he knew about
her. Id. The plaintiff claimed that these statements, through innuendo, implied that she
was guilty of immoral and improper conduct. Id. The court offered the following analysis:
A most careful and thoughtful reading of these alleged statements convinces us
that, whether taken singly or all together, they are not susceptible to the innu-
endo of fornication imputed to them by the pleader. There is nothing in them,
either with or without the colloquium, that bears upon the sex relation, except
the being out late at night with the boys; and this is so immediately qualified by
the showing of the early hour at which she returned, and by the further showing
that the speaker, as president of the institution, expected to reinstate her in the
school, that the remark clearly applies to an infraction of the rules or the proprie-
ties of this coeducational boarding school, and may not be contorted into an
imputation of unchastity.
Id.
107. See Craig v. Pyles, 39 S.W. 33, 33 (Ky. 1897) (holding that the words "[ s] he is a dirty
bitch; she has no character, and is no account," were not actionable and did not necessarily
imply that plaintiff was "a common prostitute, or [was] guilty of fornication or adultery");
Nealon v. Frisbie, 31 N.Y.S. 856, 856 (Super. Ct. 1895) (calling the plaintiff a "God damned
Irish bitch," while opprobrious, did not on its face impute unchastity and therefore was not
actionable).
108. Thormann v. Gormby, 1 Ky. Op. 461, 1867 AIL 7024, at *1 (1867).
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universally considered to impugn her chastity.10 9 Sometimes a court's
job of interpreting words like "bitch" and "whore" was made easier
because these terms were not the only derogatory communications
made by the defendant. Rather, a speaker frequently had offered ad-
ditional comments about a plaintiff that served to explain the use of
these expletives.110
Often the slanderous statement was crude; in some instances it
was opaque. Among those interpreted as undermining a woman's
reputation for chastity were: "she is a red light district woman";...
"[s] he was getting fat; some one had slipped up on the blind side of
her";112 that she "was seen at the chicken coop... with her clothes up,
with a man";113 that she and a man had gone "into the woods together
. . . under suspicious circumstances";' 14 that the speaker prevented
the plaintiff from marrying by notifying her fianc6 that "her child was
Nathaniel Griggs';... and that the plaintiff was said to be "like an old
109. See Pledger v. Hathcock, 1 Ga. (1 Kelly) 550, 1846 WL 1210, at *1 (1846) (holding
statement by defendant that plaintiff and a particular man were "whoring of it" was action-
able); Cox v. Bunker, 1844 WL 3964, at *2 (Iowa 1844) (holding that calling a woman a
"whore" was actionable per se); Williams v. Greenwade, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 432, 1835 WL
1920, at *1 (1835) (calling a woman a "drunken whore ... necessarily import[s] slander,
because it is impossible to be a whore without being guilty of fornication or adultery");
Steiber v. Wensel, 19 Mo. 513, 1854 WL 4613, *1-*2 (1854) (holding that a statement that
plaintiff and another woman were "whores," "carry on roguery and are rogues," and that
they "go to church and whore with the priests" were held to involve a charge of adultery
and therefore were actionable without alleging special damages); Noyes v. Hall, 62 N.H.
594, 1883 WL 4065, at *1 (1883) (holding that a statement calling a woman a "whore" was
actionable of itself and plaintiff did not need to allege or prove special damages); Courtney
v. Mannheim, 14 N.Y.S. 929, 929-30 (Brooklyn City Ct. 1891) (holding that the words
"[y]ou are an Irish whore" were slanderous per se given their "ordinary meaning").
110. In Walmsley v. Kopczynski, for example, the plaintiff said "I won't rent my house to
whores like you... [y] ou have two or three men running after you. The man that knocked
on the kitchen window was some one after you." 195 N.Y.S. 699, 700 (App. Div. 1922). In
Lanphere v. Clark, the defendant, pointing to the plaintiff as she stood in the door of her
hotel, stated "I will rout that bitch out of her den before Saturday night. They are a nest of
bitches." 29 N.Y.S. 107, 108 (Gen. Term 1894). The court did not seem to doubt that this
was defamatory given that it was spoken in addition to other language indicating that the
hotel she kept was a "resort of thieves and murderers." Id The court did not expressly
find that "bitch" imputed a lack of chastity; indeed, it did not opine on its meaning, but
rather only affirmed the lower court's ruling that the statements were defamatory. Id.
111. Tingle v. Worthington, 110 So. 143, 144 (Ala. 1926).
112. Emmerson v. Marvel, 55 Ind. 265, 267 (1876).
113. Lewis v. Hudson, 44 Ga. 568, 1872 WL 2450, at *1 (1872). The Lewis court found
the words actionable even under Revised Code Section 2696, which made it "actionable to
charge one with being guilty of any debasing act which may exclude him from society." Id.
at *3 (emphasis omitted).
114. Ivester v. Coe, 127 S.E. 790, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 1925). The court specifically noted
the undisputed testimony from two physicians indicating that plaintiff was a virgin. Id. at
793.
115. Richardson v. Roberts, 23 Ga. 215, 216 (1857).
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boaring sow, and a bulling cow" who had John Tilton "on top of [her]
once."
116
As one court explained, "words having a provincial meaning will
be used and understood in the province, the locality, with such mean-
ing, and if that meaning be an actionable one, the words, in the prov-
ince, will be, per se, actionable.""' 7
In struggling to construe accurately the language that gave rise to
these suits, courts sometimes recognized that it was appropriate to
read into a statement the apparent intent of the speaker.118 In one
such case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, considering whether the
sentence "she is a loose character, a bad character" '119 was defamatory,
observed:
It is said that these words do not expressly charge fornica-
tion, and here lurks the whole error of the Court below.
This is, in fact, a return to the old doctrine of mitior sensus.
They do charge it expressly, or not at all, unless wefalsify their
meaning by treating them too kindly. Such words are always un-
derstood as an assault upon the bright central virtue of a wo-
man's character, and it is almost always made in a covert
way-such is the norma loquendi. There is some natural and
instinctive decency still left, even in the most degraded char-
acters, that prevents them from speaking of this offense in
the most direct terms.'
20
Several courts recognized that a liberal interpretation of opaque state-
ments was appropriate because even those who defame may be decent
enough to have avoided speaking directly of such delicate matters.
12 1
Most courts did not shy from recognizing obvious innuendo.
The case of Matts v. Borba is of special interest because it involved
the interpretation and construction of a word in a language other
than English.1 22 Probably because of that feature, the court took inor-
116. Edgerley v. Swain, 32 N.H. 478, 478 (1855).
117. Emmerson, 55 Ind. at 270.
118. E.g., Vanderlip v. Roe, 23 Pa. 82 (1854); see also Brinsfield v. Howeth, 68 A. 566, 568
(Md. 1908) (discussing cases that analyze whether certain statements impugn chastity, such
as whether the word "match" means sexual intercourse).
119. Vanderlip, 23 Pa. at 82.
120. Id. at 84 (emphasis added).
121. E.g., id. at 82. In a similar but more overfly class-oriented statement, the court in
Lewis v. Hudson wrote: "[a] female guilty of the debasing act charged to have occurred at
the chicken coop, would find but little countenance among the low and vicious-since
even among them there is still generally left some remains of at least the form of decency."
1872 WL 2450, at *3 (Ga. 1872).
122. 37 P. 159 (Cal. 1894).
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dinate care with the issue of defamatory meaning.1 23 Both plaintiff
and defendant were Portuguese, and the offending statement was spo-
ken in Portuguese in the presence of persons who understood that
language.' 24 The statement included the word, "valhaca" which the
plaintiff claimed translated into "whore."' 25 The plaintiff offered testi-
mony that the word meant, "private whore; that is, a married woman
who is doing it on the sly" and that "the word is in common use
among the Portuguese to express a woman who has fallen so low as to
be common with every one, even without pay." 126 Others, referred to
by the court as "intelligent Portuguese" (apparently because some of
them had received tertiary education in Portugal), testified on behalf
of the defendant that the word means "knave, rogue, rascal, scamp,
scapegrace, crafty, cunning" and that it "never means unchastity. "127
They indicated the Portuguese equivalent of the English word
"whore" is "puta" and that the words "meretriz" and "prostituta" also
have that meaning. 28 The court accepted the defendant's argument
that the primary meaning of the word valhaca, "[s] tanding alone, as a
single word, [ ] does not imply want of chastity. "129 The court went on
to note, however, that like many English words whose dictionary defi-
nitions do not refer to chastity or the lack of it, the words may never-
theless be used to connote a want of chastity. 30
There are other words, however, corresponding very closely
to the word "valhaca," which, in their ordinary use, do not
refer to the subject of chastity, but yet imply qualities which
embrace chastity. The word "dishonest," for example, corre-
sponds very nearly, in its primary meaning, to the word
"valhaca." The first definition given by Webster is: "Wanting
in honesty; void of integrity; faithless; fraudulent; disposed to
deceive or cheat," while the third meaning given is "dishon-
orable; disgraceful; shameful; wanton; unchaste." So Shake-
speare used the word "honest" to denote chastity: "Wives may
be merry, and yet honest too." Even the word "occupy" was
formerly used to express sexual intercourse, though now
never so used. 3 '
123. See id. at 159-60 (analyzing the meaning of the Portuguese words spoken by employ-
ing expert testimony and comparing the words with their English equivalents).
124. Id. at 159.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 160.
130. Id.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court concluded that evidence sufficiently supported the jury ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff because it is "reasonably clear" that the
"word 'valhaca' is capable, without greatly distorting some of the defi-
nitions given to it, of expressing" a lack of chastity. 132
Late in the nineteenth century, as women began to move into the
public sphere in greater numbers, the demographics associated with
female defamation plaintiffs shifted. Women who worked outside the
home in the sorts of jobs then available to them-as nurses 133 and
teachers,' 34 for example-began to sue for defamation. Like the un-
married women, housewives, and mothers who had long availed them-
selves of defamation law, the vast majority of defamation claims by
these working women were based upon statements impugning their
chastity.' While the gossip that labeled women "whores" and
"bitches"'136 and made allegations about their private lives continued,
the demographic among defendants began to change. Suggestive and
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Wright v. Hilo Tribune-Herald, Ltd., 31 Haw. 128, 129 (1929) (newspaper
reported that nurse had left her post to go on vacation); Brady v. Chaffee, 163 Ill. App.
242, 243 (1911) (doctor called nurse many varieties of "whore" while standing on public
street); Copeland v. State, 300 S.W. 86, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1926) (nurse was said to have
committed adultery with one of her supervisors).
134. See Dixon v. Allen, 11 P. 179, 179-80 (Cal. 1886) (school teacher in training sued
newspaper publisher who reported that the teacher "by her conduct in class, by her behav-
ior in and around the building, and by her spirit... has shown herself tricky and unrelia-
ble, and almost destitute of those womanly and honorable characteristics that should be
the first requisites in a teacher"); Wertz v. Lawrence, 179 P. 813, 814 (Colo. 1919) (state-
ment that female schoolteacher "acted like she was crazy" and might kill defendant's
child); Hoover v.Jordan, 150 P. 333, 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915) (complaint to school board
called teacher "immoral," and said that she did not have "control over the school").
Interestingly, among contemporary defamation suits brought by women, teachers
have been well represented as plaintiffs. The statements on the basis of which they have
sued have frequently portrayed them as disorganized, vengeful, and even mentally unfit.
See Mendillo v. Bd. of Educ., 717 A.2d 1177, 1182 n.ll (Conn. 1998) (teacher called a
"liar," "incompetent," and "learning disabled"); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1023 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1991) (teacher accused of being in a homosexual relationship with another fe-
male teacher); Nodar v. Galbreath, 429 So. 2d 715, 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (teacher
accused of incompetence and of harassing students); Disend v. Meadowbrook Sch., 604
N.E.2d 54, 55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (headmaster of school wrote letters claiming that
teacher was "inappropriate in the way she dealt with the children"). For a discussion of
defamation cases regarding teachers, see Peter S. Crane, Note, Defamation of Teachers: Be-
hind the Times?, 56 FoRDHAm L. REV. 1191 (1988).
135. See Ketchum v. Gilmer, 115 Ill. App. 347, 1904 WL 1876, at *1 (1904) (female
teacher referred to another teacher as a "whore" and not "a decent woman"); Brinsfield v.
Howeth, 73 A. 289, 291 (Md. 1909) (plaintiff was said to be "a girl of loose character and
not fit to teach school").
136. See Hollman v. Brady, 233 F.2d 877, 877 (9th Cir. 1956) (statement that plaintiff
was an "ex-whore"); Haynes v. Phillips, 99 So. 356, 357 (Ala. 1924) (statement that plaintiff
was a "straight public whore or a straight public woman, meaning a whore"); Kaplan v.
Edmondson, 22 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. 1942) (plaintiff called a "damned bitch").
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sometimes outright salacious media statements about the social and
sexual propriety of individual women increasingly gave rise to defama-
tion actions in the age of yellow journalism.
III. TURN OF THE CENTURY: BRIDGING PRIVATE TO PUBLIC IN THE
AGE OF YELLOW JOURNALISM
The turn of the twentieth century was a time of profound change
for both women and the media. Women began to sever their "ties to
obligatory domesticity."1"7 More affluent women began to create
their own institutions, establishing "a separate space for themselves in
public life."' Middle-class wives visited shops and department stores.
Young, working-class women undertook paid work in factories, offices,
retail shops, and as domestic servants.139 Families supervised young
women less, affording them opportunities to mingle with men in of-
fices, stores, restaurants, street cars, sidewalks, and parks.' 40
While the media took note of these changes, its response was not
always respectful, in part because of the onset of the phenomenon
that became known as yellow journalism. Responding to stiff competi-
tion at a time of media expansion, newspapers in the late nineteenth
century "turned the high drama of life into cheap melodrama" to at-
tract readers by offering them a "palliative of sin, sex, and vio-
lence." 4 ' Indeed, Warren and Brandeis are believed to have written
their germinal 1890 article, The Right of Privacy,142 in response to the
137. Borden, supra note 10, at 100.
138. Id. (emphasis omitted). Borden notes, by way of example, the establishment of
women's universities, from Vassar in 1865 to Barnard in 1889. Id. Professors D'Emilio and
Freedman have observed that by 1900 a "noticeable number of young middle-class women
were enrolling in institutions of higher learning." JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN,
INTIMATE MArERs: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 190 (2d ed. 1997). They empha-
size that these educated women went on to create opportunities for other women, "as
faculty at women's colleges . . . social workers, businesswomen, or journalists." Id.
139. Borden, supra note 10, at 100. D'Emilio and Freedman have discussed shifting
patterns in women's employment. While domestic service accounted for sixty percent of
female employment in 1870, it had dropped to one-third by 1900 and to eighteen percent
in 1920. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 189. At the same time, women filled
more factory, office, and retail jobs as "the number of working women expanded far faster
than the growth of the female population." Id. Younger girls in particular held these latter
jobs. Id.
140. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 194.
141. EDWIN EMERY & MICHAEL EMERY, THE PREss AND AMERICA: AN INTERPRETATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE MASS MEDIA 244 (4th ed. 1978); see also Friedman, supra note 23, at 1114
(briefly discussing yellow journalism).
142. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 46, at 193.
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press excesses of the time.' 43 That article, considered the provenance
of the privacy tort that evolved in subsequent years, argued that the
gossip promulgated by the press was "potent for evil."'14 4 Warren and
Brandeis, echoing the paternalism of the time, articulated particular
concern about the consequences for women and the preservation of
"the sacred precincts of private and domestic life." '145
As a component of the media expansion associated with yellow
journalism, many publications began to include and target women in
their coverage. As Professor Carolyn Kitch observed, magazines, the
first truly mass medium in the U.S, achieved wide-scale distribution
only in the 1890s.' 4 6 In her study of female images on magazine cov-
ers, Kitch noted that in the first two decades of the twentieth century,
the idealized image of the new woman was often contrasted with her
evil opposite, the modern woman, a "beautiful but dangerous
wom[a]n who overpowered and used men."147 During World War I,
magazines portrayed women as angelic, men as strong. 48 After the
war, a woman was usually depicted as one of two seemingly opposite
but complementary images-on the one hand the sexually-free, asex-
ually-shaped flapper and on the other as a symbol of motherhood and
family happiness. 49 During World War II the "new woman" was one
who worked; later, however, the media emphasized that this "new wo-
man" preferred housework to paid work.'5 ° Kitch demonstrates that
World War II changed little in the media's limited portrayals of fe-
male types: "Between the 1930s and 1960s, the old stereotypes-the
'true' domestic woman, the all-American girl-pal, the sexually danger-
ous schemer, the vapid party girl, and the modern Madonna-resur-
faced fairly intact."''
Professor Gaye Tuchman has argued that, from its earliest his-
tory, fiction in women's magazines lauded women's domestic roles,
143. The history and myths surrounding the article are discussed at length in Randall
Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited: Privacy, News, and Social Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL.
L. REV. 1133, 1137-39 (1992).
144. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 46, at 196. In particular, they were concerned with
lowering standards of morality, and worried that such gossip "both belittles and perverts"
by "inverting the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations
of a people." Id.
145. Id. at 195.
146. CAROLYN KITCH, THE GIRL ON THE MAGAZINE COVER: THE ORIGINS OF VISUAL STE-
REOTYPES IN AMERICAN MASS MEDIA 14-15 (2001). By 1905 about 6000 magazines were in
publication, with a total audience of 64 million. Id. at 4.
147. Id. at 14.
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 184-87.
151. Id. at 185.
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denigrating those who worked outside the home.'5 2 She observes that
newspapers also encouraged "rigid treatment of sex roles." ' 3 During
the newspaper wars of the 1880s, competitors attracted female reader-
ship by providing a "segregated" women's page, separate from hard
news.1 54 On these pages, newspapers portrayed women as interested
in marriage, upper-class parties, food, and clothing, while ignoring is-
sues associated with less-privileged women.1 55 While content centered
on domestic topics, items written about and for women were some-
times "scandalous revelations of the activities of 'Society. '-156 Newspa-
pers added gossip columns in the early twentieth century.157 These
portrayed women "as the consorts of famous men, not as the subjects
of political and social concern in their own right.
1 5 s
Changes in a woman's social role and in her portrayal in the me-
dia around the turn of the century are reflected in the type of state-
ment that typically gave rise to a female plaintiff's defamation action.
Professor Diane Borden's empirical study of women's use of defama-
tion law provides a useful backdrop for considering some of the indi-
vidual cases. Borden analyzes the types of statements that gave rise to
defamation suits during two periods: 1897-1906 and 1967-1976.159 In
particular, she compares statements that were either about chastity or
immorality with those about the plaintiff's business or profession.
160
152. Gaye Tuchman, Introduction: The Symbolic Annihilation of Women by the Mass Media, in
HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MASS MEDIA 18, 25-28 (Tuchman et al. eds.,
1978).
153. Id. at 25. Among the magazines Tuchman studied were Ladies' Home Journal, Mc-
Call's, Good Housekeeping, Redbook, Cosmopolitan, True Story, Modern Romance, Glamour, and
Mademoiselle.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 28.
156. Id. at 26.
157. Id. at 26-27.
158. Id. at 28.
159. Borden, supra note 12, at 121-35; see also Diane Borden, Beyond Courtroom Victo-
ries: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Women and the Law of Defamation 75, 78-81,
96-97, 105-107, 110, 114, 116-117, 119 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Washington) (on file with the University of Washington Library) [hereinafter Beyond
Courtroom Victories].
While Borden's findings are illuminating, her study contains many self-acknowledged
problems. Borden, supra note 12, at 123 n.50. The West reporting system contains mostly
appellate level cases, many appellate and most trial level cases are not reported, other cases
get settled out of court, and most appellate case reports rarely display the affirmation or
reversal of damage awards. Id. While Borden displays the information in percentages, she
actually works with a small number of cases, a total of sixty-one for female plaintiffs. Id. at
125. Nevertheless, these constitute presumably all the available cases for the time periods
studied.
160. Borden, supra note 12, at 121-22.
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The former represents that which is traditionally feminine, and the
latter represents that which is traditionally masculine. 6
During the period between 1897 and 1906, only one female
plaintiff brought-and lost-a defamation action based on a state-
ment related to her business.' 62 In sharp contrast, some forty-two wo-
men sued in defamation based on statements in the immorality
category. 163 During the same period, sixty-four percent of these wo-
men prevailed in their actions based on statements impugning their
morality or chastity.164 Borden thus concluded that women tended to
161. Id. at 122. Borden hypothesizes that men's reputations are based on "honor"
whereas women's are based on "virtue." Id.
In both periods combined, she found that female plaintiffs brought approximately 61
of a total of 278 cases (21.9%). Id. at 125. Borden found that female plaintiffs brought
more than twice as many defamation actions in the earlier period, with 43 from 1897-1906,
and only 18 from 1967-1976. Id. at 124. Female plaintiffs in the earlier period predomi-
nantly sued individuals, with slightly less than a quarter suing newspapers. Id. at 131. Dur-
ing the later period, 50% of female plaintiffs sued individuals, 27.8% sued newspapers or
periodicals, and the remaining 16.7% sued non-media organizations. Id. One case was
brought against both a media defendant and an individual, which accounts for the remain-
ing 5.5%. Id. Consistent with the type of defendants, during the earlier period 72.1% of
defamation actions were for slander alone, as compared to the later period where only
16.7% of the cases were for slander alone, and 11.1% were for slander and libel. Id. at 132.
162. Id. at 133-34. Outside the nine-year period Borden studied, more than one woman
sued in defamation based on a statement about her business or profession. See Moore v.
Gregory, 34 S.E.2d 624, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1945) (damage to plaintiff's career as court
reporter and public stenographer); Kirkland v. Constitution Publ'g Co., 144 S.E. 821, 821
(Ga. Ct. App. 1928) (damage to plaintiff's career as public official and oil inspector);
Brown v. McCann, 138 S.E. 247, 248 (Ga. Ct. App. 1927) (damage to plaintiff s career as
public school teacher).
163. Borden, supra note 12, at 133. Of the 51 defamation actions women brought based
on allegations of immorality in both periods, about two-thirds (32) involved "want of chas-
tity and adultery." Id. at 125. Six other cases involved "disorderly house," five fornication,
incest or rape; four prostitution; two immorality in general; and one each abortion and
bigamy. Id. Analyzing the data from another perspective, Borden found that during the
earlier period, women brought forty-two of fifty-four (nearly seventy-eight percent) of all
actions based on statements about immorality. Id. at 126.
164. Id. at 133. Borden calculated the success rate for female plaintiffs by adding to-
gether the number of plaintiff judgments affirmed, defendant judgments reversed, and
judgments for the plaintiff. Id. at 132-33 n.54 In the later period, female plaintiffs lost
seventy-eight percent of business actions while winning fifty-six percent of immorality ac-
tions. Id. at 134.
Borden also observed a discrepancy in damages between male and female plaintiffs.
Id. at 134-35. Between 1897 and 1906, female plaintiffs were awarded damages more often
than male plaintiffs, but the damages tended to be for half the amount the males received.
Id. at 134. The situation worsened in the period from 1967 to 1976, when male plaintiffs
were awarded damages five times as often as female plaintiffs and received eight times the
amount of damages as female plaintiffs. Id. at 135. Borden hypothesized that this differ-
ence stems not only from the higher earnings of men, but also from courts' predilection
that a woman's sexual virtue-her "most prized, albeit culturally constructed possession...
was worth far less than a man's honor in the marketplace." Id. at 140-41. Another factor
likely influencing the significantly lower damage awards for women, especially in the ear-
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sue in defamation "based on their private-sphere social roles, cultur-
ally coded in terms of their sexuality (wives, mothers, housekeep-
ers)."165 Borden further concludes that the law reinforced these "uni-
dimensional cultural assumptions about women." '66
Correlating with the media images of women that were typical of
this time were publications that gave rise to a number of defamation
cases brought around the turn of the twentieth century. Reflecting
the same paternalism Warren and Brandeis exhibited in their article
on privacy, judges of the time responded with particular concern for
the chastity of young women, which they valorized in highly idealized
terms. In McFadden v. MorningJournal Ass'n,a6 7 for example, the court
addressed the defamatory meaning of an article that portrayed the
plaintiff and another young woman, in the words of the court, as en-
gaging in "ridiculous, immodest, and forward behavior. '"168 The story
was titled Row, Nell! Pull, Mame! Two Girls Row a Race for a Beau with a
Handsome Face. Prospect Park Lake Turned into a Cupid's Course, with a
Fringe of Femininity.'69 The story portrayed the plaintiff, Nell, compet-
ing with another woman in a rowing race for the affections of one
Frederick Bohn. 7 ° The newspaper facetiously labeled it the "Cupid
cup" and referred to it as "an aquatic love chase" in which the two
women demonstrated "their love for this perfectly proper Don
Juan.' 17 ' Nell was said to have "pulled till the handles of the oars
burned her pretty pink palms."' 72 Following publication of the arti-
cle, "'evil-minded persons"' sent the plaintiff mail ridiculing her and
"'subjecting her to indecent suggestions, proposals, and insults.'" 73
The court had no difficulty concluding that the article was defam-
atory because even a "casual reading" demonstrated that it "expose [d]
the plaintiff to contempt, ridicule and obloquy and ... cause[d], or
lier period, was many courts' determinations that reputational harm from slander was not
as great as the harm from libel. Borden, supra note 10, at 101.
165. Borden, supra note 12, at 133-34.
166. Id.
167. 51 N.Y.S. 275 (App. Div. 1898).
168. Id. at 280.
169. Id. at 276.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 277. The plaintiffs attorney argued that the plaintiff had received "hundreds
of indecent or immoral missives, sent to her by degraded men, who had formed an esti-
mate of her character by reason of the article published by the defendant." Id. In terms of
other damages suffered, the plaintiff said the article had "caused her to cry, and had kept
her from sleeping and eating and going into society, and made her feel as if she were of no
account, and that that feeling had continued until the trial." Id. at 279.
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tend[ed] to cause, her to be shunned or avoided."' 7 4 The court
found that the article imputed to her behavior
such as no respectable girl could be guilty of without meet-
ing the condemnation of every right-minded man and wo-
man, and gives rise to the suggestive suspicion that the
woman guilty of such behavior was loose in conduct and
ready for adventure, without regard to the becoming mod-
esty of a woman. The delineation of two young women en-
gaged in a muscular contest for the affection of a lover might
have passed current in the Middle Ages, but it is not in accor-
dance with the more refined ideas of the nineteenth century,
no matter what may be the woman's station in life. There
can be no question that the article is libelous per se. 1
75
The court's ready conclusion that a young woman, whatever her
class, would be shunned and ridiculed as a result of a report that she
had pursued a young man-not to mention that she had engaged in a
muscular pursuit-is somewhat comical by contemporary standards.
The ability of such a suggestion to defame may have seemed obvious
in light of nineteenth-century sensibilities, but the court's outrage on
behalf of the young woman seems excessively paternalistic and senti-
mental to twenty-first century eyes. 176 It also makes one puzzle at the
change in societal attitudes that would so readily see this language as
imputing unchastity, when language that a woman had "entertained
gentlemen company at all hours of the night" had not done so less
than two decades earlier. 77
The decision in Gates v. New York Recorder Co.,' 78 cited in McFadden
and decided the same year, expressed similar sentiments about the
exalted place of womanly virtue. The New York Recorder reported that
the plaintiff, a "dashing blonde, twenty years old," who was "said to
have been a concert-hall singer and dancer at Coney Island"'179 had
174. Id. at 280.
175. Id. (citing Gates v. New York Recorder Co., 49 N.E. 769, 770 (N.Y. 1898)).
176. For another example of similar judicial sentiment, see Stafford v. Morning Journal
Ass'n, 22 N.Y.S. 1008, 1012 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1893). There the defendant published an
advertisement that read: "LeHuray Sisters; Blanche, Stella, and Allien. Just from Paris.
Massage, French style. Love secrets. How to get a husband. Inclose stamp. Valuable infor-
mation for ladies by aid of cards. LeHuray sisters, 444 2nd Ave., Mt. Vernon. N.Y." Id. at
1009. The court had no difficulty upholding the jury verdict that the statement was defam-
atory to the plaintiff, one of the listed women. Id. at 1012. The court may have been
influenced by the fact that a number of men had written to the women and proposed lewd
relationships in the wake of the story's publication. Id. at 1011.
177. Hemmens v. Nelson, 34 N.E. 342, 346 (N.Y. 1893).
178. 49 N.E. 769 (N.Y. 1898).
179. Id. at 769.
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secretly married a 75-year-old man who was "fond of pretty women."18
In fact, the plaintiff was a thirty-five-year-old school teacher, who not
only had never been on any stage, but had never even been a specta-
tor in a concert hall. s ' Three days before the newspaper published
the story she had married a "reputable citizen of Brooklyn" whose age
the court did not reveal.'8 2 The court did not hesitate to hold the
newspaper report libelous per se and, indeed, considered the result-
ing injury so grave as to opine that it could not even be "measured by
mere money." 83 The court explained the obloquy associated with
places such as Coney Island as follows:
When the general public read of the plaintiff that she had
been a concert-hall singer and dancer at Coney Island, they
... [associated her] with that class of cheap and disreputable
entertainments, which flourish at the western end of the is-
land, known as 'concert halls,' the character of which has
been fully disclosed in this record. To say that the words
published of the plaintiff in the community where the char-
acter of the concert hall is well known were not calculated to
hold her up to disgrace and disrepute, and to charge her
with unchaste conduct, is to reach a conclusion both illogical
and unjust.
To make this false and serious charge concerning a lady who
... hoped.., to deserve the friendship and respect of virtu-
ous women and honorable men, was to advertise her as no
better than a woman of the pave. Such a charge, if believed,
holds a woman up to the public gaze, not only as unchaste,
but as belonging to one of the lowest classes of the great army of
fallen women.' 84
The majority's opinion expressed outrage that the plaintiff,
whom it described as a woman of virtue, should be characterized as a
"fallen woman."' 5 In so doing, the court implicitly endorsed a sort of
180. Id.
181. Id. at 770. Based also upon findings that the publication was entirely false and that
the defendant knew it was false, the court upheld the $3000 jury verdict and award. Id. at
769-70.
182. Id. at 769-70.
183. Id. at 770.
184. Id. at 769-70 (emphasis added). The court distinguished the Coney Island dance
halls from other stages, which "good and noble women have graced" because the latter are
"entirely without application" to this case where there is an explicit charge that the plaintiff
is reported to have been a concert hall singer and dancer at Coney Island, "which can
mean but one thing, as already pointed out." Id. at 770.
185. Id.
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Madonna-whore dichotomy with respect to women.'1 6 That dichot-
omy was also evident in a number of late nineteenth-century sexual
slander cases,18 7 and it was reflected in the media's portrayals of the
new woman on the one hand, and her evil opposite on the other.'
Justice O'Brien, dissenting, did not view Coney Island's dance
halls quite as unfavorably as did his colleagues.' Nor did he view
women's roles in society as so universally exalted. 0' He observed,
perhaps too optimistically, that "[w] omen are now engaged in most of
the professions and occupations of life," including the stage.' 9 ' Call-
ing them an "indispensable part of all pubic amusements and enter-
tainments," he insisted that it was no more injurious to a woman than
to a man to say that she was an entertainer.
9 2
When we consider how society is made up in these days, and
the numerous occupations in which women are engaged, it
would be impossible to hold that loose morality is necessarily
imputed to a female from the fact that she is or was a con-
cert-hall singer or dancer. In all civilized countries it has be-
come an art or profession in which women earn a living
without necessarily being disgraced. * * * It could be writ-
ten and published to-day of many good and devoted women
that they were once upon the stage, and yet I think that no
186. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 133 (noting that "[t]he 'pure' woman
and the 'fallen' woman represented two sides of the same sexual coin"). They explain that
the "fallen woman" image emerged in the mid-nineteenth century as the antithesis to the
pure woman, the new ideal of womanhood. Id. A "fallen woman" endured a terrible
stigma. Id. at 70. One novelist of the period wrote that a virtuous woman became, "'when
once fallen, the vilest of her sex.'" DAVID BRION DAVIS, HOMICIDE IN AMERICAN FICTION,
1798-1860: A STUDY IN SOCIAL VALUES 219 (1957) (noting NED BUNTLINE, THE B'HOYS OF
NEW YORK: A SEQUEL TO "THE MYSTERIES AND MISERIES OF NEW YORK" 51 (n.d.)); see also
ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN 207 (1989) (discussing the divi-
sion between mother and whore, with the virgin being the potential mother and the sexu-
ality of a woman actualized in the image of the whore).
187. McFadden v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 51 N.Y.S. 275, 280 (App. Div. 1898); Stafford
v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 22 N.Y.S. 1008, 1012 (Gen. Term 1893). Courts then, however,
rarely categorized a woman as a "whore"; they simply contemplated the category of the
"whore" for comparison sake, generally presuming the chastity of all female plaintiffs. See,
e.g., McFadden, 51 N.Y.S. at 280 (implying a difference between respectable women and
"loose" women). But see Beggarly v. Craft, 31 Ga. 309, 315 (1860) (contrasting daughters
who grow up without restraint to the "modest maiden" in the context of a sexual slander
action).
188. See supra notes 146-151 (referring to Kitch's analysis).
189. Gates, 49 N.E. at 771-72 (O'Brien, J., dissenting).
190. See id. at 771 (emphasizing that under prior case law statements imputing unchas-
tity to a woman were not actionable unless special damages were shown).
191. Id.
192. Id,
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one would suppose that it imputed to them anything in the
slightest degree disgraceful.1" 3
Justice O'Brien thus spoke like an early "equality" or "sameness" femi-
nist, espousing an ideology associated with that strand of feminism.19 4
He was also far less paternalistic toward women, describing them as
less fragile, less idealized, less needful of protection, and more auton-
omous than had his colleagues. 95 Still, his opinion implied a clear
dichotomy between good and devoted women on the one hand, and
those of questionable morality on the other. He thus engaged in the
sorts of judgments about worthiness that were increasingly being
made by most judges at the turn of the century, as a woman's chastity
was less frequently presumed than it had been a few decades earlier.
Ervin v. Record Publishing Co.19 6 is another turn-of-the-century def-
amation case that illustrates the media's scandalous portrayals of wo-
men at a time they were bridging the private and public spheres.1 97
Like McFadden and Gates, the story in Ervin hinted at social impropri-
ety.1 98 It also, however, suggested that the plaintiff engaged in illicit
sexual activity. 99 The plaintiff, Mabel Clare Ervin, was ajournalist 200
for the defendant newspaper, the Sporting Edition.2°' She sued when
the daily paper published a story about her supposed relationship with
193. Id.
194. See BAER, supra note 57, at 28-30, 54-55 (describing sameness and difference theo-
ries in feminist jurisprudence); Deborah L. Rhode, Definitions of Difference, in THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 197-212 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) (analyzing the
use and disadvantages of a sexual difference framework in law).
195. Gates, 49 N.E. at 771. Justice O'Brien's disavowal of the law's paternalism also ap-
plied to the New York legislature's decision almost thirty years earlier to deem slander per
se statements that impugned a woman's chastity; he apparently disagreed with that deci-
sion. See id. (citing and discussing the New York statute).
196. 97 P. 21 (Cal. 1908).
197. Id. at 21-22. Other cases also illustrate the early twentieth-century press's use of
satire in salacious and hateful ways. In Beeson v. H.W. Gossard Co., a woman hired by a
corset company was reported to have modeled corsets at the American Medical Association
Meeting. 167 Ill. App. 561, 564 (1912). A newspaper characterized her a "living Venus"
and suggested she appeared indecently clad. Id. In Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, a newspa-
per described the Cherry Sisters, female entertainers, in a review as "strange creatures with
painted faces and hideous mien." 86 N.W. 323, 323 (Iowa 1901). The article stated that
the "mouths of their rancid features opened like caverns, and sounds like the wailings of
damned souls issued therefrom." Id. The report described one sister as a "capering mon-
strosity," one as a "frisky filly," and the other as an "old jade." Id, The court held the
report privileged as concerning a public performance, and noted that the newspaper's use
of ridicule, sarcasm, and exaggeration was justifiable in this case. Id at 325.
198. Ervin, 97 P. at 22 (noting that the article implied that the plaintiff was a member of
the underworld and that she engaged in indecent activities).
199. Id.
200. Id. (describing Ervin as "engaged in the business of writing for newspapers").
201. Id. at 21-22.
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a well-known "Chinese prize fighter."2 °2 The story, which referred to
the plaintiff as "Queen Mab,"9 3 read, in relevant part:
Before he left home, he wired "Queen Mab," asking her to
meet him at the depot at 7 a.m., but the hour was too early
for her majesty, and Ah Wing came into town with nobody to
welcome him. He was dressed in his bulliest and brassiest
Chinese costume, consisting of a pair of pale blue flowered
trousers, a dark blue broadcloth jacket, and a black pot-
shaped chapeau surmounting by a cute little rosette of red
silk. The first time he was here he had on his second best
suit. The queen interviewed him and made the biggest hit of
her life. This time Ah Wing wore his best clothes because-
well, because he wanted to look well in the eye of her maj-
esty, and he never dreamed that she wouldn't be at the de-
pot to meet him. He forgot that one of the prerogatives of
royalty is to do as you please, and Ah Wing was sad as he
came into the Record office to find Queen Mab. There are
some things which are better left unsaid, so it is best to pass
over the meeting between the queen and her humble sub-
ject. Some things are too sacred for mere words. 20 4
The plaintiff alleged that these words suggested, and were under-
stood as meaning, that
[p] laintiff was a person of low character, a sweetheart and
boon companion, and the consort of the said Chinaman
prize fighter, that she associated with him, was in the habit of
202. Id. at 22.
203. Id. at 21. The newspaper's use of this title may imply a reference to Shelley's poem
of the same name-that poem was once censored in Britain. See Robert C. Post, Cultural
Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297,
306 (1988) (citing Regina v. Moxon, 4 St. Tr. N.S. 693 (Eng. 1841)).
204. Ervin, 97 P. at 22. Not only is sexism in relation to the plaintiff apparent in publica-
tions such as this one, so is racism in relation to the "Chinaman" fighter. See id. at 21-22.
In Stevens v. Kobayshi, another case in which a publication demonstrated both sexism and
racism, the Japanese-American News reported that the plaintiff had formerly been "'a Chi-
nese doctor's concubine'" and that she "'surely is no good or worthy of teaching; she is not
decent.'" 128 P. 419, 420 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912). The court, analyzing the meaning of "con-
cubine" relative to the word "mistress" found sufficient evidence to support the jury's ver-
dict for the plaintiff that this statement had defamatory meaning. Id. The court also
discussed the meanings of these words relative to the Japanese word "mekake" which it
does not define. Id.
Racism is also evident in many early defamation cases from the American South. See,
e.g., Castleberry v. Kelly, 26 Ga. 606, 609 (1858) (finding that statement, "'Negroes have
been with your wife"' was defamatory as "it is disgraceful to be on terms of social inter-
course" with slaves). Cases, primarily from the Northeast, in which a woman was called an
"Irish whore" or an "Irish bitch" also evince the racism of that time and place. See, e.g.,
Courtney v. Mannheim, 14 N.Y.S. 929, 929 (Brooklyn City Ct. 1891); Nealon v. Frisbie, 31
N.Y.S. 856, 856 (Sup. Ct. 1895).
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meeting him socially and intimately, and would have met
him at the train, except that it was too early.
20 5
The plaintiff concluded by alleging that the charge was false and
scandalous, and that it imputed to her a "low and base character, with-
out shame or self-respect. "206 The appellate court rather summarily
upheld the jury's finding that the article was defamatory, saying that
the plaintiff had properly pleaded the innuendo that rendered defam-
atory the otherwise ambiguous statement.
2°7
Ervin, like many other cases of the era, well illustrates the phe-
nomenon of yellowjournalism. In particular, it demonstrates the ways
in which women often bore the brunt of scandal generated by such
journalistic practices, particularly when that scandal was sexual in
nature.208
The 1910 case of Barth v. Hanna2 °9 shows that female plaintiffs
continued to sue individuals, not only media outlets, for defamation
based on their sexual propriety.210 Amolia Barth, a school teacher in
Carroll County, Illinois, brought suit against her employer, Stephen
Hanna.21' Barth claimed that Hanna's defamatory statement caused
her no longer to be able to teach in the local school district.21 2 Specif-
ically, Barth alleged that Hanna had made the following statement:
205. Ervin, 97 P. at 22. Indeed, the court stated the publication "might readily be under-
stood by any one reading it as implying that the plaintiff was a member of the underworld,
familiar with the Chinese prize fighter, and upon such terms of intimacy with him that
when they met things took place between them that were not proper for publication." Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 22. Among the additional facts pleaded that provided the innuendo was in-
formation that the plaintiff was "an unmarried woman of marriageable age" who was
known as "Mab Ervin" and that at the time of the publication she was employed by the
Record as a writer. Id.
208. See id. (describing the negative effects the defamatory statement had on the plain-
tiff). Stories of women who had fallen because of rough living-even when it wasn't sex-
related-also sold newspapers and thus also made for tantalizing stories in the age of yel-
lowjournalism. In Butler v. News-Leader Co., Annie Butler sued the News-Leader Company
based on a story that portrayed her as a drug addict who had committed theft in order to
supply her addiction. 51 S.E. 213, 215 (Va. 1905). Butler, a "famous rifle shot," had ap-
peared under her maiden name, Annie Oakley, with a Wild West show. Id. at 214. The
story was headlined "Annie Oakley at the Bottom of Toboggan. Once Famous Beauty and
Crack Shot of the World Winds up in Police Court for Petty Theft." Id.
209. 158 Ill. App. 20, 1910 WL 2308 (1910).
210. Id. at *1. In addition to Barth, there are other cases in which the chastity of a
school teacher was impugned by a statement. See, e.g., Hewett v. Samuels, 272 P. 703, 704
(Idaho 1928) (statement that the plaintiff-teacher had engaged in immoral acts); Kidder v.
Bacon, 52 A. 322, 326 (Vt. 1902) (statement that the plaintiff had been caught in the act of
adultery).
211. Barth, 158 Ill. App. 20, 1910 WL 2308, at *1.
212. Id.
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She followed the boy, a pupil in the public school, around
like a boaring sow would follow a boar .... She is a catch-
colt .... She is a bastard and has no rights in law .... She
slept with the boy .... She slept with Virgil McCombs [a 13-
year-old male student of plaintiffs] .... We could not use
her on account of her immorality .... She was expelled
from another school because she got to fooling around with
some big boys .... I told her she would be a pretty thing to
employ in a school room if there was a lot of big boys... she
would just make a plaything for them.2 13
Affirming the jury's verdict,214 the appellate court concluded that
such slander was actionable per se without proof of special damage
because the words might impair one's credit or reputation within
one's profession.215
Barth v. Hanna is one of several cases of this era in which courts
recognized this interrelation between private and public. These
courts acknowledged that a statement which undermined a woman's
reputation for chastity-something quintessentially private-could
have an impact on her professional reputation-something quintes-
sentially public. In another case, for example, a court held that a
statement to the plaintiff's employer that she "did not act like a 'lady"'
injured her in her "trade or profession," when it caused her to lose
her job.216
213. Id.
214. Id. at *4. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2000. Id.
215. Id. at *3. Kidder v. Bacon is also interesting in this regard because there the plaintiff
also linked her public role as a school teacher to this private matter with regard to which
she had been defamed. 52 A. 322, 324 (Vt. 1902). The plaintiff in Kidder alleged that the
charge of adultery was spoken "in her character as a school teacher" and the court permit-
ted her to offer evidence of her "reputation and standing as a teachd' prior to the defama-
tory statement. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, courts sometimes analyzed these public-
private "cross over" slander actions more as ones in which a plaintiff was injured in her
profession rather than as "chastity" cases. See id.; Barth, 158 II. App. 20, 1910 WL 2308, at
*1, 4.
216. Stanley v. Moore, 173 S.E. 190, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934). To the contrary, in Porak
v. Sweitzer's, Inc., the court held that the plaintiff, who made her living as a bookkeeper, did
not have a claim for libel per se when her name appeared on a list of delinquent debtors.
287 P. 633, 634-35 (Mont. 1930).
As respects a charge of failure to pay debts, without any imputation of insolvency,
it seems to be settled that a writing containing the mere statement that a person
who is not a trader or merchant, or engaged in any vocation wherein credit is
necessary for the purpose and effectual conduct of his business, owes a debt and
refuses to pay or owes a debt which is long past due is not libelous per se, and
does not render the author or publisher of such statement liable without proof of
special damages.
Id. at 635 (quoting 17 R.C.L. 299). The plaintiff did not attempt to prove special damages.
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Because it reveals judicial and societal views about female virtue
in relation to rape, Youssoupoffv. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd.2 17 is
of particular interest among cases from this era. This 1934 English
decision illustrates how the reputations of alleged rape victims were
affected amongst those who learned of the rapes. The plaintiff, a Rus-
sian princess, sued on the basis of MGM's film, Rasputin, The Mad
Monk, which featured a portrayal of a "Princess Natasha" being se-
duced by Rasputin .2 18 After the jury awarded the plaintiff £25,000,
MGM appealed. 219 The film company argued that the plaintiff was
not identified in the film and that the film portrayed the woman be-
ing raped, not seduced, such that it was not defamatory. 220 Lord Jus-
tice Scrutton, in taking up the second point, fairly ridiculed the
defendant, noting that it took "some courage" to make the argu-
ment.22 ' Defining defamation as "a false statement about a man to his
discredit,"222 the court noted the great deference that it must give to
the jury's determination of whether the statement constituted libel.22 3
Lord Justice Scrutton interpreted the essence of the defendant's argu-
ment as follows:
In Liebel v. Montgomery Ward & Co., a stenographer brought a slander action against a
merchant who said that her credit was no good in his store. 62 P.2d 667, 667-68 (Mont.
1936). The court said this did not constitute slander per se because there was no showing
that this hurt her in her business as a stenographer. Id. at 671. However, in Kosmitis v.
Bailey, the court held that an injury "may consist entirely of mental anxiety and suffering
subjectively experienced by the plaintiff' even if there is evidence that the remarks did no
damage to her reputation as a lawyer. 685 So. 2d 1177, 1186-87 (2d Cir. 1996).
217. 50 T.L.R. 581 (Eng. C.A. 1934). While Youssoupoff indicates that suits brought by
women whose rapes had been the subject of media reports or other publicity tended to be
based on defamation, more recently rape survivors have pursued cases based on invasion of
privacy, in particular, the publication-of-private-facts variety. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F.,
491 U.S. 524, 524 (1989) (survivor sought relief after police inadvertently posted her name
in the police newsroom); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 469 (1975) (plaintiff
sought relief after victim's name was broadcast on the television news); see also Hyde v. City
of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Mo. App. 1982) (female rape survivor whose name was
published had cause of action regardless of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan); Doe v. Daily
News L.P., 660 N.Y.S.2d 604, 605 (1997) (libel action based on statement that plaintiff, who
was not identified in story, had falsely reported a rape, was not actionable).
Plaintiff sensitivity regarding publicity given to rapes arises because society often
blames the victim in issues of acquaintance rape, domestic violence, or harassment.
RHODE, supra note 6, at 95. Many contemporary Americans believe "'nice girls' aren't as-
saulted; 'loose' and 'careless' women are." Id. at 120. Litigation based on both defamation
and invasion of privacy is more understandable in this light.
218. Youssoupoff 50 T.L.R. at 581-82.
219. Id. at 581.
220. Id. at 582.
221. Id. at 584. He also wrote, "I desire to approach this argument seriously if I can,
because I have great difficulty in approaching it seriously." Id.
222. Id. (citing Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q.B.D. 491 (1882)).
223. Id.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
To say of a woman that she is raped does not impute unchas-
tity. From that we get to this, which was solemnly put for-
ward, that to say of a woman of good character that she has
been ravished by a man of the worst possible character is not
defamatory. That argument was solemnly presented to the
jury, and I only wish the jury could have expressed, and that
we could know, what they thought of it, because it seems to
me to be one of the most legal arguments that were ever
addressed to . . . a sensible body.22 4
Lord Justice Slesser similarly scoffed at the notion that the plaintiff
might not have been defamed, focusing on the movie's certain conse-
quences for her: "One may, I think, take judicial notice of the fact that
a lady of whom it has been said that she has been ravished, albeit
against her will, has suffered in some social reputation and in oppor-
tunities of receiving respectable consideration from the world." '225
The Lord Justices rendering decisions in the case disagreed as to
whether the allegedly defamatory film depicted the plaintiff226 being
"ravished"-that is, raped-or merely seduced.227 Nevertheless, at
least Lord Justice Slesser appeared to consider such a distinction irrel-
evant to the question of defamatory meaning, writing that
it was not necessary to ask the jury to entertain such specula-
tion [about rape versus seduction] at all. When this woman is
defamed in her sexual purity I do not think that the precise
manner in which she has been despoiled of her innocence
and virginity is a matter which ajury can properly be asked to
consider.228
224. Id. at 584. The court continued, "I really have no language to express my opinion
of that argument. I therefore come, on the second point, to the view that there is no
ground for interfering with the verdict of thejury... [and] that the words and the pictures
in the film are defamatory of the lady whom they have found to be Princess Irina." Id.
225. Id. at 587.
226. The plaintiffs identification was an additional issue addressed on appeal, but de-
tails of the court's handling of that matter are not relevant to the issue of defamatory
meaning. Id. at 582-84.
227. Id. at 584-88. LordJustice Slesser opined that the pictures and language of the film
were consistent with either rape or seduction, and he was uncertain that the jury consid-
ered it rape rather than seduction. Id. at 587-88.
228. Id. at 588. Lord Justice Slesser clarified, "When I say 'properly' I do not mean it
would be wrong to ask them to consider it, but the absence of any such consideration
cannot, in my view, disturb the jury's ultimate finding." Id.; cf Loecks ex rel. T.L. v. Reyn-
olds, 34 Fed. Appx. 644, 650, 2002 WL 539111, *1 (10th Cir. 2002) (news report that minor
plaintiff had engaged in consensual sex was substantially true when she had been victim of
statutory rape); Street v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir. 1981) (whether
rape prosecutrix truly had been raped determined whether the documentary's statements
alleging she had lied in her testimony were true or false); Kennedy v. Cannon, 182 A.2d 54,
56 (Md. 1962) (attorney's statement that the plaintiff had "'submittd [sic] to [the defen-
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Whereas most defamatory statements feature some element of the
plaintiffs wrongdoing, moral or character failing, or ignorance, 2
29
Lord Justice Slesser considered the question of the plaintiffs morality
or fault "immaterial.
230
[A] s has been frequently pointed out in libel, not only is the
matter defamatory if it brings the plaintiff into hatred, ridi-
cule, or contempt by reason of some moral discredit on her
part, but also if it tends to make the plaintiff be shunned and
avoided and that without any moral discredit on her part.23 '
None of the judges considering the case on appeal specifically
noted that if Princess Irina had in fact been raped, rather than se-
duced, by Rasputin, she would not have done anything blameworthy,
although Lord Justice Slesser hinted at it.2" 2 Rather, the judges fo-
cused on what they apparently saw as the logical conclusion that the
plaintiff would be shunned and ridiculed as a consequence of this
portrayal-regardless of the fact that, at least in theory, society does
not hold rape victims at fault for the crime committed against
them. 23 3 This analysis of defamatory meaning, surely a reflection of
the time, sadly implies that rape survivors bear some blame for their
victimization, just as most other defamatory statements suggest a
moral failing by their subjects. 23 4
dant's] advances willingly"' was slanderous per se and not privileged); Gazette, Inc. v. Har-
ris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 733 (Va. 1985) (article falsely indicating that victim was pregnant and
unmarried at time of rape was defamatory).
229. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
230. Youssoupoff 50 T.L.R. at 587. The Lord Justice used the language "more or... less
moral" to describe the distinction between ravishment and seduction, implying that in the
former situation, she had no moral fault but in the latter situation, she had some degree of
moral fault. Id.
Lord Justice Greer, on the other hand, assumed that the jury believed that the film por-
trayed the plaintiffs seduction, thus falsely implying her moral weakness and explaining
the substantial damages award. Id. at 586.
231. Id. at 587. LordJustice Greer, in discussing the damages award rather than defam-
atory meaning, wrote:
I cannot help thinking myself that the jury took the view that this was a case in
which the defendants had alleged that the lady had been seduced, not merely
that she had been raped, and if they did I should not be inclined to interfere.
The reason I say that is because of the largeness of the damages which they
awarded.
Id. at 586.
232. Id. at 587.
233. See id. (implying that she would not be at moral fault if she had been raped). But
see RHODE, supra note 6, at 120 (noting that society often blames rape victims).
234. See Youssoupoff 50 T.L.R. at 584 (implying that a rape victim is at fault to some
extent). Though British law does not recognize false light invasion of privacy, the film in
Youssoupoff would be a terrific candidate for redress under such a cause of action because
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IV. THE CONTEMPORARY ERA: OF WHORES AND HYPERBOLE
The tide of women moving into paid employment has risen stead-
ily since it began in earnest more than a century ago. "Women's par-
ticipation in the public workforce has increased in each decade
during the last century, from sixteen percent of the labor force in
1880 to forty-four percent in 1980. ' '235 In 2003, women comprised
forty-six percent of the labor force. 236 Cases brought by female defa-
mation plaintiffs in the past half century reflect this demographic shift
and the greater diversity in women's roles in our society.
A. Contemporary Media Portrayals of Women
The publications and broadcasts that give rise to women's defa-
mation suits in the contemporary era are linked to trends in how the
media portrays women. 2 ' Feminist critics of the contemporary media
the plaintiff is portrayed as pitiful, a portrayal that would likely be found highly offensive.
See infra Part V.A.1 and accompanying text.
Of interest among contemporary cases is Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publication Board,
Inc., 372 N.W.2d 253 (Iowa 1985). The plaintiff there sued when a newspaper reported
that she had been raped. Id. at 254. In fact, she had been the victim of a sexual assault
when her assailant forced her to perform oral sex. Id. Apparently assuming that a false
statement that a woman had been raped would in fact carry defamatory meaning, the court
found in favor of the defendant on the basis of the substantial truth doctrine. Id. at 256.
The court held that the events that occurred gave rise to second degree sexual assault,
which was tantamount to a charge of rape. Id. at 255-56. The plaintiffs point may have
been that there is something more harmful to reputation about being a victim of rape than
about being a victim of forced oral sex. See id. at 255 (noting that the plaintiff had stressed
at trial that no genital sexual intercourse had occurred).
See also Loecks ex rel T.L. v. Reynolds, 34 Fed. Appx. 644, 648, 2002 WL 539111 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding that although under state law a person cannot consent to sex if she is
under the age of fifteen, an article stating that a thirteen-year-old victim of statutory rape
had engaged in "consensual sex" was substantially true and therefore precluded
defamation).
235. Borden, supra note 10, at 100.
236. See News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, The Employment Situ-
ation: June 2003, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_07032003.
pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). Deborah Rhode illuminates that although women have
made dramatic progress by entering the work force, including traditionally male-domi-
nated professions, great discrepancies still exist between the positions and pay that women
attain as compared to those attained by men. RHODE, supra note 6, at 141-76. For exam-
ple, although female representation in the bar has increased from three to forty-five per-
cent since the 1960s, female lawyers are half as likely as similarly qualified males to become
partners. Id. at 141. The pay gap between men and women in comparable positions
ranges from ten to thirty-five percent. Id. Rhode emphasizes, "Law is not atypical." Id.
237. See Borden, supra note 12, at 119-20 (noting the relationship between media cover-
age of women and defamation actions). Of the cases analyzed by Borden during the pe-
riod 1967-1976, only 27.7% of female plaintiffs sued newspapers or periodicals, while half
sued individuals and 16.7% sued non-media institutions. Id. at 129-32. Almost 17% of
these actions were for slander, about 56% were for libel only, about 11% were for both
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have discussed its "symbolic annihilation" of women by virtue of wo-
men's "condemnation, trivialization, or absence. '238 In spite of the
slight majority of the population that women now represent and the
close to fifty percent of the labor force they comprise, the media
rarely portrays women in any but highly traditional roles. 239 The few
women portrayed working outside the home are generally con-
demned.24 ° Other women are trivialized by their portrayals as "child-
like adornments who need to be protected" or are "dismissed to the
protective confines of the home."24' Professor Deborah Rhode has
observed that while women appear to be everywhere in the media,
they are in fact missing from positions of status and authority.
24 2
libel and slander, and approximately 11% were for both libel and invasion of privacy. Id. at
132.
238. Tuchman, supra note 152, at 8; see also Borden, supra note 10, at 99 (noting that the
media symbolically annihilates women by representing them in their domestic roles).
239. Borden, supra note 10, at 99.
240. Tuchman, supra note 152, at 8. Susan Faludi has noted that the media backlash to
feminism in the 1980s paralleled a similar backlash in Victorian times. SUSAN FALUDI,
BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 78 (1991). Carolyn Kitch sim-
ilarly argues that many of the media stereotypes associated with the period 1970-1990
emerged in the first three decades of the twentieth century. KITCH, supra note 146, at 3.
She illustrates with the cover of Time announcing the death of the feminist movement:
The women's heads that floated ominously on Time's 1998 cover were types ar-
ranged in a pattern, from older, matronly activists to the dangerous but beautiful
radical to the cute, skinny, sexually free girl. The same types appeared in the
same order on magazine covers of the early twentieth century, during the peak
and the aftermath of the suffrage movement.
Id.
241. Tuchman, supra note 152, at 8. As another example, Susan Alexander, examining
Mademoiselle and Ladies' Home Journal from 1966-1994, found that though statistically fewer
and fewer real women believed the most satisfying lifestyle was a traditional marriage with a
husband who assumed responsibility, nonfiction content continued to emphasize that "a
woman's ultimate happiness and true fulfillment depend on possessing a loving husband
and children." Susan H. Alexander, Messages to Women on Love and Marriage from Women's
Magazines, in MEDIATED WOMEN: REPRESENTATIONS IN POPULAR CULTURE 25, 36 (Marian
Meyers ed., 1999) [hereinafter MEDIATED WOMEN].
242. RHODE, supra note 6, at 66-67. Rhode writes:
Female journalists have escaped the "women's page," with stories confined to
food, fashion, and society "do's and doings." On billboards and soap operas, her-
oines have been promoted. No longer do three-quarters of the television com-
mercials featuring women involve laundry and bathroom products .... Because
women have escaped these constraints and now seem to be everywhere, we lose
sight of where they are missing. Their absences are in predictable places, notably
those positions of greatest status and authority.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Marian Meyers observes:
[Slymbolic annihilation is no longer an appropriate blanket description for the
media's portrayal of women. Certainly, women continue to be trivialized,
marginalized, and silenced by the media. However, over the past 20 years, femi-
nism and the women's movement have, in many cases, made inroads in both
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Rhode emphasizes that a discomfort with female authority and a
preoccupation with female appearance predominate contemporary
media portrayals.2 4' The media presents accomplished women in
"sexually freighted terms," such as portraying an Olympic gymnast as a
"'calculating coquette,"' or a feminist activist as promoting "'her
agenda by means she affects to despise."' 24 4 Rhode observes that the
media often presents powerful women as sex objects, thus "un-
dermin[ing] their credibility and marginaliz[ing] their contribu-
tions. "245 Portrayals of working women are sometimes hostile in a way
not directly related to sexuality. The media use images of women as
strident, irrational, and extremist to discipline or censure those who
have not remained in their rightful place-the domestic sphere.24 6
Hateful images of women are among the communications that now
give rise to women's defamation actions. 2
4 7
The media's sexual trivializations and degradations of women are
also the basis for much new chastity litigation. 24" The culprits include
society and the media .... The representations of women just prior to the next
millennium could more accurately be described as fractured, the images and
messages inconsistent and contradictory, torn between traditional, misogynistic
notions about women and their roles on the one hand, and feminist ideals of
equality for women on the other. Mediated women appear both hypersexualized
and asexual, passive and ruthlessly aggressive, nurturing and sadistic, indepen-
dent and dependent, domestic and career-oriented, silent and shrill, conforming
and deviant ....
Marian Meyers, Fracturing Women, in MEDIATED WOMEN, supra note 241, at 3, 12. Carolyn
Lin speculates that in the "500 channel" age, media, with its increased fragmentation of
the mass audience, will need to target diverse audiences separately, leading to a wider
range of portrayals. Carolyn Lin, The Portrayal of Women in Television Advertising, in MEDi-
ATED WOMEN, supra note 241, at 253, 264.
243. RHODE, supra note 6, at 69.
244. Id. at 73-74.
245. Id. at 74. For example, the media ridiculed Hillary Clinton for her attire, stating
that "'Fashion stayed home"' in response to "one mid-1990s European venture." Id. at 73.
They also criticized her for "trying to be fashionable," for wearing "absurdly" styled accesso-
ries, and for "acquiescing in press releases that sounded like fashion promotions." Id. at
73-74. The media also made numerous comments about O.J. Simpson prosecutor Marcia
Clark, including that her legs were "great." Id. at 74. Feminist leaders "who defy cultural
standards of femininity are subject to ridicule," but those who "take pains to look attrac-
tive .. . risk seeming vain, petty, or hypocritical." Id. On the other hand, the New York
Times ridiculed activists for the opposite tendency, using the headline "Leading Feminist
Puts Hairdo before Strike" for a story about a 1970 women's movement rally. Id.
246. Id. at 87. By way of example, Rhode notes Time magazine's coverage of women in
the 1970s, characterizing them as strident, humorless, extremist, lesbian, and hairy-legged.
Id. More than a decade later a cover story on women in the 1990s reported that "hairy legs
haunt the feminist movement as do images of women being strident and lesbian." Id.
There is no acknowledgement that Time created those very images.
247. See infra Part IV.C.3.
248. SeeJane Caputi, The Pornography of Everyday Life, in MEDIATED WOMEN, supra note
241, at 57, 57-79 (discussing how popular culture and the mass media degrade women).
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the mainstream media, as well as the ever-burgeoning pornography
industry, which utilizes the images of unwitting women, as well as
those of paid models.
249
B. Doctrinal Stumbling Blocks in the "New Chastity" Cases
As noted above, certain defamation doctrines loom large in the
chastity cases that women bring in the contemporary era. I provide an
overview of those doctrines here as a prelude to the more detailed
analysis of the cases.
1. The Fact-Opinion Dichotomy, Rhetorical Hyperbole, and Imaginative
Expression.-Defamation law, at both common law and in the constitu-
tional era, seeks to prohibit false communication of fact while permit-
ting free expression of critical opinion. 25 0 Justice Powell's oft-quoted
line from Gertz epitomizes the rationale behind the fact-opinion di-
chotomy: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. ' 25 1 The challenge has thus been one of defining what con-
stitutes protected idea or opinion. In practice, this task has proven
extraordinarily complex.
2 52
249. The size of the pornography industry in the United States has been the subject of
some debate in recent years. The New York Times Magazine, in a May 2001 cover story,
reported that the pornography business in the United States is worth between $10 billion
and $14 billion a year, meaning its accrued revenue is far greater than either the NFL, the
NBA, or Major League Baseball. Frank Rich, Naked Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 20,
2001, at 50. That article also asserted that "porn is no longer a sideshow to the main-
stream . . . it is the mainstream." Id. Several journalists responded by challenging these
figures and assertions. See Dan Ackman, How Big is Porn?, Forbes.com, available at http://
www.forbes.com/2001/05/25/0524porn-print.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2004) (estimating
the industry to be worth between $2.6 billion and $3.9 billion annually); Emmanuelle Rich-
ard, The Perils of Covering Porn, ONLINE JOURNALISM REv., Apr. 3, 2002, at http://www.ojr.
org/ojr/buiness/p01786665l.php (last modified June 5, 2002) (quoting Ackman, supra,
and other porn industry insiders about the limited economic potential of the porn
industry).
Professor Smolla has written about the frequency with which pornographic outlets like
Hustler and Penthouse, which might be considered mainstream pornography, have been en-
gaged in defamation and other litigation implicating the First Amendment. SMOLLA, supra
note 30, ch. 8. For a discussion of pornography's role as an "opiate of the masses" and
"frontier literature" that presages future sexual relationships and practices, see JOAN HOFF,
LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 347 (1991).
250. See SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:1.
251. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). Justice Powell instructs us
that the best remedy for undesired ideas is the "competition of other ideas." Id at 340. He
goes on to say "there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact," thus setting up
the long-standing dichotomy between ideas and opinions on the one hand, and facts on
the other. Id.
252. A number of scholars have examined the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes
defamatory meaning, particularly in terms of the dichotomy between fact and opinion. See
John Bruce Lewis & Gregory V. Mersol, Opinion and Rhetorical Hyperbole in Workplace Defama-
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Under the common law fair comment privilege, courts typically
ruled against defendants whose opinions were sufficiently derogatory
and therefore capable of injuring the plaintiff's reputation.253 A state-
ment of opinion was privileged only if reasonably justified by true
facts. 25 4 Comment was most often privileged "when it concerned a
matter of public concern, was based upon true or privileged facts, rep-
resented the actual opinion of the speaker, and was not made solely
for the purpose of causing harm. ' 25" Later, the common law began to
protect opinions regarding matters of public concern even when they
were not so reasonably based.2 5 6 Only after New York Times in 1964 did
the protection of opinion take on a constitutional dimension.257 After
New York Times commentators assumed the fair comment privilege had
been trumped by First Amendment considerations.258 Subsequently,
a great deal of speech was given absolute protection as opinion. 259
tion Actions: The Continuing Quest for Meaningful Standards, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 19, 27-28, 36,
38, 42 (2002); Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opin-
ion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 648-55
(1990); Peter Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Defamation, 66 TEX. L. REv. 303, 342-48
(1987); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Curbing the High Price of Loose Talk, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 359, 395-427 (1985).
Professor David Anderson has written that the method most often used to distinguish
fact from opinion analyzed four factors to determine
whether "the totality of circumstances in which the statements are made" indi-
cated that the average reader would understand them as opinion rather than fact.
The factors were (1) the common meaning of the language used, (2) the ver-
ifiability of the statement, (3) the journalistic context in which the statement was
made (e.g., editorial column vs. news article), and (4) the setting in which the
statement occurred (e.g., political controversy vs. private business dispute).
David A. Anderson, Is Libel Law Worth Reforming?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 487, 506 (1991) (foot-
notes omitted).
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977).
254. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:2. For a brief history of the privilege, see Post, supra
note 252, at 650.
255. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990).
256. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:4. In a fair comment privilege analysis, the statement
was typically divided into two portions-the first containing the factual assertions which
were provable as either true or false; the second consisting of the opinion based upon such
facts. Courts ultimately applied the fair comment privilege only against public plaintiffs,
albeit a very broad range. Id. § 6:5. But the fair comment privilege created another chal-
lenge of definition: the meaning of "fair." Most courts left the question of the "fairness" of
the comment to the jury, which instead tended erroneously to judge the comment's value
or worth, a practice potentially "inimical to free expression." Id. § 6:6.
257. Id. § 6:3.
258. Id § 6:7.
259. The following statements were deemed opinion and therefore enjoyed absolute
protection:
[A] broadcast characterizing plaintiff as a member of an "an international net-
work of medical quackery whose patients were victims of 'cancer con artists' "; a
published assertion that plaintiff "is the Al Capone of the City"; and a review of a
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In its 1990 decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,2 6 0 the Su-
preme Court sought to clarify the situation.261 Milkovich repudiated
the Gertz assertion that "there is no such thing as a false idea," charac-
terizing it as dictum.26 2 The Court refused to create either any sort of
"wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled
'opinion"' or a "separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion. ' '263
The Court wrote:
[W] e think the "breathing space" which "freedoms of expres-
sion require in order to survive," .... is adequately secured by
existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an ar-
tificial dichotomy between "opinion" and fact.
2 6 4
Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or
if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still
imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such state-
ments in terms of opinion does not dispel these
implications.265
television documentary on sex education in which the reviewer stated "My impres-
sion is that the executive producer [plaintiff] . . . told his writer/producer . . .
'We've got a hot potato here-let's pour on titillating innuendo and as much
bare flesh as we can get away with. Viewers will eat it up!'"
Anderson, supra note 252, at 506 (quoting Kirk v. CBS, 1987 WL 11831, *1 (N.D. Ill. June
4, 1987)); Baker v. L.A. Herald Exam'r, 721 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. 1986)).
260. 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
261. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:7.
262. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974)). As Professor Anderson has summarized the case:
The much-quoted sentences from Gertz were not intended "to create a wholesale
defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion." The Court
explained that statements of opinion often convey implications that can cause as
much damage to reputation as explicit statements of fact. It concluded that the
other constitutional protections adequately protect the free and uninhibited dis-
cussion of public issues, and that any benefits resulting from the proposed privi-
lege for opinion did not outweigh society's "pervasive and strong interest in
preventing and redressing attacks upon reputation."
Anderson, supra note 252, at 507 (footnotes omitted).
263. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18, 21. Further, in spite of the fact that the defendant news-
paper's column repeatedly indicated that the accusation of perjury was largely the author's
opinion rather than an assertion of fact, the Court upheld the plaintiffs defamation claim.
Thus, the Court concluded that "a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the state-
ments in the ... column imply an assertion that ... Milkovich perjured himself in ajudicial
proceeding." Id
264. Id. at 19 (quoting Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772
(1986)) (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964)).
265. Id. at 18-19.
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On its face, then, Milkovich refused either to mandate a constitu-
tional inquiry into whether a statement is opinion or fact, or to make
actionable only factual statements. 26 6 Even while eschewing protec-
tion of opinion as such, the Milkovich Court relied on two key prece-
dents that it said would provide sufficient protection to the press:
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps26 7 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell.268 The Court wrote:
Foremost, we think Hepps stands for the proposition that a
statement on matters of public concern must be provable as
false before there can be liability under state defamation law,
at least in situations.., where a media defendant is involved.
Thus, unlike the statement, "In my opinion Mayor Jones is a
liar," the statement, "In my opinion, Mayor Jones shows his
abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and
Lenin," would not be actionable. Hepps ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will re-
ceive full constitutional protection.
269
As additional protection for speech, the Court cited a line of cases,
culminating in Falwell, for the proposition that statements "that can-
not 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an indi-
vidual" are protected.2 7 °
Milkovich essentially restated the dichotomy as one between fact
and non-fact. 27 ' Albeit with a different name, "the rubric of the 'opin-
ion' doctrine remains alive and well" after Milkovich.27 2 "Imaginative
266. Id.
267. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
268. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
269. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-20.
270. Id. at 20 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1987)). In so
doing, the Court said that "public debate will not suffer for lack of 'imaginative expression'
or the 'rhetorical hyperbole' which has traditionally added much to the discourse of our
Nation." Id. (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 53-55).
271. See SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6.21.
272. Id. Lower courts interpreting Milkovich now examine two central questions regard-
ing whether the defendant's statement is opinion: "whether [the statement] can reasona-
bly be interpreted as stating or implying defamatory facts about the plaintiff and, if so,
whether the defamatory assertions are capable of being proved false." Id. § 6.22.
New wrinkles can be added, of course. In a New York Court of Appeals decision re-
manded by the Supreme Court after its decision in Milkovich, the court crafted its own
broader approach to the fact-opinion distinction based on state constitutional law. Im-
muno AG. v Moor-Jankowski, 77 N.Y.2d 235, 249 (1991), discussed in SMOLLA, supra note 30,
§ 6:26. The Immuno decision permits New York courts to place the statements within the
context in which they appear to determine whether they are constitutionally protected
opinion. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:26. In that case, because the statements were made by
a citizen at a public hearing in a "rambling, table-slapping monologue," the court held they
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expression," "rhetorical hyperbole," and "loose, figurative, or hyper-
bolic language" have remained protected in the wake of Milkovich as
types of speech that are not "provable as false '27 3 or that "cannot 'rea-
sonably be interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual.
274
Courts thus continue blindly to protect speech that takes these forms,
overlooking the substantive message it conveys.
As will become evident from the detailed discussion of cases be-
low, the doctrines of "opinion" and "rhetorical hyperbole" often loom
large in women's chastity-oriented defamation actions. Indeed, analy-
ses under these doctrines serve to disarm the offending statements
from a legal standpoint, frequently leaving a court to conclude-even
as it acknowledges the irony-that the more hateful, objectionable,
and offensive the communication, the less likely it is to give rise to
liability.2
7 5
2. Truth and Falsity.-Because the goal of defamation law is to
protect the reputation that an individual has earned, the law typically
has permitted recovery only for false statements. 276 While in earlier
times truth only served as a limited defense, twentieth-century Su-
preme Court decisions indicated a strong conviction that the First
Amendment protects truthful speech "in all but the most extreme
situations. "277
The truth defense took on a constitutional dimension with New
York Times in 1964, and the germinal Supreme Court decision on the
issue of truth and falsity came in 1986. The Court in Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps,27 8 which was discussed above in relation to
Milkovich, held that when the allegedly defamatory statement is made
were not an actionable presentation of facts. Id. (citation omitted). Other state and fed-
eral appellate courts have also sought to place apparently factual assertions within the con-
text of non-actionable opinion. Id. § 6:27.
273. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 6:21 (citation omitted).
274. Id.
275. See Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 915 (Wyo. 1992); Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d
771, 774 (Wyo. 1991) (noting that defamation law has evolved "along a strange path to a
place where we now say that the more outrageous, vile, vulgar, humiliating and ridiculous
the publication, the more it is protected" and that even statements that subject individuals
to "enormous ridicule" are "all right").
276. See Zimmerman, supra note 66, at 306. The offense of defamation from its incep-
tion was harm to reputation through falsity. English common law has always granted an
absolute truth defense in civil defamation cases. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 5:2. Some Amer-
ican jurisdictions at the turn of the century modified truth to a more limited defense, such
as requiring the defendant to prove he published the derogatory (but true) statement in
good faith and without malice. Id. § 5:3.
277. Zimmerman, supra note 66, at 311.
278. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
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by a media defendant and involves issues of public concern, a private
plaintiff must bear the burden of proving falsity in order to recover
damages.279 The Court confirmed that it was prepared to dictate this
price against the interests of legitimately defamed private plaintiffs
who would be unable to prove the falsity of the defamer's state-
ment.28° Rationalizing the decision as a minor change to the law, the
Court wrote:
We note that our decision adds only marginally to the bur-
dens that the plaintiff must already bear as a result of our
earlier decisions in the law of defamation. The plaintiff must
show fault. A jury is obviously more likely to accept a plain-
tiffs contention that the defendant was at fault in publishing
the statements at issue if convinced that the relevant state-
ments were false. As a practical matter, then, evidence of-
fered by plaintiffs on the publisher's fault in adequately
investigating the truth of the published statements will gen-
erally encompass evidence of the falsity of the matters
asserted.2"'
Perhaps to mollify critics, the Court then severely limited the reach of
its holding. In a footnote, the Court declined to consider the quantity
of proof that a private plaintiff must present to recover damages, or
what standards would apply if the plaintiff were to sue a non-media
defendant.28 2
After Hepps, media defendants in cases involving matters of public
concern may litigate the truth issue with greater confidence because
the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, even when the plaintiff is a
private person. 28  Courts employ a substantial truth test,2 8 4 meaning
279. The Court acknowledged that "requiring the plaintiff to show falsity will insulate
from liability some speech that is false, but unprovably so." Id. at 778.
280. To do otherwise, the Court concluded, would risk deterring speech that the Consti-
tution has declared free. Id. at 777.
281. Id. at 778.
282. Id. at 779 n.4. Justice O'Connor's footnoted limitation in Hepps leaves a gaping
hole in defamation law: what happens when the plaintiff sues a non-media defendant, or
the case relates to a purely private matter? Arguably in such cases the First Amendment-
inspired concerns would be greatly reduced.
As Smolla has speculated, some private plaintiffs suing a non-media defendant for
defamation regarding a private matter will likely seek to thrust the burden of proving truth
upon the defendant. Under current law, such a burden-imposed by some states exhibit-
ing greater concern for its citizens' respective reputations than their freedom to criticize
each other-is constitutional. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 3.24 n.5. Professor Smolla has
opined, "The wisest choice in those cases left open by Hepps... is to place the burden of
proof on the plaintiff, creating one uniform rule for all defamation cases." Id. § 5:13.
283. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., 475 U.S. at 778.
284. SMOLLA, supra note 30, § 5:14.
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that a statement with only minor inaccuracies will still be defensible as
substantially true. 2 " These defendants are thus protected from liabil-
ity even when the precise truth of the statement cannot be ascer-
tained.286 In practice, this means many media defendants can
successfully employ a defense that combines the substantial truth test
with the Milkovich doctrine: all statements either are "substantially
true" or not "provably false. 21
7
Recent commentators have pointed out that defamation law, par-
ticularly in the constitutional era, does a poor job of rehabilitating a
plaintiffs reputation precisely because cases do not often squarely ad-
judicate the issue of the truth or falsity. 288 As stated in the Annenberg
Report on Libel Reform:
Libel suits only occasionally resolve the most critical issue
from the plaintiffs perspective-whether the defamatory
statement was true or false. The litigation often focuses on
the defendant's alleged malice or recklessness rather than
on the question of truth .... After years of litigation, the
court either fails to set the record straight or does so too late
for the decision to be meaningful or useful. 28
A failure to establish truth or falsity is a feature of many new chas-
tity cases, as the court's conclusion that a statement is not actionable
preempts an ultimate inquiry about whether the statement that gave
rise to the litigation is true or false.
For a woman suing in any chastity case, the issue of truth or falsity
presents a particular conundrum. 211 If the woman is to prevail on her
285. Id. The key is to determine whether the inaccuracy in any way alters the substance
of the statement and thus the damage to the plaintiff's reputation. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. The issue of defamatory meaning is also closely connected with the substantial
truth test. Id. § 5:28. For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the black protesters
were not singing "My Country, 'Tis of Thee," as alleged, but rather the "Star Spangled
Banner." 376 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1964). The defendants in this case had two defenses: (1)
the allegation was substantially true, because the inaccuracy in no way altered its substance,
and (2) there was nothing defamatory in this small factual misstatement. SMOLLA, supra
note 30, § 5:28.
288. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 184-200.
289. PROPOSAL FOR THE REFORM OF LIBEL LAw, REPORT OF THE LIBEL REFORM PROJECT OF
THE ANNENBERG WASHINGTON PROGRAM 10 (1988). This proposal for libel reform would
mandate that plaintiff request a reply or retraction before suing. Id. The proposal also
would permit transformation of a damages action into an action for declaratory judgment.
See also BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 188, 193 (providing statistics on the adjudication
of truth or falsity in defamation cases and indicating that falsity is fully adjudicated in only
fourteen percent of cases).
290. A few other cases illustrate different ways in which the issue of truth or falsity may
play out in chastity cases. In Street v. National Broadcasting Co., a woman who accused several
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claim, she must prove she is chaste or that she did not engage in
whatever act of sexual impropriety the statement alleged.2 ' In short,
she must put her sexual propriety and sexual history at issue before
the court, surely a consequence of litigation that no woman would
undertake lightly. The dilemma is illustrated by a couple of cases,
Street v. National Broadcasting Co.29 2 and Pring v. Penthouse International,
Ltd.
2 93
The plaintiff in Street was a white woman who accused nine black
men of raping her in what became known as the Scottsboro rape case,
men of rape was depicted by NBC as having lied about the rape. 645 F.2d 1227, 1231-32
(6th Cir. 1981). A determination of whether the statement was false necessitated a deter-
mination of whether she had been a truthful witness and, indeed, had been raped. Id. at
1233.
In Cox Enterprises v. Thrasher, a newspaper article implied that a married woman was
promiscuous because she had contracted chlamydia, a sexually transmitted disease. 442
S.E. 2d 740, 741 (Ga. 1994). The plaintiff apparently was unable to prove the falsity of the
statement and therefore lost her case. Id. Noting that the plaintiff was a private citizen but
the publication a matter of public concern, the court characterized as uncontroverted the
evidence that "Thrasher was infected with a bacteria that was treated with the drug used to
cure Chlamydia." Id, at 741-42. Agreeing with the trial court that because the bacteria was
not identified before treatment, the appellate court found that whether or not the plaintiff
had the sexually transmitted disease would never be known. Id. (citing Philadelphia News-
papers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)). The court did not explain what the matter of
public concern was, but, in a footnote, rejected the plaintiffs argument that "discussing
the dangers of a transmittable disease with few manifest symptoms that affects millions of
people, did not involve speech of inherent public concern." Id. at 741 n.1.
In Crellin v. Thomas, a woman sued when she was called a whore and said to have
"worked in a house of prostitution." 247 P.2d 264, 264 (Utah 1952). In fact, the plaintiff
admitted that she had, for a short time and some 30 years earlier, worked as a "dance hall
girl," also called a "percentage girl," in two different establishments, both in the "red light
district" of Ely, Nevada. Id. at 265. The character of these establishments was disputed.
One witness called one of the places "a whorehouse-a good one," while others said that
prostitutes (or "crib girls" as they were also called) worked out of the establishments, but
were not employed by the dance halls. Id. at 265-66. The dance halls did, however, employ
"percentage girls" to "dance with the patrons and encourage them to buy drinks." Id. at
266. Apparently the name "percentage girl" was derived from the fact that the "girl" got to
keep 50¢ for each $1 drink she sold. Id. Because the appellate court concluded that a
distinction existed between "percentage girls" and prostitutes, the court found erroneous
the jury instruction that if the plaintiff had worked "in a house of prostitution in any capac-
ity" the defendant must win. Id. at 265-66. The court explained that, in spite of the doc-
trine of substantial truth, the "language of the utterance" was of "such a fixed and certain
meaning" that a dance hall girl was not necessarily a prostitute. Id. at 266. The court
explained that this is so, "even though the dance hall may have been a house of prostitu-
tion or that prostitution may have been practiced in connection with it." Id.
291. See generally Street, 645 F.2d at 1227; see also Pring v. Penthouse, Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d
438 (10th Cir. 1982).
292. 645 F.2d 1227 (6th Cir. 1981).
293. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982); see infra notes 389-405 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing details of case).
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arising from events in Alabama in 1931.294 She sued several decades
later when NBC made a television docudrama depicting her as having
lied about her criminal allegations regarding the men.295 While
courts never reached the issue of these representations' truth or fal-
sity,296 doing so would have put a jury in the position of adjudicating
the very truth or falsity of her claim that she had been raped.
The Pring plaintiff sued on the basis of a magazine article that
portrayed her performing acts of fellatio on several men.297 In order
to avoid answering various interrogatories during pre-trial discovery
for her defamation suit, she made a strategic litigation decision. She
amended her complaint to focus on the defamatory meaning of the
three acts of fellatio she was said to have performed. 298 The effect was
to narrow her cause of action to defamation based upon these three
sexual acts and to exclude general implications that might be drawn
from them. As the court acknowledged, one consequence of this was
to disallow the defendants from questioning the plaintiff about her
sexual history.299 In order to avoid having her sexual propriety made
an issue at trial, Pring thus chose to forego her best opportunity for a
defamation victory: a general imputation that she had been behaved
in a sexually improper way.
This aspect of the Pring case makes one curious about the influ-
ence such considerations must have on a female plaintiff seeking re-
dress in chastity cases. Like rape victims before the advent of rape
shield laws, many female defamation plaintiffs are naturally reluctant
to have their sexual histories put at issue in a public trial.3 °° One can
294. Street, 645 F.2d at 1227.
295. At one point in the documentary, the plaintiff was referred to as a "bum" and said
to have been on the "hustle." Id. at 1232. She was also referred to as a "whore," and
suggestive flashbacks showed her inviting sexual advances" of two men. Id.
296. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff, as a public figure, had failed to establish
that the defendant knew its portrayal of her was false or that it had recklessly disregarded
the truth. Id. at 1236-37. Thus, as in many defamation cases in the constitutional era, the
case was decided on the basis of the fault requirement, rather than on the basis of the
statement's truth or falsity.
297. Pring, 695 F.2d at 439.
298. Id. at 441.
299. Id. It also prevented the plaintiff from making arguments that the statements gen-
erally imputed that she was immoral. Id.
300. See Leo A. Farhat & Richard C. Kraus, Michigan's "Rape-Shield"Statute: Questioning the
Wisdom of Legislative Determinations of Relevance, 4 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 545, 546-47 (1987)
(describing the goals of rape shield statutes preventing defendants from showing that a
complaining witness had a "poor reputation for chastity," that a witness was likely to be
untruthful and less credible because she was not chaste, and also the defense strategy of
"trying the complaining witness rather than the defendant"); Peter M. Hazelton, Note,
Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous Advocacy, 19 AM. J. CriM. L. 35. 36 (1996) (describing
rape shield laws as protecting witnesses from defense attorneys' efforts to shift the trial
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see that this rule "outs" personal and private information about a fe-
male plaintiff seeking redress for her communicative injury. Yet, as I
discuss in more detail below, such disclosures may be a natural conse-
quence of my proposed solution to make legally cognizable the inju-
ries for which women seek redress in the new chastity cases.
C. Women as Defamation Plaintiffs in the Contemporary Era
Following a century of higher visibility and increasingly signifi-
cant roles in politics, commerce, and other public-sphere arenas, we
might expect contemporary women to be the subject of defamatory
communications in the mass media as frequently as men. 30 1 Further,
we might expect them to sue as often as men. Contrary to these ex-
pectations, male defamation plaintiffs still well outnumber females.30 2
When contemporary women do bring defamation lawsuits, like their
male counterparts, they do so based on a wide range of communica-
tive injuries. These increasingly include statements associated with
their jobs and professions or statements otherwise made in the work-
place.3 °3 Perusal of cases litigated in the 1980s and 1990s indicates
focus from the defendant to the witness and her charcter by admitting evidence of her sex
life); Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1245, 1246-47 (1989) (explaining that the rape shield laws were created to curtail in-
quiry into a woman's sexual past in order to resolve the case on more rational grounds and
to prevent the victim from having to undergo a "second rape" at trial).
301. Borden, supra note 10, at 99.
302. Id. (citing BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 7). One study calculated that women
represented only eleven percent of all defamation plaintiffs in the 1980s. BEZANSON ET AL.,
supra note 17, at 8. Professor Borden's empirical study of the gender of defamation plain-
tiffs during the period 1967-1976 reveals that women were plaintiffs in only 18 of the 148
defamation cases reported by West. Borden, supra note 12, at 125. Borden's study also
shows that between 1967 and 1976, male plaintiffs were awarded damages five times as
often as female plaintiffs, and received eight times the amount of damages as female plain-
tiffs. Id. at 135.
Borden has observed that the "overwhelming majority of libel plaintiffs are men en-
gaged in corporate or public life who boast relatively elite standing in their communities."
Borden, supra note 10, at 99. She also notes that suits are most often brought by wealthy
and powerful persons-those "most likely to be the targets of defamatory comments be-
cause of their prominence in the public sphere and who can afford the time and expense
of defending their reputations from harm." Id.
303. See Cent. Bering Sea Fishermen's Ass'n v. Anderson, 54 P.3d 271, 275 (Alaska 2002)
(economic development project coordinator awarded compensatory and punitive damages
after accusations of stalking and physical violence by former employers); Moffatt v. Brown,
751 P.2d 939, 939 (Alaska 1988) (physician libeled by right-to-life organization); Rybachek
v. Sutton, 761 P.2d 1013, 1013 (Alaska 1988) (newspaper columnist defamed in editorial to
the paper); Fairbanks Publ'g Co., v. Pitka, 445 P.2d 685, 686 (Alaska 1968) (school teacher
subject of newspaper article that said she was fired); Gannett Co. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174,
1178 (Del. 2000) (female obstetrician and gynecologist awarded $2.6 million in compensa-
tory damages and $250,000 in punitive damages based on news story that she was perform-
ing unnecessary hysterectomies); Kanaga v. Gannett Co., 2002 WL 143819, at *1 (Del.
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that women frequently now sue in defamation based on statements
related to their roles as employees and professionals. 30 4 At the same
time, since the 1960s, the number of cases stemming from straightfor-
ward assertions of "unchastity" has tapered off. Nonetheless, there are
some indications that courts remain more sympathetic to a woman's
traditional chastity claim than to a claim related to her role in the
workplace.3 °5
Increasingly, statements that give rise to defamation suits of all
sorts also give rise to other tort claims, and this is certainly true with
the new chastity claims. For example, potentially defamatory state-
ments have been spoken under circumstances that also make them
viable candidates for redress under a theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.30 6 Yet others overlap with different varieties of the
Super. Ct. Jan. 10, 2002) (mostly discussing damages); Ayash v. Dana Farber Cancer Inst.,
30 Media L. Rep. 1825, 1825 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2001) (director of research protocols in
breast cancer study defamed in newspaper article alleging malpractice).
304. Particularly prevalent are cases arising from statements by employers that evaluate
women as employees or accuse them of malfeasance. These statements are virtually always
protected as privileged. See Lieberman v. Gant, 474 F. Supp. 848, 852 (D. Conn. 1979)
(female professor denied tenure sued on the basis of statement that her teaching was aver-
age and her writing marginal); Jensen v. Times Mirror Co., 634 F. Supp. 304, 307-08 (D.
Conn. 1986) (female reporter fired because she allegedly allowed her employer to publish
inaccurate information about her roommate, who was a participant in an armed robbery);
Luckey v. Gioia, 496 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (female nurse sued doctor for
libel based on doctor's statements blaming nurse for an improper patient transfer);
Kramer v. Kroger Co., 534 S.E.2d 446, 449 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (plaintiff sued for defama-
tion and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that she was forced to resign
after her employer wrongfully accused her of theft); Nye v. Dep't of Livestock, 639 P.2d
498, 499 (Mont. 1982) (bringing a wrongful discharge and a slander complaint against the
Montana Department of Livestock for terminating plaintiffs employment with the Depart-
ment for deficiencies in her work); Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear, 771 P.2d 114, 116 (Mont.
1989) (defendant accused plaintiff of stealing from store's cash register); Minyard Food
Stores, Inc. v. Goodman, 80 S.W.3d 573, 574 (Tex. 2002) (court held as privileged one
employee's defamation of another in the context of a workplace misconduct investiga-
tion); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 897-98 (Utah 1992) (plaintiff
nurse said to have been addicted to controlled substances).
305. It is telling that women have been far more successful in their pursuit of chastity
cases, even in the latter part of the twentieth century, than they have been in the pursuit of
cases about their public sphere roles. Borden's study shows, for example, that between
1967 and 1976, women won only two (twenty-two percent) of the nine suits based on state-
ments about their business or profession, while they won five (fifty-six percent) of the nine
suits based upon allegations of unchastity or immorality. Borden, supra note 12, at 134.
306. See Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Pub'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir.
1992); Branda v. Sanford, 637 P.2d 1223 (Nev. 1981); Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988). Various scholars have taken up issues associated with sexu-
ally and racially hateful speech and some have discussed them in relation to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Bowman, supra note 19; Jean C. Love, Dis-
criminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 WAsH. & LEE L.
REv. 123 (1990). Professor Rodney Smolla has focused on the tort in light of First Amend-
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invasion of privacy tort.30 7 Finally, related to the fact that more wo-
men are in the workplace and many of the statements that give rise to
defamation lawsuits are spoken or otherwise published there, signifi-
cant overlap now exists between defamation and sexual harassment
law.308 In this setting in particular, defamation law has taken a back
seat to a more robust remedy that was previously unavailable.
Many of the statements that have given rise to the new chastity
claims could also be considered hate speech. Indeed, the statements
are often self-evidently misogynist in their message. The Supreme
Court has made it so difficult to regulate hate speech, however, that
creating a remedy based on this theory is not feasible. °9
A few things are particularly surprising about women's use of def-
amation law in the past several decades. First is the persistence of
chastity-type cases. One might expect that in this age of sexual libera-
tion, 3 1  a woman's chastity would matter less and she would notbother to seek redress for such an injury. Well into the 1970s, how-
ment limitations. See Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analy-
sis of Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARiz. ST. L.J. 423 (1988); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinking First
Amendment Assumptions about Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH & LEE. L. REv. 171 (1990).
307. SeeDouglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985) discussed infra
at notes 520-533 ; Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984) discussed
infra at notes 534-541; Stanley v. Gen. Media Communications, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701
(W.D. Ark. 2001) (female students photographed participating in a condom fitting contest
while on their spring break in Florida sued and lost their claims for libel, false light and
appropriation varieties of invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress based on Penthouse's publication of the photo); Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 1346, 1353 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (CEO of defendant company allegedly called plaintiff
a "fucking whore").
308. See Carroll v. Bayeriche Landesbank, 125 F. Supp. 2d 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Walia v.
Vivek Purmasir & Assocs., 160 F. Supp. 2d 380 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Parsons v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 889 F. Supp. 465 (M.D. Fla. 1995); Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665 (D.
Minn. 1994); Bertotti v. Philbeck, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D. Ga. 1993); French v.Jadon,
Inc., 911 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1996); Roberts v. Philip Morris Mgmt. Corp., 733 N.Y.S.2d 190
(App. Div. 2001).
309. The germinal case is RIA.V. v. City of St. Pau4 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The Supreme
Court held there that any regulation of hate speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest. Id. at 395. The Court also held that any regulation
must be content-neutral and not designate the type of speech being regulated based on the
ideas being expressed. Id. at 391-93.
A rich literature on hate speech in relation to tort has its genesis in the work of Profes-
sor Richard Delgado. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial In-
sults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133 (1982); WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Mari J.
Matsuda et al. eds., 1993). See also Lu-in Wang, The Transforming Power of "Hate". Social
Cognition Theory and the Harms of Bias-Related Crime, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 47 (1997) (discussing
in detail the range of harms caused by hate speech and specifying why these harms are
different than those caused by other crimes).
310. See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 138, at 237-60.
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ever, many women sued on the basis of straightforward assertions of
their sexual impropriety. 31  It was as if the more things had changed,
the more they had stayed the same.
Also noteworthy is the rise of what I have already labeled the new
chastity cases: those based on statements that demean and degrade
women in relation to their sexual personhood, generally without as-
serting anything literal or specific about their sexual behavior. The
statements that are the basis for these cases have become, for all prac-
tical purposes, liability-proof. This is because the statements are ei-
ther so hateful that they are seen as carrying no ascertainable content
or they are so exaggerated and imaginative that they are deemed to be
beyond reasonable belief.3 12 Often in the form of parody, they tend
to be protected as rhetorical hyperbole or some other variety of
speech that is said not to be capable of being proven true or false. 3
Such statements ridicule and demean the targeted woman in relation
to her sexuality, rendering her the contemporary version of the proto-
typical "fallen woman." Yet she is bereft of any legal redress for a com-
municative injury that often seriously undermines her personhood,
wounding her dignity, identity, and self-esteem.
3 14
Here, I discuss three broad categories of contemporary chastity
cases: those based on straight forward assertions of a woman's sexual
misbehavior, those based primarily on sexually hateful epithets, and
the so-called new chastity cases.
1. Old Chastity Cases in a New Era.-While many contemporary
cases involve parody or other forms of protected speech, others in-
volve more prosaic statements in which a woman's sexual behavior
becomes the subject of media attention or other comment. 5 Like
their predecessors from earlier decades, "traditional" chastity cases liti-
gated in the contemporary era arise from straight forward statements
that undermine a girl or woman's reputation for sexual propriety.
31 6
311. Borden, supra note 12, at 134.
312. SMOLLA, supra note 30, §§ 5:14-5:17.
313. Id. § 6:21.
314. Id. § 5:13.
315. See infra note 316.
316. See McGuire v. Adkins, 226 So. 2d 659, 660 (Ala. 1969) ("she was wild, stayed out
late with boys and had a bad reputation"); French v.Jadon, Inc., 911 P.2d 20, 32-33 (Alaska
1996) (stating that plaintiff had traded sex for drugs alleges sexual misconduct and crimi-
nal activity and, thus, is defamatory per se); Anson v. Paxson Communications Corp., 736
So. 2d 1209, 1211 (Fla. 1999) (holding that statement that plaintiff was "a drug-using ho-
mosexual prostitute" was not necessarily protected opinion); Cox Enters., Inc. v. Thrasher,
442 S.E.2d 740, 741 (Ga. 1994) (newspaper article implied that married woman was pro-
miscuous because she had contracted chlamydia, a sexually transmitted disease); Thomas
2004]
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In one case, the physician of a thirteen-year-old school girl incorrectly
reported to her school that she was pregnant.3 17 The defamatory
character of the statement appears to have been presumed, as the
matter was not addressed in the opinion.31 s In another, TV Guide'
implication that the plaintiff was a call girl was the basis for a success-
ful libel suit.319 A statement alleging that a woman was "like a she-dog
that slept around with a lot of men" was said to "impute[ ] unchas-
v. Hillson, 361 S.E.2d 278, 280 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (misdiagnosis of gonorrhea and com-
munication to plaintiffs husband was defamatory, though privileged); Tench v. Ivie, 173
S.E.2d 237, 238 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that it was a jury question whether saying
woman "ran around with men" was defamatory); Balderree v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309,
324-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (statement that woman "propositioned" business associates
held slander per se); Trevino v. Espinosa, 718 S.W.2d 848, 850 (Tex. 1986) (newspaper
described pictures of plaintiff as "XXX" and "top secret"; court upheld jury's determina-
tion that statement was defamatory).
A great many chastity cases were brought by women in New York in the 1960s, with
varying outcomes. See Conner v. Niemiec, 269 N.Y.S.2d 788, 789 (App. Div. 1966) (state-
ment by landlord that he knew "what's going on up there and I'm not running a whore-
house" was actionable per se as imputing a crime to tenant); Wildstein v. New York Post
Corp., 243 N.Y.S.2d 386, 389 (Spec. Term 1963) (statement about police delving into busi-
ness affairs decedent had with plaintiff might reasonably be held to convey meaning of
some "meretricious association"); Segal v. Barnett, 263 N.Y.S.2d 789 (App. Div. 1965)
(statement referring to the plaintiff as a prostitute and implying that she had frequent
sexual relations with numerous men); Segel v. Barnett, 226 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (Spec. Term
1962) (words unspecified, but they were held to impute unchastity or adultery and there-
fore to be slander per se); Hewitt v. Wasek, 231 N.Y.S.2d 884, 884 (Sup. Ct. 1962) ("keep-
ing company" indicates associations between courting persons, but does not necessarily
imply sexual intimacy); Morris v. Stellakis, 212 N.Y.S.2d 488, 490 (Spec. Term 1961) ("you
had men or a man paying the rent" on your apartment held not necessarily to impute
unchastity). The cases dropped off sharply in the 1970s and 1980s, but a few cases were
decided. See Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004 (App. Div. 1984) (words
"fooling around with his wife" could mean that plaintiff was having an affair with one of
the defendants and therefore was libelous per se); Morrow v. Wiley, 423 N.Y.S.2d 658, 659
(App. Div. 1980) (statement that plaintiff "often had men visitors to her apartment when
her parents weren't home" was not an actionable imputation of unchastity).
317. Vigil v. Rice, 397 P.2d 719 (N.M. 1964).
318. In their pleadings, the plaintiffs (the young woman was joined by her parents)
asserted not only that the plaintiff was not pregnant, but that she was "chaste." Id. at 720.
319. Montandon v. Triangle Publ'ns, Inc., 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975).
The offending statement read: "'From Party Girl to Call Girl.' Scheduled guest: TV Per-
sonality Pat Montandon and author of 'How to Be a Party Girl.'" Id. at 188 (quoting TV
Guide listing). The court wrote, "It cannot be gainsaid, and the evidence strongly shows,
that this published writing exposed the subject to hatred, contempt, ridicule and obloquy."
Id. at 190. The court cited the testimony of Arthur Huston, Professor Emeritus of English
from U.C. Berkeley, that the "average reader would conclude from the article that Miss
Montandon had progressed from being a party girl to being a call girl, with party girl
meaning a girl who likes to give and go to parties and a call girl being a prostitute." Id. at
189-90. The trial court also noted lay evidence that supported this interpretation, includ-
ing the testimony of a newspaper society editor, a bank vice president, two TV producers,
and one of the plaintiffs fans. Id. at 189-90.
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tity. '' 320 Another article falsely indicating that a woman was unmarried
and pregnant was held defamatory. 32t A statement implying that a
married woman has committed adultery is still standard fare, and a
number of defamation lawsuits in the past several decades have been
based on such communications.322
320. Padilla v. Carrier Air Conditioning, 67 F. Supp. 2d 650, 664 (E.D. Tex. 1999). The
court wrote that the remark "could constitute defamation per se' but that the employer-
defendant could not be held liable "for the racist views" of the employee who had made
the statement. Id. The finding regarding defamatory meaning was, therefore, dicta.
Nonetheless, the court's characterization of the statement as racist, rather than sexually
degrading, is interesting.
321. Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 733 (Va. 1985) (article about rape trial that
falsely indicated that victim was pregnant and unmarried at time of rape was defamatory).
322. See Brewer v. Memphis Publ'g Co., 626 F.2d 1238, 1245 (5th Cir. 1980) (implication
that woman was divorced and having an affair with a married man, who happened to be
Elvis Presley, assumed to carry defamatory meaning); Sauerhoff v. Hearst Corp., 538 F.2d
588, 591 (4th Cir. 1976) (newspaper report that married man, who had won the lottery,
had a "girlfriend," was "intrinsically defamatory" because it "can be read by innuendo as
meaning that [the two] were having an extra-marital affair"); Lyons v. Gilliland, 303 F.2d
452, 453 (9th Cir. 1962) (libelous statements accused plaintiff of adultery with defendant's
husband); Knievel v. ESPN, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1176 (D. Mont. 2002) (statement
that Evel Knievel was a pimp and his wife was a prostitute); Ellis v. Price, 990 S.W.2d 543,
545 (Ark. 1999) (defendants told plaintiffs husband that his wife was carrying another
man's child); Grimes v. Carter, 50 Cal. Rptr. 808, 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (defendant told
others that plaintiff had slept with two or more married men); Moreau v. Brenan, 466 So.
2d 572, 573 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (allegation that married woman engaged in "extra-marital
sexual relations" was defamatory, to both the woman and her husband); Devlin v. Greiner,
371 A.2d 380, 388 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (false statement by private detective to
husband stating that his wife had committed adultery not absolutely privileged); Mather-
son v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1004 (App. Div. 1984) (words "fooling around with his
wife" could mean that plaintiff was having an affair with one of the defendants and there-
fore be libelous per se).
Women do sometimes lose chastity cases, of course. See Campbell v. Seabury Press,
486 F. Supp. 298, 300 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (statement that plaintiff and her husband had
previously "practic[ed] marriage" was ambiguous and did not "necessarily refer to premari-
tal sexual intimacy or unchastity"); Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1026 (Colo. Ct. App.
1991) (allegation of adultery and homosexuality held not slander per se, causing plaintiff
to lose her case due to her failure to prove special damages); Schupmann v. Empire Fire &
Marine Ins. Co., 689 S.W.2d 101, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (statement questioning whether
minor plaintiff was pregnant, but not implying belief that she was, did not impugn her
chastity); Hoeck v. Tiedebohl, 391 P.2d 651, 652 (N.M. 1964) (holding that a statement
that woman was "expect[ing] an addition to an already half-grown family" not libelous per
se); Gaeta v. N.Y. News, Inc., 465 N.E.2d 802, 803 (N.Y. 1984) (article stating that woman
was involved in "messy divorce" and that she "dated other men" was not defamatory).
Cases based on statements that women are bad mothers are also not uncommon. See
Webster v. Wilkins, 456 S.E.2d 699, 700 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) ("She's unfit to have a kid.");
Overman v. Klein, 654 P.2d 888, 889 (Idaho 1982) (statements that children were physi-
cally abused, improperly supervised, and not suitably fed and clothed); Richie v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., 532 N.W.2d 235, 237-38 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (allegations of
sexual abuse); Satler v. Larsen, 520 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380 (App. Div. 1987) (report of physical
abuse); Tobin v. Sykes, 24 N.Y.S. 943, 943 (Gen. Term 1893) (plaintiff had been "punish-
ing" her child); Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307, 1308 (Utah 1990) (claims of sexual abuse).
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As in earlier eras, some courts have been very sensitive to the pos-
sibility that a statement alleged sexual impropriety. For example, the
Missouri Court of Appeals in a 1992 decision held that an allegation
that the plaintiff had "propositioned" business acquaintances was slan-
der per se.3 23 The court explained that, considering its vernacular
meaning, the statement "branded" the woman as one willing to "bar-
ter sexual favors for business gains." '324
A few contemporary cases might be considered "accidental" chas-
tity cases. In one case, for example, a television reporter stated that
the plaintiff was "an alleged prostitute," but in doing so had acciden-
tally transposed the plaintiffs name with that of the woman who was
in fact the alleged prostitute.3 25 In another, a television news feature
on prostitution showed a film clip of the African-American plaintiff at
a time when the reporter was noting that "street prostitutes [are]
often black. '3 26 The court held that this posed a jury question with
regard to defamatory meaning.3 27
Regardless of the fact that accident, rather than malice, caused
these unfavorable portrayals, the plaintiffs' successes in these cases
demonstrate contemporary courts' sensitivity to false portrayals of wo-
men that show them to be unchaste or engaged in behavior that is
generally viewed as sexually immoral. Like their more numerous fore-
runners, contemporary chastity cases of this "traditional" variety have
the unfortunate effect of reinforcing the social significance of a wo-
man's sexual propriety.
2. Epithet-Based Cases.-As illustrated by numerous cases over the
years, a statement calling a woman a whore was long seen as conveying
defamatory meaning.32 8 Cases based on such assertions were at that
time winners for women, as courts were quick to conclude that such
statements meant that the woman had engaged in inappropriate-or
323. Balderree v. Beeman, 837 S.W.2d 309, 324-25 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). Interestingly,
the court's decision was based on the fact that the statement imputed to her "misconduct
and lack of integrity in her occupation, bespeaking unfitness to perform it." Id. In decid-
ing the case on that basis, the court did not have to consider whether the statements also
imputed "serious sexual misconduct." Id. at 325.
324. Id. at 324.
325. O'Hara v. Storer Communications, Inc., 282 Cal. Rptr. 712, 714 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991).
326. Clark v. Am. Broad. Co., 684 F.2d 1208, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
327. Id. at 1219.
328. See supra notes 109-110 (discussing nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century
cases in which women were defamed by being so labeled).
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even illegal-sexual behavior.3 29 Epithets such as "bitch" and "slut"
were less reliably held defamatory, but frequently also provided the
basis for winning suits. 33 ° In the contemporary era, however, sexually
hateful epithets, when they constitute most or the entirety of the of-
fending statement, have rarely been the foundation of successful defa-
mation actions.33 ' Courts now tend to see the statement as personal
invective or opinion without any "ascertainable content. "332 Further,
courts considering such cases are concerned about running afoul of
First Amendment protection of hate speech. 3
Courts adjudicating claims based on sexually hateful epithets
often do not contemplate that the words have anything to do with sex,
gender, or chastity at all. Instead, they view these statements essen-
tially as expressions of personal contempt.3 34 Any meaning related to
sexual impropriety has been largely neutralized over the years as our
use of language has changed. 335 The gender angle attendant in the
words is nevertheless still present in relation to the targeted person's
own gender because it reinforces gender as a basis for the disdain or
hatred expressed. Jane Caputi has written, "[b] itch functions as a uni-
versal term of contempt for women, '"336 and in any event the power
and meaning of sexually hateful epithets may be perceived quite dif-
ferently by women than by men. 37
Typical of contemporary cases are Ward v. Zelikovsky338 and Lee v.
Metropolitan Airport Commission,339 which represent two courts' deter-
329. See, e.g., Williams v. Greenwade, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 432, 1835 WL 1920, at *1 (1835)
(calling a woman a "drunken whore ... necessarily import[s] slander, because it is impossi-
ble to be a whore without being guilty of fornication or adultery").
330. See, e.g., Craver v. Norton, 86 N.W. 54, 54 (Iowa 1901) (concluding that the word
"bitch" has a defamatory meaning).
331. See Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 983 (N.J. 1994) (concluding that the word
"bitch" did not have a verifiable factual meaning); Lee v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 428
N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that statements calling the plaintiff
"fluffy," a "bitch," or "flirtatious" were too imprecise to be actionable).
332. Ward, 643 A.2d at 983.
333. See supra note 309 (discussing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)).
334. See Caputi, supra note 248, at 65-69 (describing past and contemporary use of the
word "bitch").
335. See, e.g., Knievel v. ESPN, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1180-81 (D. Mont. 2002) (re-
fusing to find label of "pimp" defamatory due to the various innocuous contemporary
meanings of the word).
336. Caputi, supra note 248, at 65.
337. See Love, supra note 306, at 147-49, discussed in Bowman, supra note 19, at 565 (not-
ing that sexist speech may be common in our society because the average person regards it
as unavoidable, or even acceptable, because we apply a majoritarian test to discriminatory
speech targeting a member of a non-dominant group).
338. 643 A.2d 972 (N.J. 1994).
339. 428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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minations that calling a woman a "bitch" was not actionable. In Ward,
the statement was made at a condominium association meeting at
which the plaintiff was apparently also accused of being an anti-Sem-
ite.141 In Lee, the statement was made in the workplace.3 ' In both
cases, the courts concluded that the offending comment was an opin-
ion and was, therefore, not actionable in defamation.342 In Ward, for
example, the court wrote that "[a] ithough extremely offensive to Mrs.
Ward and perhaps understood by those who heard it to express a neg-
ative opinion of her, defendant's description of Mrs. Ward as a 'bitch'
was 'simply personal invective.' ,,3 43 Acknowledging that "bitch" is "un-
doubtedly disparaging," the court nevertheless said that to consider it
actionable would be to "imbue the term with a meaning it does not
have. '3 4 4 The court wrote:
Such a holding would, in effect, say that some objective facts
exist to justify characterizing someone as a bitch. If calling
someone a bitch is actionable, defendants must be able to
raise the defense of truth. "Bitch" in its common everyday
use is vulgar but non-actionable name calling that is incapa-
ble of objective truth or falsity. A reasonable listener hearing
the world "bitch" would interpret the term to indicate merely
that the speaker disliked Mrs. Ward and is otherwise inarticu-
late. Although Zelikovsky's manner of expression was very
offensive, our slander laws do not redress offensive ideas. Be-
cause the term "bitch" has no ascertainable content, is not
verifiable and the context does not imbue the term with a
fact intensive meaning, the trial court should have ruled the
"bitch" statement non-actionable.345
340. Ward, 643 A.2d at 975-76 (stating that defendant allegedly "jumped up" at a meet-
ing and said of plaintiff, " [s ] he's a bitch," and either "[t ] hey don't like Jews" or "they hate
Jews").
341. In addition, the plaintiff in Lee was apparently called "fluffy" and flirtatious. Lee,
428 N.W.2d at 821. The plaintiff also alleged that she was "defamed when fellow employ-
ees made comments at a meeting and in personal conversations which occurred in the
office, regarding alleged sexual affairs, the manner in which she got her job, and other
comments regarding her character." Id. at 819.
342. Ward, 643 A.2d at 979-80; Lee, 428 N.W.2d at 820, 821 (citingJanklow v. Newsweek,
Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir. 1986), Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977)). The Lee court wrote that "the social context of these
statements, office gossip and banter, would not lead a listener to believe them as state-
ments of fact." Id. at 821.
343. 643 A.2d at 982 (quoting Ward v. Zelikovsky, 623 A.2d 285 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1993) (Skillman, J., dissenting)).
344. Id.
345. Id. at 982-83.
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The Lee court wrote that the terms were "too imprecise in nature to be
actionable defamatory statements" and that summary judgment for
the defendant was appropriate because the statements were "mere
opinions." 346 These courts' reliance on a statement's character as
opinion is akin to that of courts in the new chastity cases, as I discuss
further below.
Some contemporary courts, in contrast, have regarded epithet-
based statements as capable of defamatory meaning. These cases gen-
erally involve the presence of what might be called explanatory words,
in addition to the epithets. This additional language tends to clarify
that the speaker is asserting something in relation to the woman's sex-
ual behavior. In Walia v. Vivek Purmasir & Associates, Inc., for example,
the court summarily concluded that the words "whore" and "slut" con-
stituted slander per se.34 7 There the plaintiffs male employer had so
characterized the plaintiff to members of her family and also to others
in their shared Indian community. 4' Given that these statements
were uttered after the plaintiff filed a sexual harassment suit based on
the defendant's egregious behavior in the workplace-for example,
squeezing the plaintiffs breasts, asking her to sit in his lap, ordering
her a cocktail dress, and telling her she would marry him if he were
not already married-it is not surprising that the court viewed the
words "whore" and "slut" as related to the plaintiffs sexual behavior
or propriety.349 Nevertheless, the court might as easily have dismissed
them as epithets, verbal assaults that merely expressed the defendant's
anger that the plaintiff had sued him and carried no meaning regard-
ing her character or behavior. 5°
In Branda v. Sanford,351 a fifteen-year-old hotel busgirl sued come-
dian Redd Foxx for allegedly calling her a "fucking bitch," "fucking
cunt," and "no lady. '3 52 The plaintiff had the encounter with Foxx as
she performed her duties as a busgirl at a Las Vegas hotel, when Foxx
346. Lee, 428 N.W.2d at 821.
347. 160 F. Supp. 2d 380, 394-95 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). In so holding, the court cited the
New York Civil Rights statute, N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS Law § 77 (McKinney 1992) and Courtney v.
Mannheim, 14 N.Y.S. 929 (Brooklyn City Ct. Gen. Term 1891), in which the City Court of
Brooklyn held that the word "whore" is slanderous per se under New York Law. Walia, 160
F. Supp. 2d at 394-95.
348. Walia, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
349. Id. at 383-84, 394-95.
350. Interestingly, the court seemed quite attuned to the cultural context in which this
occurred, specifically the parties' situation in the "Indian community" in which "people
blame the woman." Id. at 384. The court valued the damage to the plaintiffs reputation
and standing in the community at $20,000. Id. at 395.
351. 637 P.2d 1223 (Nev. 1981).
352. Id. at 1224.
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also asked her if her name, Cheryl, was "like in cherry." '53 She sued
him for both defamation and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress.3 5 4 The trial court determined that the words "cherry" and
"bitch" did not imply unchastity and were therefore not slander per
se.3" On appeal the Nevada Supreme Court agreed that the words
were not, as a matter of law, slanderous per se, but held that a jury
should have been allowed to determine whether, in light of the con-
text in which spoken, the words were defamatory.356 The court noted
the "ample testimony" that Foxx spoke additional words that could be
construed to be defamatory. 7 In particular, the court said, "'you're
no lady,' '[profanity] shouldn't bother you,' and 'f-k-g bitch"'
could be seen to "impute unchastity. ''3 58  On the other hand, the
court acknowledged that these statements were also capable of a non-
defamatory construction, "as insults and epithets, rhetoric which is
not generally actionable. 3 5' 9  The court cited other cases where
"bitch," modified by "low-lived" or "whoring," had been held suscepti-
ble of a defamatory construction, 360 but did not acknowledge that
those cases dated back nearly a century.
Smith v. Atkins36 is another case in which the statement's charac-
ter as opinion or epithet was not raised in defense. There, a female
law student sued for defamation and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress after her law professor allegedly called her a "slut" in a
classroom setting.362 While some details were disputed, it was appar-
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1225-26; see also Halliday v. Cienkowski, 3 A.2d 372, 373 (Pa. 1939) (finding
use of the word "bitch" not actionable per se).
356. Branda, 637 P.2d at 1226.
357. Id.
358. Id.
359. Id. (citing Raible v. Newsweek, Inc., 341 F. Supp. 804 (W.D. Pa. 1972)); Cinquanta
v. Burdett, 388 P.2d 779 (Colo. 1964)). The court did not acknowledge that the words
might carry defamatory meaning on some basis other than one related to the plaintiffs
chastity, i.e., that the plaintiff was a hateful or extremely unpleasant woman. Compare
Smith v. Atkins, 622 So. 2d 795, 799-800 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (assuming "slut" went to
plaintiff's sexual propriety), with Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d 972, 982-83 (N.J. 1994), and
Lee v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815, 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (both assum-
ing that "bitch" did not relate to plaintiffs' sexual propriety).
360. Branda, 637 P.2d at 1226 (citing Craver v. Norton, 86 N.W. 54 (Iowa 1901)); Cam-
eron v. Cameron, 144 S.W. 171 (Mo. Ct. App. 1912).
361. 622 So. 2d 795 (La. Ct. App. 1993).
362. Id. at 797. The facts were disputed regarding precisely what the professor said. She
alleged that he had, on several occasions during class, made her and another female stu-
dent "the example in his hypotheticals or the butt of his comments." Id. at 796. Although
she says she asked him to cease doing so, he did not. Id. Over the course of the semester,
the professor frequently "told the class that he had seen Theresa Smith at a nightclub
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ently agreed that the professor had recounted to the class a story
about seeing the plaintiff at a local bar, where she fell to the floor as
she started to sit.363 After the defendant told the story, the plaintiff
apparently challenged him, in front of the class, about why he had not
helped her up.364 He "responded with either 'I aint' pickin' no Slut
up off the floo" or an elaborate mock stage-whisper 'Slut." 365
The trial court found that the defendant had defamed the plain-
tiff. 66 The appellate court upheld the verdict, summarily concluding
that "calling a woman a 'slut' is defamatory per se."367 The court did not
specify whether its conclusion was based on the common-law rule that
a statement impugning a woman's chastity was slanderous per se.3 68
Judge Plotkin's concurrence with the holding was more thorough
and analytical. He disagreed that calling a woman a "'slut' is always
actionable as defamatory per se," '369 but noted that Louisiana law does
hold that "using words imputing 'immorality or other traits or acts
calculated to arouse hatred, ridicule, etc."' generally is defamatory
per se. 370 He made determinative of the statement's meaning the
context and circumstances surrounding its utterance.7 t On that ba-
sis, he concluded that the defendant had defamed the plaintiff "by
saying what he said in the way that he said it, without making sweeping
named 'Whispers' in New Orleans over the weekend." Id. On the day at issue, he "publicly
ridiculed and humiliated Theresa Smith by recounting an embarrassing moment that had
happened to her the past weekend at 'Whispers.'" Id. Apparently after consuming a num-
ber of drinks, the plaintiff, while returning to her seat, "missed the seat, landing on the
floor." Id. The defendant recounted this incident to the entire class. Id. at 797.
363. Id. at 796-97.
364. Id. at 797.
365. Id. Compare these facts to those described in Lisa R. Pruitt, Law Review Story, 50
ARK. L. REv. 77, 77-81 (1997).
366. Atkins, 622 So. 2d. at 799. The trial court also found that she had not proved
"damage to reputation or loss of esteem of her fellow student [sic]." Id. The court set
damages at $1500 plus legal costs and interest. Id.
367. Id. at 800 (discussing Manale v. City of New Orleans Dep't of Police, 673 F.2d 122,
125 (5th Cir. 1982), in which calling a male police officer "a little fruit," "fruit," and "gay"
was held defamatory per se). Further, finding the award of $1500 inadequate and an abuse
of the court's discretion, the appeals court increased it to $5000, calling that "the lowest
amount that could be awarded." Id.
368. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing this common law rule of
slander per se). However, in its discussion of Manale, the court noted that "Louisiana law
distinguishes between statements only susceptible of a defamatory meaning and those that
are defamatory 'per se.' It defines the latter type as those having a tendency to deprive a
person of the benefit of public confidence or to injure him in his occupation or reputa-
tion." Atkins, 622 So. 2d at 799 (quoting Manale, 673 F.2d at 125 (citations omitted)).
369. Atkins, 622 So. 2d at 802 (Plotkin, J., concurring).
370. Id. (citing Moreau v. Brenan, 466 So. 2d 572, 574 (La. Ct. App. 1985)).
371. Id.
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statements about whether the same word might be actionable under
other circumstances.
372
Judge Plotkin undoubtedly came closer than his colleague writing
for the majority to doing justice to the question of whether the word
"slut" carries defamatory meaning. Still, none of the judges took up
the question of the actual meaning of the word "slut." The judges did
not inquire, for example, whether it connotes a lack of chastity or
some sexual impropriety, or whether it might be defamatory based on
some other connotation. Even Judge Plotkin focuses more on the
context in which the word was uttered than on its content.374 None of
the opinions in Smith, however, mentioned rhetorical hyperbole or
epithet-concepts that have defeated so many similar claims and
which might have defeated this one.375
These epithet-based cases demonstrate how little has changed
over the years in terms of women being targeted by sexually hateful
epithets, both standing alone and in the context of other disparaging
remarks. What has changed is the greater difficulty that contemporary
women experience in winning such lawsuits. Losing cases usually fail
on the basis that they are protected opinion. 76 These cases demon-
strate that the statements deemed actionable are typically those in
which the epithets are accompanied by other remarks, or, in the event
of Walia, events that make it reasonable to interpret them as attacking
the plaintiffs reputation for sexual propriety. 377 For it is on that basis,
and not because they may also be misogynistic hate speech, that courts
grant redress.3 7a The epithet cases therefore fall between traditional
372. Id. He went on to note his agreement with the increase in damages award based on
what he called the "egregious circumstances" of the case, noting the "personal attack on
[a] student[ ] in [a] crowded classroom setting" and the "insular, closed environment,
where the plaintiff was very vulnerable, both personally and professionally." Id. at 803.
Another concurring judge, without stating reasons, said that he would have raised the dam-
ages awarded to $10,000. Id. at 802 (Barry, J., concurring). Chief Judge Schott in his
dissent seemed to suggest that his colleagues were unduly sympathetic to the plaintiff and
that they based their findings on their own evaluations of witnesses' credibility, which dif-
fered from those of the trial court. Id. at 801 (Schott, CJ., dissenting).
373. See id. at 802 (Plotkin, J., concurring).
374. Id. at 802-03. Cases like Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) and
Pring v. Penthouse International, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) also illustrate the signifi-
cance of context. See infra notes 384-400 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 328-360 and accompanying text (discussing Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643
A.2d 972 (NJ. 1994); Lee v. Metro. Airport Comm'n, 428 N.W.2d 815 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988)); see also infra notes 423-442 and accompanying text (examining Seelig v. Infinity
Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002), and others).
376. See, e.g., Ward, 643 A.2d at 974-80; Lee, 428 N.W.2d at 820-21.
377. Walia v. Vivek Purmasir & Assocs., Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 380, 394-95 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), discussed supra notes 347-350.
378. Id.
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chastity cases and new chastity cases on a continuum that also runs the
gamut between statements that undermine one's reputation for chas-
tity and those that ridicule and demean on the basis of sexuality.
3. The "New Chastity" Cases.-What I have labeled the new chas-
tity cases arise from portrayals that parody or otherwise ridicule a
plaintiff in relation to her sexual personhood. The female plaintiffs
who bring these lawsuits are often private persons, known only to their
respective circles of family and friends.37 9 They are sometimes rela-
tively high-profile women, such as models or actresses of limited
fame.380 They are rarely politicians or others involved in matters of
public controversy.38 t Whatever their status as public or private, it
rarely determines the outcome of a woman's chastity-related suit. In-
stead, the defamation lawsuits these women bring are rarely success-
ful 38 2 because of other constitutional doctrines: those that protect
379. See, e.g., Clark v. Am. Broad. Co., 684 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (6th Cir. 1982) (describing
a private woman's experiences after being portrayed as a prostitute on a television
broadcast).
380. Professor Ruth Colker, who has written about cases including the type I call new
chastity cases, sorted plaintiffs into five categories:
(1) well-known nonpolitical individuals, often models or actresses who are por-
trayed sexually without their consent; (2) private individuals who have informa-
tion about their sexual behavior or sexual victimization published in news-related
stories without their knowledge or consent; (3) public or private figures who are
portrayed in dramatic fictionalizations of their sexual behavior without their con-
sent; (4) individuals who seek to enter the arena of political dialogue and face
sexual invectives about their gender; and (5) private individuals who appear in
advertisements in a sexually suggestive context without their knowledge or
consent.
Ruth Colker, Published Consentless Sexual Portrayals: A Proposed Framework for Analysis, 35
Buiw. L. REv. 39, 42-43 (1986) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Colker, Published Consentless
Portrayals]. The plaintiffs in the cases that are my focus fall primarily into categories 1 and
5, but with respect to the latter category, the publications are rarely advertisements and
more often editorial content in the respective publications.
Professor Colker's project took an approach different to mine. In particular, she dis-
cussed these matters in relation to the law on pornography and invasion of privacy. She
proposed a framework for analysis of cases which she characterized as "consentless sexual
portrayals." Id. at 62-68. Her work preceded development of many of the constitutional
doctrines that have so complicated the litigation of these claims in the past twenty years.
See also Ruth Colker, Legislative Remedies for Unauthorized Sexual Portrayals: A Proposa4 20
NEW. ENG. L. REv. 687 (1984-85); Ruth Colker, Pornography and Privacy: Towards the Develop-
ment of a Group Based Theory for Sex Based Intrusion of Privacy, 1 LAw & INEQ. 191 (1983)
[hereinafter Colker, Pornography and Privacy].
381. However, for example, one case, Montandon v. Triangle Publications, Inc., did involve
a well-known author who had falsely been described as a "call girl" in a national publica-
tion. 120 Cal. Rptr. 186, 188 (Ct. App. 1975).
382. As already noted, facts that give rise to defamation suits may also give rise to suits
for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, increasingly, sexual
harassment. Nevertheless, the only one of these causes of action that provides much prom-
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opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, and other types of statements that are
unlikely to be "taken literally" by those who perceive them.383
Pring v. Penthouse84 is representative of the parody cases in which
women have turned to defamation law seeking redress. The plaintiff
was Kimerli Jayne Pring, a former Miss Wyoming who sued on the
basis of a story in Penthouse magazine. 385 The story, set at a Miss
America contest, was about a Miss Wyoming contestant named
Charlene, whose talent was baton twirling.38 6 In the story, as she was
about to perform her talent, Charlene was described as thinking
about an incident back in Wyoming when she caused a football player
to levitate by performing an act of fellatio on him. 87 When the story
returns to the contest stage, Miss Wyoming is said to be performing
her talent, which is a fellatio-like act on her baton.3 8  Later, she is
described as fantasizing about "sav[ing] the world" with her "real tal-
ent"389 before performing an act of fellatio with her coach at the edge
of the stage.390 This causes her coach to levitate while the audience
applauds the new Miss America-a contestant other than Miss Wyo-
ming-at center stage.3 91 The story ends with a description of the
television cameras remaining on Miss Wyoming and her coach, rather
than on the new Miss America.392
In legal arguments, Penthouse characterized the story as a "spoof
of the contest, ridicule, an attempt to be humorous, 'black humor,' a
complete fantasy which could not be taken literally."39 3 In her com-
plaint, Pring asserted that the article "create[d] the impression" that
ise for plaintiffs bringing new chastity cases is false light invasion of privacy. See infra Part
V.A.1 (discussing cases).
383. See, e.g., Knievel v. ESPN, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1182-83 (D. Mont. 2003) (find-
ing that a reasonable person would not conclude that a photo caption implied that a wo-
man was a prostitute).
384. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982). Ms. Pring's lawyer, Gerry Spence, has written a book
about the trial. GERRY SPENCE, TRIAL By FIRE: THE TRUE STORY OF A WOMAN'S ORDEAL AT
THE HANDS OF THE LAW (1986).
Other cases involving sexually demeaning portrayals pre-date Pring and are discussed
in Colker, Pornography and Privacy, supra note 380, at 213-15. These include Vitale v. Na-
tional Lampoon, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d
8 (Sup. Ct. 1959); and Martin v. Senators, Inc., 418 S.W.2d 660 (Tenn. 1967).
385. Pring, 695 F.2d at 439.
386. Id. at 440-41.
387. Id. at 441.
388. Id.
389. Id. Specifically, she considers the possibility of preventing World War III by using
her talent on the entire Soviet Central Committee, Marshall Tito, and Fidel Castro. Id.
390. Id
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. at 439.
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she had performed fellatio on her coach in the presence of a national
television audience at the pageant and that she had committed fella-
tio-like acts upon her baton at the pageant. 94 While lay witnesses for
the plaintiff testified that the article "could not be about the plaintiff,"
her expert witness argued that "some individuals might attach a
broader subliminal meaning of sexual permissiveness." '95 At trial, the
plaintiff won one of the largest damages awards ever granted in a defa-
mation case: $1.5 million in actual damages and $25 million in puni-
tive damages.396
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, however, re-
versed the jury and dismissed Pring's complaint based on its conclu-
sion that the offending publication could not be perceived as
describing actual facts or events.397 While describing the article as "a
gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the Miss
America contest and contestants" with "no redeeming features
what[so]ever," the court explained that the article nevertheless de-
served First Amendment protection.3 9 ' Because the story described
something that was "physically impossible in an impossible setting,"
the court said that readers would have understood the offending por-
tions as "pure fantasy and nothing else. '3 99 Indeed, in its analysis, the
court failed altogether to acknowledge any impact on Kimerli Pring as
the contestant identified, and mentioned the faceless institution of
394. Id. at 441.
395. Id. at 442-43.
396. SPENCE, supra note 384, at 397. In addition, Pring was awarded $10,000 in actual
damages and $25,000 in punitive damages against the author of the article, Philip Cioffari.
Id. Ruling on post-trial motions, the district judge reduced the $25 million in punitive
damages awarded against Penthouse to $12.5 million. Id. at 421.
397. Pring, 695 F.2d at 442 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
Cf Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992),
discussed infra at notes 542-555 and accompanying text. The plaintiff there, 96-year-old
Nellie Mitchell, sued when the Sun newspaper published her photo with a story headed
"World's oldest newspaper carrier, 101, quits because she's pregnant. I guess walking all
those miles kept me young." Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp.
791, 793 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
398. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443 (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (holding
that the First Amendment protected "vulgar magazines").
399. Id. (citing Greenbelt, 398 U.S. at 6). Elsewhere the court wrote: "It is impossible to
believe that anyone could understand that levitation could be accomplished by oral sex
before a national television audience or anywhere else. The incidents charged were impos-
sible. The setting was impossible." Id. The court also wrote that the statements "were
obviously a complete fantasy." Id.
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the Miss America pageant and its multiple contestants as the only
targets. 400
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Breitenstein asserted that the of-
fending publication contained both fact and fiction.40 ' While the de-
tails of the levitation, dreams, and public performance were fiction, he
wrote, "[fl ellatio is not. It is a physical act, a fact, not a mental idea.
Fellatio has long been recognized as an act of sexual deviation or per-
version."40 2 Emphasizing that the word "'fellatio' was not used as a
hyperbole or epithet," and that Penthouse did not claim that the "fact
statement" about fellatio was truthful, Judge Brietenstein concluded
that the article defamed Pring's character and was not protected by
the first amendment.40 3 Thus Breitenstein acknowledged Pring's in-
jury, in typical chastity-case defamation terms, as one to Pring's repu-
400. Id. In a separate suit, the Miss America pageant sued Penthouse for defamation.
Miss America Pageant, Inc. v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981). The
plaintiff lost based on its inability to establish actual malice, but the court expressly refused
to hold that the story was protected by the first amendment by virtue of its satirical form.
Id. at 1287-88.
401. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
402. Id. at 443-44. He went on to say that
[r]esponsibility for an irresponsible and reckless statement of fact, fellatio, may
not be avoided by the gratuitous addition of fantasy. Penthouse does not claim
that the fact statement was truthful. Moral standards may have changed since the
First Amendment was adopted but that change has not gone so far as to protect a
publisher which defames [a person] by relating commission of an act of sexual
deviation and perversion.
Id. at 444. Breitenstein's expression of his outrage at this statement is reminiscent of nine-
teenth-century judges who expressed similar outrage when women were accused of lack of
chastity, let alone perversion. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
Judge Breitenstein went to some length to distinguish the present case from National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, in which the plaintiffs had been referred to as "scabs" in a union
publication, and Greenbelt, in which a newspaper report of a city council meeting character-
ized the "plaintiffs negotiating position as 'blackmail."' Pring, 695 F.2d at 444. Breiten-
stein specifically pointed out that in both cases the defamatory statement was true. Id. He
argued that nothing in either case applied a "'reasonably understood' test to defamation
actions generally." Id. In concluding that the statement was true, Breitenstein presumably
referred to both the non-literal interpretation regarding an unreasonable bargaining posi-
tion, as well as to the facts indicating it was true. This is discussed further infra at notes
627-634.
The legal implications of an allegedly defamatory communication being opinion or
rhetorical hyperbole, particularly in the workplace setting, are discussed in a recent article.
Lewis & Mersol, supra note 252.
403. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting). Judge Breitenstein distin-
guished the offending statement in Pring from two Supreme Court cases relied upon by the
majority and long associated with constitutional protection of opinion. He observed that
the protected opinion at stake in each of those cases was, in fact, true. Id. See generally Nat'l
Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (stating that the epithet at issue
was based on truth); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (noting
that the offensive behavior at issue was described truthfully).
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tation based on false allegations that she had engaged in sexually
deviant behavior.
4 °4
Geary v. Goldstein4 °5 is another such "new" chastity case, again one
in which a relatively high profile woman sued on the basis of a sexu-
ally degrading portrayal of her.4 ° 6 There, a producer of pornographic
television programming converted a television commercial for Wasa
Crispbread, in which model Angie Geary appeared, into an unautho-
rized video that juxtaposed scenes from the commercial with graphic
sexual images.40 7  Geary sued for defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy.40 8 In conflicting opinions, Judge Kimba Wood initially charac-
terized the offending video as capable of defamatory meaning,40 9 but
three years later she granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the video was a parody and that no reason-
able viewer would fail to perceive it as such.4 10
Geary was hired by Wasa to appear in a television commercial for
its product.411 The commercial juxtaposed two types of scenes: some
of the plaintiff in a towel emerging from a morning shower and meet-
ing her male companion in the kitchen in his bathrobe and some
showing various types of bread, including the Wasa Crispbread prod-
404. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444. Breitenstein's assessment of truth in the Greenbelt and Letter
Carriers cases reveals that he looks beyond hyperbole to determine the non-literal message
conveyed.
405. 831 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) [hereinafter Geary I].
406. Id. at 270.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 271.
409. Id. at 277-78. Judge Wood held that Geary's cause of action for defamation was
viable. Id. at 278.
410. Geary v. Goldstein, 1996 WL 447776, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) [hereinafter Geary I].
In a somewhat similar case, a professional model who had posed for a cigarette advertising
campaign sued when Hustler magazine reproduced the ad, in a slightly altered form, as a
parody. Byrd v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 433 So. 2d 593, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). In
the original ad for Viceroy cigarettes, the plaintiff was "making the famous 'V' for victory
sign." Id. Hustler airbrushed the photograph to eliminate one of the plaintiffs fingers,
giving "the impression that [he] was making an obscene gesture." Id. The caption be-
neath the photo read:
Up Your Ad When you saw this ad in magazines or on billboards, you might re-
member having seen this gentleman with two fingers-rather than one-raised in
front of his face. But the reader who sent us this couldn't resist the temptation to
change the picture. We can't blame him-this is probably what the cigarette
companies are saying to Americans.
Id. Although ajury awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in his defamation and invasion of privacy
claim, the appellate court reversed. Id. at 595. The court said that the caption sufficiently
clarified that the photo, as it appeared, had not been consented to by the plaintiff. Id.
Thus, his argument that it created false impression of him necessarily failed. Id.
411. Geary 1, 831 F. Supp. at 270.
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uct.4 12 The beginning of the voiceover recited statistics indicating
how many million people eat "this as bread," accompanied by a pic-
ture of a bagel, then how many million people "eat this" while show-
ing a picture of a croissant.413 It ended by cutting to a picture of Wasa
Crispbread.414 The remaining voiceover stated: "[0] nly eight million
eat this as bread. These people produce more safe cars and blond
beauties. They invented the Nobel prize and the zipper. They also
play better tennis, and they watch less television. That's the Swedish
way. Wasa Crispbread. You can have it in America. '4 15 Accompany-
ing the latter part of the final voiceover was video of Geary leaning
back on the kitchen counter and embracing her companion as she
accidentally knocks a box of Wasa Crispbread from the counter.41 6
The underlying message seemed to be that the couple portrayed eat
Wasa and consequently are happier, feel healthier, and perhaps have
a better sex life.
The defendant was inspired by this commercial to adapt it for
Midnight Blue, a "sexually explicit late-night cable television pro-
gram."4 7 The adaptation's first half maintained the voiceover's initial
sentences, as well as the parts of the commercial in which Geary ap-
peared.418 Those parts were juxtaposed, however, not with pictures of
different bread products, but rather with images of "scantily clad
couples, apparently engaging in oral sex and vaginal and anal inter-
course."419 Rather than implying that people eat bread, the adapta-
tion implied that the "this" which people ate were sex organs or that
they engaged in the sexual activities portrayed.420 At one point, for
example, "in a pornographic part of the adaptation a man ejaculates
into the mouth of a woman whose face is obscured. The adaptation
immediately cuts to Ms. Geary wiping her mouth," a clip from the
original commercial. 42' As the voiceover's second paragraph contin-
ued, the adaptation "consisted almost entirely of pornographic video-
tape with little cutting to the original commercial, except that it
broadcast the visual of Wasa Crispbread with the commercial's tag
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id. at 275 n.6.
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line: "Wasa Crispbread. You can have it in America. '422 The defen-
dant received the permission of neither Geary nor Wasa to use any
part of the commercial, and Wasa stopped running its commercial
after the adaptation was broadcast, thereby ending the plaintiff's roy-
alty income.423
In her initial consideration of Geary's defamation claim, Judge
Wood had no difficulty concluding that the Midnight Blue adaptation
was a "statement."424 She also found that Geary had stated a cause of
action for defamation because it was possible that some reasonable
viewers could believe that the plaintiff "willingly participated in a por-
nographic video segment-and that such an interpretation could be
one that 'brings her into hatred, contempt or ridicule by asserting
some moral discredit upon [her] part.' "425 Three years later, how-
ever, on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, Judge Wood
reached a contrary conclusion. 4 26 Finding in this second opinion that
what she had previously characterized as pornography was clearly a
"parody"4 27
-and using the term "parody" throughout her opinion to
422. Id. at 270.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 277 (citing Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1977); Burton v.
Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936)).
425. Id. at 277 (citing Schermerhorn v. Rosenberg, 426 N.Y.S.2d 274, 281 (App. Div.
1980)). In a footnote, Judge Wood went on to disagree with Douglass v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 769 F.2d 1128, 1135 (7th Cir. 1985), in which Judge Posner had written that the
implication that someone appeared in pornography could not be defamatory "in today's
moral climate." Id. She wrote:
I disagree that such a conclusion is so clear that it can be reached as a matter of
law. One need only consider that a mere nine years ago, a woman was prevented
from serving as Miss America because she had posed for nude photos several
years before. See "Miss American Asked to Quit Over Photos Showing Her Nude,"
New York Times, July 21, 1984, Al Col. 6 (quoting executive director of Miss
America Pageant as saying that for Vanessa Williams to 'remain as Miss America
would seriously jeopardize and irrevocably damage the entire Miss America Pag-
eant program'). I cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that an actress trying to
succeed in mainstream productions would not face serious obstacles to her career
and a damaged reputation in her community, if people believed that she had
appeared in pornography.
Id. at 277 n.10. There is, of course, a certain irony in Wood's statements, given thatJudge
Wood's own career was affected by the revelation that she had been involved with the
Playboy organization. See, e.g., Ruth Marcus & Mary Jordan, Clinton Resumes Hunt for Attor-
ney General, BUFFALO NEWS, Feb. 7, 1993, at A10 (stating thatJudge Wood trained briefly as
a Playboy Bunny in the 1960s); Clinton Resumes Search for AG; Critics Say Wood Abandoned,
DALLAs MORNING NEWS, Feb. 7, 1993, at 8A (stating that many were concerned that Wood
trained at a Playboy Club while a student).
426. Geary II, 1996 'WL 447776, at *4.
427. Id. at *1 n.2. Interestingly, Judge Wood cites the then-recent Supreme Court deci-
sion in Campbell v. Acuff Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580 (1994). In that case, the Court
discussed the meaning and obviousness of parody in the context of the fair use defense to
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refer to the offending video-Judge Wood concluded that "most rea-
sonable viewers would correctly infer" that each set of juxtaposed
images came from a different source.4 28
Citing the defendant's own filings in the case, the court wrote, in
a footnote, that Midnight Blue "substituted for [the advertisement's]
bland images of bread shocking images of sex in order to expose and
ridicule the [advertisement's allegedly] exploitative sexuality. ... The
work is a classic parody in that it retained characteristic aspects of the
original work, and also had the effect of ridiculing the original
work." '429 Judge Wood noted that its presentation within the "Mid-
night Blue" program would lead viewers to interpret it as a parody.43 °
The judge observed that a "theme of Midnight Blue" is "'the hypocrisy
of denying sexuality and the mainstream media's censoring of explicit
sex . . . while exploiting sex for purely commercial gain.'" 431 As for
"'channel-surfing' viewer[s]" who would not see enough of the show
to know that it was irreverent and featured other parodies, Judge
Wood declined to include them in the "category of reasonable view-
ers" because a statement must be interpreted considering "the full
copyright infringement, stating that parody in that context is "'a literary or artistic work
that imitates the characteristic style of... a work for comic effect or ridicule': or a "'com-
position in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of thought and phrase in an
author... are imitated in such a way as to make them appear ridiculous."' Id. (citing 11
OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY 247 (2d ed. 1989)). It seems odd thatJudge Wood chose to
state this part of her rationale in a footnote rather than in the text of the opinion.
428. Id. at *1.
429. Id.
430. Id. (quoting Defendant's Memorandum at 28).
431. Id. Wood quoted from Goldstein's deposition, in which he asserted that he was
'commenting on the fact that 'Madison Avenue, Wasa Bread, is using T and A to get me to
pay attention and to sell some hard piece of matzo-like bread.'" Id. She also emphasized
the disparity in production quality between the Wasa video clips and those added in the
Midnight Blue production as evidence that no reasonable viewer would conclude that it
was anything other than a parody. Id. The court wrote:
Here, for example, where the Parody effectively criticized Wasa for its use of sex-
ual innuendo in its advertising and ridiculed Geary's performance in the Wasa
advertisement, it is not reasonable for a viewer to infer that either Wasa or Geary
consented to Goldstein's use of the segments from the Advertisement, for pay-
ment or otherwise. The contrast between the crude, pornographic character of
the Parody and the high production quality of the Advertisement makes an infer-
ence of consent or association even less likely than in the case of a non-porno-
graphic parody.
Id. The court then cited Campbell, quipping that "'[p]eople ask for criticism, but they only
want praise.'" Id. at *2 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (quoting SOMERSET MAUGHAM, OF
Hu Ar BONDAGE 241 (Penguin ed. 1992))). On this basis, the court observed that there
was no reason that the plaintiff would be presumed to have consented to being the object
of criticism. Id.
[VOL. 63:401
Two CENTURIES OF TALK ABOUT CHAsTrrY
context" in which it was promulgated.43 2 Rejecting contrary interpre-
tation rules that she said would be "too dangerous to the rights of
media speakers" and relying expressly on "First Amendment values,"
the judge concluded that no reasonable viewer would have made the
defamatory inference alleged-that the plaintiff had participated in
or consented to the video.433 The implication of Geary's voluntary
association not being credible, Judge Wood concluded that she could
not have been defamed.434 Aside from the conclusion that the video
had not damaged Geary's reputation, at no point did the court ac-
knowledge how Midnight Blue's admitted ridicule of Geary might oth-
erwise have injured her.4" 5
The decision of the California Appellate Division in Seelig v. Infin-
ity Broadcasting Corp.4 36 provides yet another example, this one involv-
ing radio and therefore no visual component.437 The plaintiff, who
had been a losing contestant on the reality television show Who Wants
to Marry a Multimillionaire?, declined a request to be interviewed by the
defendant radio station.4 3 8 On the day when the segment of the tele-
vision show in which the plaintiff appeared was to air, two talk show
hosts on the defendant radio station were chatting about the televi-
sion show when one of the hosts said that "we have uh, a local loser"
on the television program. 439 He and his on-air producer, in the
course of banter about the television program and its local contestant,
referred to the plaintiff as "Chicken butt" and said, "I found out more
dirt about this girl, since we're not saying her name. She actually is
432. Id.; see alsoJames v. Gannett Co., 353 N.E.2d 834, 838 (N.Y. 1976); Frank v. Nat'l
Broad. Co., 506 N.Y.S.2d 869, 874 (App. Div. 1986); Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d
998, 1004 (App. Div. 1984); Orr v. Lynch, 401 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899 (App. Div. 1978). Judge
Wood opined that "it would be clear to any viewer who watched for more than a few min-
utes that both the Parody and Midnight Blue were produced by Goldstein; that they arose
from his particular set of beliefs; and hence that the Parody was part of the larger work of
the Midnight Blue Program." Geary II, 1996 WL 447776, at *3.
433. Geary I, 1996 WL 447776, at *3. In distancing herself from her earlier contrary
conclusion, Wood wrote that she had given "insufficient weight to New York precedent,"
thus emphasizing that a court must interpret a statement in context. Id. at *2.
434. Id. at *3.
435. See id. Judge Wood tailored her analysis narrowly to the defamation context.
436. 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108 (Cal. App. 2002).
437. Id at 111.
438. Because she was not selected to be one of five finalists, the plaintiff appeared on
the television show for less than a minute, stating only her name and that she worked in
sales at a radio station in San Francisco. Id. The plaintiff received the cost of a trip to Las
Vegas and some gifts, but she was not paid for her participation in the show. Id. The
reason the plaintiff gave for declining the interview was that she had participated in the
contest only as a "personal experience" and that she did not want to "bring attention to
herself or to chance being ridiculed or subjected to public humiliation." Id. at 112.
439. Id.
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the ex-wife of someone who works at our sister station down the hall.
And uh, yeh, he just says what a big skank she is." 440
In determining that it was unlikely that the plaintiff would prevail
on her claim,4 4 ' the court noted that a defamation claim must include
"a statement of fact that is provably false. ' 4 42 The court continued:
Statements do not imply a provably false factual assertion
and thus cannot form the basis of a defamation action if they
cannot "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts"
about an individual. Thus, "rhetorical hyperbole," "vigorous
epithet[s]," "lusty and imaginative expression[s] of. . . con-
tempt," and language used "in a loose, figurative sense" have
all been accorded constitutional protection . . . ." The dis-
positive question after the Milkovich case is whether a reason-
able trier of fact could conclude that the published
statements imply a provably false factual assertion.44 1
Thus, the question became whether "chicken butt," "big skank,"
and "local loser" could, considering the context in which they were
stated, reasonably be understood to state actual facts capable of being
proven false.44 4 Considering the literal meaning of "chicken butt,"
the court noted this must express the subjective interpretation of the
defendant because a "literal interpretation is nonsensical when ap-
plied to a human being." '4 4 5 Characterizing the statements varyingly
as "sophomoric," "in bad taste," "a school yard taunt," and "plainly a
derogatory figure of speech," the court nevertheless said that chicken
butt and local loser were "unquestionably statements of the speaker's
subjective judgment.44 6 They fall into the realm of "classic rhetorical
440. Id. The plaintiff was very upset and angry with her ex-husband for reportedly hav-
ing made these statements, but he denied having made them. The radio producer who
had made the comment on air later apologized for attributing the comment to him. Id. at
114.
441. Id. The analysis was offered pursuant to California's Anti-SLAPP Statute, aimed to
curtail lawsuits that "chill the valid exercise of. . . freedom of speech and petition for
redress of grievances." CA. Crv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2003). Pursuant to the statute,
the trial court is to grant a motion to strike "unless the court determines that the plaintiff
has established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim."
§ 425.16(b) (1).
442. Seelig, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1,
19 (1990)), which explained that an idea must be proven false to be actionable under
defamation law.
443. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ferlauto v. Ham-
sher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1401 (1999), and Moyer v. Amador ValleyJ. Union High
School Dist., 225 Cal. App. 3d 720, 724 (1990)) (citations omitted).
444. Id. at 117.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 117-18.
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hyperbole which cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actualfacts.' - 447
Although the plaintiff offered testimony that "big skank" meant
a woman of loose morals, 448 the court found it not actionable.449
The court called "skank" a "derogatory slang term of recent vintage
with no generally recognized meaning," "devoid of any factual con-
tent," and "too vague to be capable of being proven true or false."45
Focusing on what it called the "non-serious" nature of the broadcast,
the court called the exchange "light banter," noted that it was "fre-
quently punctuated by laughter," and concluded that "no reasonable
listener would take them as factual pronouncements."451
447. Id. at 117 (citing Ferlauto, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1404; quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at
20). The court considered them comparable to-indeed, indistinguishable from-
" 'creepazoid attorney'" and " 'loser wannabe lawyer,'" which had been found to be rhetori-
cal hyperbole in another case. Id. (quoting Ferlauto, 74 Cal. App. 4th at 1404).
448. Seelig, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118.
449. Id.
450. Id. at 118.
451. Id. Indeed, the court consistently dismissed the plaintiff's arguments, refusing to
take any of the comments about her seriously. As another example, at one point in the
proceedings plaintiff noted that the on-air producer had attributed the "skank remark" to
the plaintiff's "jilted ex-husband," arguing that jilted indicates that plaintiff "dumped her
husband as part of an infidelity or extramarital affair." Id. at 118; see also id. n.7. The court
quoted MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 629 (10th ed. 2000) to refute the argu-
ment, noting that jilt" is defined as "to drop (a lover) capriciously or unfeelingly." Id. at
n.7.
An analogous case involving male plaintiffs and the epithet "bastard" is Curtis Publ'g
Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d 344, 345 (5th Cir. 1966). There the defendant referred to the
Mississippi Highway Patrol as "bastards" who "walked off and left us" according to a quote
by ajustice Department official who was discussing joint efforts by the two law enforcement
bodies in relation to the registration of James Meredith as a student at the University of
Mississippi in 1962. Id. In analyzing whether "bastards" carried defamatory meaning, the
court took a very literal approach, writing:
[I]t is perfectly clear that no reasonable person of ordinary intelligence could
believe that the person whom the author of the article was quoting was accusing
every member of the Mississippi Highway Patrol who was on duty at Oxford of
having been born out of wedlock. On the contrary it is perfectly apparent that
these words were used as mere epithets, as terms of abuse and opprobrium. As
such they had no real meaning except to indicate that the individual who used
them was under a strong emotional feeling of dislike toward those about whom
he used them. Not being intended or understood as statements of fact they are
impossible of proof or disproof. Indeed such words of vituperation and abuse
reflect more on the character of the user than they do on that of the individual to
whom they are intended to refer. It has long been settled that such words are not
of themselves actionable as libelous. [Citations omitted] . . . [A court in 1838
stated] '[t]hat mere general abuse and scurrility, however ill-natured and vexa-
tious, is no more actionable when written than spoken, if it do not convey a de-
grading charge or imputation. Against all such attacks, a man needs no other
protection than a good character; and the law will not suppose that damage can
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By seeking and considering only the literal meaning of "chicken
butt," the court ignored the essence of the communication: an expres-
sion of disgust and disdain for the plaintiff. Its handling of "skank"
was similarly one-dimensional. In concluding that the word had no
"generally recognized meaning, '4 52 the court overlooked its dictionary
definition: "a prostitute or a dirty, repulsive, or immoral person. 45
The court also ignored the dictionary's note that the word's use dates
to between 1980 and 1985-as much as a full twenty years before its
use by these defendants.454 Thus, the court's finding that the offend-
ing statements were devoid of factual content is wrong.
With respect to "local loser," on the other hand, the court took a
different approach, reading the term literally and finding it true.45 5
"Loser is a description applied to persons in many contexts," the court
wrote, "that bears no potential defamatory inference, particularly if,
like plaintiff in this case, the person was unsuccessful in some
contest."
45 6
The defendant's message in Seeligwas conveyed in a mocking and
contemptuous tone. 457 The court observed that it was punctuated by
laughter, but that laughter was evoked at the plaintiff's expense.458
She was the butt of their joke, which carried underlying factual asser-
tions about both her character and her actions.459 In short, the Seelig
court concluded that the term could not be taken literally and there-
fore must be protected rhetorical hyperbole, invective, or humor that
no one would take seriously.46° What the court failed to do was deter-
mine the meaning conveyed by the hyperbolic statement. Here, ar-
guably, that message was two fold: that the plaintiff was an absurd
figure who was to be ridiculed for having participated in Multimillion-
aire, but also that she was sexually promiscuous.
happen to such a character from the pointless arrows of mere vulgarity.' This is
still the law.
Id. at 348 (quoting Rice v. Simmons, 1838, 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 417, 429). The Birdsong court
did not appear to consider that the use of the word, in this context, might undermine the
plaintiffs in their profession, implying as it did, that they had failed their partners in crime-
fighting.
452. Id. at 118.
453. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DIcTIoNARY 1229 (2001).
454. Id.
455. Seelig, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117.
456. Id.
457. See id. at 112-16. While the plaintiff avoided the show in anticipation of disrespect-
ful behavior, the name-calling and personal jabs exceeded cordial behavior.
458. Id. at 118.
459. Id.
460. Id.
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Walko v. Kean Collegd61 was decided a few years after Pring and
cited both that decision and Falwell in finding that the offending pub-
lication was protected as a parody.462 The defendant, a student news-
paper, published a "spoof' edition in which an ad indicated that the
plaintiff, a college administrator, could be reached on a "whoreline"
for "good phone sex."463 The trial court granted the defendant's sum-
mary judgment motion on the basis that, appearing in a seven-page
spoof insert on a page that contained not a single serious article, no
reasonable person would have understood it as factual information
about the plaintiff.464 Like other courts in these new chastity cases,
the court viewed the publication with disdain, observing that while
everyone would know the "whoreline" ad was a joke, it was "not a very
good joke, perhaps; downright vulgar and tasteless, most readers
probably would conclude; but definitely not an assertion of fact that
anyone would take seriously.
465
While Dworkin v. L.F.P, Inc.466 concerned a woman portrayed as
hateful rather than sexually degraded,467 the case echoes several of
the doctrinal themes that loom large in the new chastity cases. In-
461. 561 A.2d 680 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
462. Id. at 683 (citing Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 440 (10th Cir. 1982)
and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 46 (1987)).
463. Id. at 682. The insert was titled the Incredible whereas the name of the student
paper was the Independent. Interestingly, three other administrators were also listed in the
ad-one other woman and two men. It read: "Whoreline Have a Problem? Want to Rap?
Call Whoreline at 687-SEXY ANYTIME for good phone sex Featuring: Janice Murray[,]
Ann Walko[,] Steve Guttman[,] and Matt Lynch." Id.
464. Id. at 683 (citing Greenbelt Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970), for the
proposition that rhetorical hyperbole is constitutionally protected). Noting that the ad was
.surrounded by a page of obviously 'fake' ads, in the middle of what was unquestionably a
parody of the usual student newspaper," and that "other well known names on campus"
were also included, the court concluded that "[n]o reasonable person, even glancing at
the offending ad, could possibly conclude that it was a factual statement of plaintiffs availa-
bility for 'good telephone sex.'" Id.
465. Id. at 684.
466. 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992).
467. See also Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 879 (9th Cir. 1988) (featuring
an anti-pornography lobbyist as "Asshole of the Month" and calling her "tightassed house-
wife," "threatened by sex," a "fanatic," a "crackpot," and a "deluded busybody" in need of
.professional help"); Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F. Supp. 1004, 1018 n.8 (S.D. Ala. 1981)
(librarian allegedly portrayed as an "uppity woman" and as a "bitch"); Burnett v. Nat'l
Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (portraying falsely that a fa-
mous entertainer was rude to restaurant patrons, including Henry Kissinger); Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Lipscomb, 362 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Va. 1987) (portrayingjunior high teacher
as erratic, unfair, disorganized, and forgetful); Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 723 P.2d
1195, 1197 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (characterizing suits brought by women who were called
"constitutional crazies" as nuisance law); Maguire v. Journal Sentinel, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 881,
885 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1999) (alleging that plaintiff, recently divorced from a Marquette the-
ology professor, attacked the authenticity of his beliefs).
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deed, Dworkin is like the new chastity cases in that the defendant there
similarly used mean-spirited language with sexual content to ridicule
and degrade a woman.468
The offending statements appeared in a July 1995 issue of Hustler
magazine in which Gerry Spence, a well-known defense attorney, was
the featured "Asshole of the Month."469 After noting that Spence was
known for representing the proverbial "little guy" and that he had
won huge judgments against large corporations, the article also dis-
cussed Andrea Dworkin, whom the court characterized as "an outspo-
ken opponent of pornography."470 The story read:
His client is "little guy" militant lesbian feminist Andrea
Dworkin, a shit-squeezing sphincter in her own right. In her
latest publicity-grab Dworkin has decided to sue Hustler for
invasion of privacy among other things.
Dworkin seems to be an odd bedfellow for 'Just folks,"
"family values" Spence. After all, Dworkin is one of the most
foul-mouthed, abrasive manhaters on Earth. In fact, when
Indianapolis contemplated an antiporn ordinance co-au-
thored by Dworkin, she was asked by its supporters to stay
away for fear her repulsive presence would kill the statute
***. Considering that Dworkin advocates bestiality, incest
and sex with children, it appears Gerry "this Tongue for
Hire" Spence is more interested in promoting his bank ac-
count than the traditional values he'd like us to believe he
cherishes.
This case is a nuisance suit initiated by Dworkin, a
crybaby who can dish out criticism but clearly can't take it.
The real issue is freedom of speech, something we believe
even Dworkin is entitled to, but which she would deny to any-
one who doesn't share her views. Any attack on First Amend-
ment freedoms is harmful to all[,] Spence's foaming-at-the-
mouth client especially. You'd think someone of Spence's
stature would know better than to team with a censor like
Dworkin.4 71
468. E.g., Geary II, 1996 WL 447776, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Seelig v. Infinity Broad.
Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 111 (Cal. App. 2002).
469. Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 907 (citing Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 793 (Wyo. 1991),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 984 (1992)).
470. Id. Dworkin is the author of, among other works, INTERCOURSE (1987) and POR-
NOGRAPHY. MEN POSSESSING WOMEN. See ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY. MEN POSSESSING
WOMEN (1981). She was the co-author, with Catherine MacKinnon, of a model anti-por-
nography ordinance that was adopted by the City of Indianapolis before being struck down
as unconstitutional. See infra note 584.
471. Id. at 907-08. As a result of this article, Dworkin, along with two Wyoming-based
National Organization for Women officials, brought a variety of claims. ld. at 908. In the
[VOL. 63:401
2004] Two CENTURIES OF TALK ABOUT CHASTITY
The Wyoming Supreme Court in Dworkin upheld the trial court's
grant of the defendant's summary judgment motion on the basis that
the offending language constituted non-actionable "[a]busive epi-
thets, vulgarities, and profanities.47 2 After concluding that the plain-
tiff was a public figure and noting that she would have to prove actual
malice with convincing clarity in order to win her defamation
claim,473 the court considered whether the Hustler statements were ac-
tionable as a matter of law.4 74 The court observed that the Supreme
Court in Milkovich had provided protection for "statements that can-
not 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an indi-
vidual. '4 75 The Dworkin court also quoted with approval the Milkovich
language that valued imaginative expression and rhetorical hyperbole
as adding greatly to the discourse of our nation.476 In order to deter-
mine whether a statement is factual, the Dworkin court wrote, it must
"scrutinize the type of language used, the meaning of the statement in
context, whether the statement is verifiable, and the broader social
circumstances in which the statement was made.
477
fourth claim, at stake here, Dworkin alone sued for libel. Id Under each claim, the plain-
tiffs sought $50 million in actual damages and $100 million in punitive damages. Id.
472. Id. at 915.
473. Id. at 913. The court noted that the Wyoming Constitution is even more "elaborate
and clearly worded" than the U.S. Constitution in its protection of free speech. The state
document reads: "Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being
responsible for the abuse of that right ***." Id. The court then concluded that it was not
necessary to discuss possible additional state protections because the public-figure/media
defendant "federal floor ... adequately protects the media defendants here from liability
to Dworkin." Id.
474. Id. at 914.
475. Id. (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 2 (1990)).
476. Id. The court expresses concern that free speech will be stifled. Id.
477. Id. The Dworkin court noted that "[t]he kind of language used may signal readers
that a writer is not purporting to state or imply actual, known facts." Id. at 915.
The court analogized the present matter to two Supreme Court decisions, one in
which "blackmail" had been held to be "no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous
epithet" and one in which "scab" was determined to be a "literary definition" of traitor, and
in which the word was used "in a loose, figurative sense," "a lusty and imaginative expres-
sion of the contempt felt by union members." Id. (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v.
Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) ("scab" case)); Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler,
398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970) (using the word "blackmail" to characterize a land developer's negoti-
ating position).
Another recent case held that similar language was not actionable. Flowers v. Carville,
310 F.3d 1118, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002). In a suit by Gennifer Flowers againstJames Carville,
George Stephanopoulos, and Hillary Rodham Clinton, the court held that comments by
the defendants that Flowers' allegations against President Clinton were "trash," "crap," and
"garbage" to be no more than "generic invective" and not actionable in defamation. Id. at
1127. Other recent cases demonstrate that offensive language is often inactionable. See
Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1362-63 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (stating that
the comment that plaintiff was "psycho" was not slander per se where term amounted to an
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Finally, the court compared the Hustler statement about Dworkin
to the ad parody in Falwell.47 8 The Dworkin court wrote that the "ad
hominem nature of such language easily identifies it as rhetorical hy-
perbole which, as a matter of law, cannot reasonably be understood as
statement of fact." '4 79 Clearly falling into this category, the court
wrote, were Hustler's statements characterizing Dworkin, the litany of
which it proceeded to repeat-from "'little guy' militant lesbian femi-
nist," to "shit-squeezing sphincter" to "a cry-baby who can dish out crit-
icism but clearly can't take it."480 The court later characterized these
as "hopelessly vague, imprecise, indefinite and amorphous.""4 8 The
court went on to explain that certain "formats-editorials, reviews, po-
litical cartoons, monthly features-signal the average reader to expect
a departure from what is actually known by the writer as fact." '48 2 Be-
cause the "Asshole of the Month" regular feature appears under the
heading "Bits and Pieces" and because its tone is "pointed, exagger-
ated and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric" the court was con-
vinced that the "average reader is fully aware that the statements
found there are not 'hard news."483
.expression of opinion" about her personality and reasonable persons could differ on this
issue); Thompson v. Campbell, 845 F. Supp. 665, 680 (D. Minn. 1994) (noting that state-
ments that plaintiff was "complainer" and "troublemaker" were too imprecise to be action-
able because they related to personal traits; to be actionable, statements must be specific
and verifiable by fact).
478. Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 915; see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48
(1988).
479. Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 915.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 916. The court went on to write, "[t]hese terms are loosely definable and
subjectively interpreted in such a variety of contexts that they cannot support an action for
defamation. 'Lacking a clear method of verification with which to evaluate a statement * *
* the trier of fact may improperly tend to render a decision based upon the approval or
disapproval of the contents of the statement, its author, or its subject.'" Id. (quoting
Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
482. Id. at 915.
483. Id. The court acknowledged that four statements in the article were more likely to
be objectively capable of proof: "that Dworkin is a lesbian; supporters of the anti-pornogra-
phy ordinance asked her to stay away; she advocates bestiality, incest and sex with children,
and she initiated a nuisance suit." Id. The court analyzed each of these separately and
found that each statement was true, or if the inference drawn by Hustler from Dworkin's
own writings was false, Dworkin had not established that it was "drawn with actual malice."
Id. at 916-19.
Oddly, in a case Gerry Spence brought based on the same publication, the court de-
nied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that Spence should have his
day in court,just as Falwell had. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 779 (Wyo. 1991); see Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988). The Spence court also cited the proposi-
tion that certain publications, including the "lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or 'fighting' words ... are no essential part of any exposition of ideas,
and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
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Like Geary and Pring, then, the Dworkin court essentially consid-
ered the facial message of the offending statement and concluded
that no one would take it literally. The court did not, however, go on
to consider what meaning or message the average reader would
perceive.
Finally, the court discussed the "broader social circumstances in
which the statement was made" and concluded that Hustler's commu-
nication related to a matter of public controversy.4"4 The court reiter-
ated that Dworkin was an anti-pornography activist who had taken on
publications and publishers such as Hustler and Flynt.48 5 The court,
therefore, viewed Hustler's article as an "ad hominem attack against an
advocate of a social, moral and political viewpoint contrary to Hus-
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." Spence, 816
P.2d at 775 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942)). Spence
relied on Chaplinsky's language to support the proposition that an individual may sue for
"the kind of grossly defamatory statement as those at issue here." Id. The Spence court then
made a somewhat awkward segue to Milkovich, saying that it develops Chaplinsky in a "con-
cise, easily read and understood fashion." Id. In sum, the Spence court said Milkovich
[L]aid to rest the absurd notion that anything published that is couched in opin-
ion language cannot be defamation for which damages are recoverable when it
said: "[W]e think the 'breathing space' which 'freedoms of expression require in
order to survive,' . . . is adequately secured by existing constitutional doctrine
without the creation of an artificial dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact."
Id. at 775 (quoting Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19 (1990), which in turn
quotes Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 772 (1986)) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The Spence court then explained how this principle was similar to the
common-law privilege of fair comment, which provided immunity for "the honest expres-
sion of opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true or privi-
leged statement of fact." Id. The court also acknowledged that some of the other aspects
of the Hustler feature might be proved false by Spence, in particular the statement that
he'd "sold out his personal values for a chance to 'fatten his wallet.'" Id. at 776. Applying
this principle, the court concluded that it was for a jury to determine whether Hustler was
exercising the privilege to state "an honest expression of opinion, on a matter of public
concern," when it called Spence a "'vermin-infested turd dispenser,' a 'parasitic scum-
sucker,' a 'shameless shithole,' a 'reeking rectum,' a 'hemorrhoidal type,' and 'Asshole of
the Month for July.'" Id. at 775. Because the statements are clearly defamatory, the court
said, they were actionable unless protected criticism of a public figure under the common-
law privilege. Id. at 776.
Overall, the Wyoming court's handling of Spence's claim displayed more sensitivity to
him as a human being than the Dworkin court did to her. The court also found significant
Spence's role as an attorney. Id. at 777. At one point, the court wrote: "Free speech can-
not equate with the freedom to intimidate, destroy and defame and advocate seeking to
represent a client." Id.
484. Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 914.
485. Id. The court analogized this to "labor's historical confrontation with manage-
ment" that presented a "widely recognized arena in which bruising and brawling, rough
and tumble debate is daily fare." Id. at 916; see also Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin,
418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) (referring to social and situational circumstances that are rele-
vant to a court's decision).
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t/ers. The statements in question were uttered in the context of an
ongoing debate in which Dworkin seeks to destroy the industry of
which Hustler is part. '48 6 The court concluded: "Ludicrous statements
are much less insidious and debilitating than falsities that bear the
ring of truth. We have little doubt that the outrageous and the out-
landish will be recognized for what they are."487 "Vulgar speech," the
court wrote, "reflects more on the character of the user of such lan-
guage than on the object of such language." ' 8
486. Dworkin, 839 P.2d at 916. The court went on to quote another case in which Hustler
Magazine was involved: "The offending phrases in this article are, unfortunately, represen-
tative of the type of language generated in a dispute over such a subject." Id, (quoting Ault
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1080
(1989)).
487. Id. (quoting Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir.
1989)). Elsewhere, Dworkin made the argument that "the truth, when published with
good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be sufficient defense." Id. at 920. Dworkin
argued that, pursuant to this provision, Hustler bore the burden of proving that the state-
ments, even if true or constitutionally protected, were published with "good motives and
for justifiable ends." Id. The court concluded that, "[w]here the challenged statements
criticize public officials or public figures in matters of public concern, 'the interest in pri-
vate reputation is overborne by the large public interested, secured by the Constitution, in
the dissemination of the truth.'" Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73
(1964)). The Wyoming court did not, of course, acknowledge that the statements about
which Dworkin complained contained few "truth[s]." Id. The Wyoming court simply
noted that the U.S. Constitution trumped this Wyoming provision, which it said was "re-
pugnant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution." Id.
488. Id. at 916. In a concurring opinion in which he explained that the outcome was
dictated by established law, Justice Cardine nevertheless expressed his repugnance with the
protection of the offending material. He wrote: "I am less than enthusiastic over a state of
law which allows a publisher to create a money-making business out of cruel, obscene,
random attacks upon public figures." Id. at 922 (Cardine, J., concurring). He ridiculed
the proposition that these publications might be equated with those of Shakespeare or
Chaucer, writing "[tihey are hardly in that class." Id. Opining that Canadian law struck a
"better balance" between the rights to reputation and free speech and press, the Justice
concluded, "I firmly believe that freedom of speech and of the press can survive nicely
without the protection now afforded the likes of Hustler magazine." Id. He also re-charac-
terized Milkovich as providing somewhat less protection for statements of opinion than the
majority had indicated, while nevertheless concluding that U.S. Supreme Court precedent
dictated the conclusion reached by the majority. Id.
Justice Urbigkit, dissenting, took a completely different tack, finding that summary
judgment was not appropriate "within this profusely demonstrated, factually conflicting
appellate record." Id. at 927 (Urbigkit, J., dissenting). He continued:
Where the words of the libel are ambiguous, allegorical, or in any way equivocal,
and the jury have found that they were meant and used in a defamatory sense, the
court will not set aside their verdict, unless it can be clearly shown that, on read-
ing the whole passage, there is no possible ground for the construction put upon
it by thejury. But where the words are not reasonably capable of any defamatory
meaning, there the judge will be right in directing a nonsuit.
Id. at 932.
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These cases illustrate that adjudication of "new chastity" cases is
dominated in the constitutional era of defamation law by what was
formerly called the fact opinion-dichotomy. 89 More particularly,
analysis of these cases is dominated by the question whether the of-
fending statement can reasonably be interpreted to assert actual facts
about the individual.49 Courts talk of literal interpretations, hard
news, and the capability of verification and contrast those variations of
actionable statements with language that is vague, amorphous, hyper-
bolic, imaginative, and which no reasonable person would believe.491
What courts fail to do, however, is consider what lies between these
dichotomous categories-that is, the message that is conveyed in hy-
perbolic or imaginative form. What courts are really asking is not
whether any reasonable person would believe the statement, but
rather whether any reasonable person would take it literally. The an-
swer in most cases is, of course, no. Courts should be asking instead
what is the non-literal meaning, the subtext or innuendo, of the hyper-
bolic, imaginative, and vague communication. That message should
then be analyzed in light of Milkovich's fact and non-fact dichotomy,
asking whether a statement carries a provably false connotation.
V. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE INJURY AND CRAFTING A REMEDY
By summarily concluding that these sexually hateful statements
are protected as rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative expression,
courts are able to avoid acknowledging the harms they inflict. In fact,
a serious dignitary injury is inflicted on one who is targeted by such
speech.4 92 Such dignitary injuries are widely recognized in modem
tort law, and the following discussion draws heavily on that recogni-
489. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1414 n.6 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(noting that a majority of circuits have held that opinions are constitutionally protected
because one cannot express a false opinion); see also id. at 1415 (drawing a distinction
between a "reasonably understood" requirement and the fact-opinion dichotomy in defa-
mation actions). The Supreme Court has since held that the First Amendment does not
protect opinions because a statement of opinion may suggest a false assertion. Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1990).
490. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21 (posing the dispositive question in the case as whether
a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the statements made by the defendant imply
an assertion that the plaintiff acted in a particular way).
491. See, e.g., Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680, 683-84 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988)
(determining that a parody advertisement was not defamatory because it was surrounded
by "fake ads," no reasonable person would believe it, it was clearly delineated as intended
humor, and it was therefore not fact); see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (advocating the
protection of "imaginative expression" and "rhetorical hyperbole" in public debate).
492. See, e.g., Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 251 (5th Cir. 1984) (compensating plaintiff
for the embarrassment and humiliation suffered when the defendant published her pic-
ture in a sexually explicit magazine).
2004] 489
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tion in support of a new tort that would provide redress for sexually
hateful speech. It also considers the constitutional limitations that
would apply.
A. False Light Invasion of Privacy as an Alternate Remedy
One cause of action that seeks to protect individual dignity is
false light invasion of privacy.493 In contrast to the new chastity cases
discussed above, female plaintiffs relying on a false light theory have
won some lawsuits arising from portrayals that are highly offensive and
demeaning.494 A closer consideration of the tort, then, may lead to a
solution for the otherwise uncompensated injuries that occur in the
new chastity cases.
1. The Law.-One of the four types of invasion of privacy de-
scribed by Prosser in his landmark 1960 article,495 the false light tort
provides redress for widely publicized statements that portray a person
in a way that is both inaccurate, and highly offensive to a reasonable
person. 49 ' Although it features similarities to defamation law, the in-
jury redressed is to mental and emotional well-being rather than to
493. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
494. See, e.g., Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1093 (5th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing defendant magazine liable, on a false light theory, for publishing nude pictures of the
plaintiff and a description of an offensive sexual fantasy without verifying consent).
495. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
496. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652E (1977); see also Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 958-
59 (1989) (identifying publicized statements placing a person in false light as one of four
branches of the modern invasion of privacy tort); Nathan E. Ray, Note, Let There Be False
Light: Resisting the Growing Trend Against an Important Tort, 84 MINN. L. REv. 713 (2000)
(providing an overview of false light invasion of privacy and defending the tort against
criticisms). But see Ken Gormley, One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1387-
90 (describing the Supreme Court's mechanical application of its press-friendly standard
for defamation cases to false light cases and the resulting failure of false light privacy claims
when they conflict with the First Amendment); J. Clark Kelso, False Light Privacy: A Requiem,
32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 783 (1992) (arguing that, despite the more than 600 false light
cases litigated, not one displays an important contribution that the tort makes to the body
of law); Matthew Stohl, False Light Invasion of Privacy in Docudramas: The Oxymoron Which
Must be Solved, 35 AKRON L. REv. 251 (2002) (classifying courts' application of false light
invasion of privacy as "narrow" and asserting the near-impossibility of prevailing on a false
light claim); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light that
Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1989) (exposing weaknesses in the false light privacy tort and
arguing for its elimination). See generally Prosser, Privacy, supra note 495, at 398-401 (dis-
cussing the emergence of the false light privacy tort, its various applications, and possible
concerns associated with it); John W. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 1093, 1096-1108 (1962) (discussing the precedent for false light cases).
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reputation. 497 Because of its orientation to psychic well-being, one
court has called it an "odd hybrid of defamation and intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. '49" Like defamation, liability for the false
light tort is contingent on an inaccurate communication.499 Most
courts interpret this to require a false statement of fact, which is de-
fined in a way akin to how Milkovich defines the same requirement in
defamation.5 ° ° Nevertheless, a few courts have permitted rhetorical
hyperbole or imaginative expression to provide the basis for a false
light claim.50 1 The Restatement (Second) of Torts also requires that each
497. Wood, 736 F.2d at 1088 (citing Braun, 726 F.2d at 250); see also Flowers v. Carville,
310 F.3d 1118, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that in some jurisdictions false light does
not require injury to reputation where defamation does).
498. Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1132. The Flowers court went on to say that this "jurisprudential
offspring [ ] recalls George Bernard Shaw's witty rebuff of Isadora Duncan." Id.
499. Id. at 1132.
500. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (suggesting that, in a
defamation case, the dispositive question is whether as assertion could be reasonably inter-
preted by a jury as stating facts). Similarly, the Flowers court stated that rhetorical hyper-
bole may not be the basis for a false light claim, and overturned the trial court's decision
on this point. Flowers, 310 F.3d at 1133 & n.14. Indeed, if a communication can be charac-
terized as a spoof or a parody, that has also defeated claims for false light invasion of
privacy. In Stein v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, Inc., the plaintiff sued based on video titled
"What's sex like with your partner?" 944 P.2d 374, 376 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In it, video
clips of the plaintiff's husband and his colleagues each describing in detail a household
chore they hate, were juxtaposed and presented as answers to the question "What's sex like
with your partner?" Id. at 376. The plaintiffs husband's "answer" was
The smell. The smell, the smell. And then you go with the goggles. You have to
put on the goggles. And then you get the smell through the nose. And as you get
into it things start flying all over the place. And the smell. And you get covered
in these things.
Id. The court noted that defamation law does not view as actionable a "parody or spoof
that no reasonable person would read as a factual statement, or as anything other than a
joke." Id. at 380 (quoting Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680, 683 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1988)). The court concluded that those seeing the video "had to know it was a spoof,
devoid of any real or purported factual material" and therefore that summaryjudgment for
the defendant was appropriate. Id. at 381; see also Pospicil v. Buying Office, Inc., 71 F.
Supp. 2d 1346, 1361-62 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (stating that in order to recover on a false light
claim, the plaintiff must show that the publicity was false and not a statement of personal
opinion); Ault v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 860 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
defendant was not liable for defamation or false light after printing an inflammatory article
about the plaintiff because the article stated an opinion rather than fact. In making that
distinction, the court applied a three-prong test: 1) whether the words are defamatory in
light of the surrounding publication; 2) whether the context in which the statements were
made lead to anticipation of inflammatory speech; and 3) whether the language that was
generated is the kind generally expected to be used in a legal dispute). Id
501. See People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1069 (8th
Cir. 1993) (finding story that reported 101-year-old woman was pregnant was an assertion
of fact that could be proven true or false and that, in the context of the case, it was reasona-
bly believable and therefore actionable in false light); Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 775
(Wyo. 1991) (permitting jury to decide whether "vermin-infested turd dispenser," "para-
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and every plaintiff prove the defendant's knowledge or reckless disre-
gard as to the statement's falsity.50 2 While this requirement is not nec-
essarily constitutionally mandated for private plaintiffs, as opposed to
public figures, most jurisdictions impose the requirement on all plain-
tiffs. 50 1 Only four states have expressly rejected the tort of false light
invasion of privacy.504 One court rationalized doing so on the basis of
an optimistic assessment that 'journalists simply are more responsible
and professional today" than during the age of yellow journalism that
spawned Warren and Brandeis' plea for recognition of a right to
privacy.50 5
For purposes of the new chastity cases, the most significant dis-
tinctions between false light and defamation are (1) that statements
which form the basis for successful false light cases need not imply
something blameworthy on the part of the plaintiff5"6 and (2) that the
injury associated with false light more closely reflects the nature of the
injury suffered by these female plaintiffs. Words that portray the
plaintiff in a false light typically cause her to be ridiculed, humiliated,
and shunned, even though they do not necessarily indicate that she
has done anything immoral and blameworthy. 5 7 Words that defame,
on the other hand, may also cause a plaintiff to be ridiculed, humili-
ated, and shunned, if only briefly.50 8 What makes defamatory words
sitic scum-sucker," and "shameless shithole," among others, were honest expressions of
opinion or fair comment on a matter of public concern).
502. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E(b) (1977).
503. See id at cmt. d (pointing out that limits to First Amendment protections afforded
to the media in defamation cases since Gertz may not apply to privacy cases); see also Wood
v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1984) (explaining that, after Gertz,
most states adopted negligence as the minimum standard of care in defamation cases
where the plaintiff sought actual damages, but that the actual malice standard was required
where the plaintiff sought punitive damages); People's Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l,
Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791, 798 (W.D. Ark. 1992) (upholding ajury instruction requiring actual
malice for a false light claim brought by a private plaintiff and framing the issue as whether
the defendant "intended, or recklessly failed to anticipate, that readers would construe the
publicized matter as conveying actual facts or events concerning" the plaintiff).
504. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 235 (Minn. 1998); Renwick v. News
& Observer Publ'g Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C. 1984); Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d
577, 579 (Tex. 1994); Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (asserting
that New York does not recognize a false light privacy tort).
505. Renwick, 312 S.E.2d at 413.
506. Statements forming the basis for defamation suits are historically ones that hold
the plaintiff up to obloquy and ridicule. See discussion supra notes 27-30 and accompany-
ing text.
507. See Ray, supra note 496, at 726 (listing possible interests protected by false light,
including freedom from scorn, ridicule, embarrassment, and humiliation).
508. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (defining defamatory communications
as those tending to "harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of
the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him").
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harmful by contemporary standards, however, is that they assert-im-
plicitly or explicitly-that the plaintiff has done something to deserve
that treatment.5"9 Statements that give rise to successful defamation
suits indicate that the plaintiff has earned this ill-treatment by society
because he or she has, for example, committed a criminal act or en-
gaged in dishonest behavior." l° Thus, communications such as those
in Youssoupoff (falsely reporting that the plaintiff had been raped), or
statements falsely imputing homosexuality or the contraction of a dis-
ease, formerly gave rise to successful defamation actions.511 These
statements would now more likely find redress instead in false light
invasion of privacy.5 12 As one court has expressed this requirement of
509. See, e.g., Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1122 (discussing action in which plaintiff
alleged that defendants painted her in a false light by "claiming that she had lied in her
story to the Star and 'doctored' . .. tape-recorded phone calls").
510. See, e.g., idL at 1127-28 (distinguishing between comments that may be classified as
rhetorical hyperbole, which are not defamatory, and statements that insinuate deception,
which could be defamatory). Of course, a number of contemporary cases also indicate
that society sees adultery as blameworthy or immoral because these statements also still
give rise to successful defamation actions. See, e.g., Ellis v. Price, 990 S.W.2d 543, 549 (Ark.
1999) (upholding a jury verdict holding defendant liable for telling plaintiff's husband
that she had been unfaithful).
511. See Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 L.T.R. 581, 584 (Eng.
C.A. 1934) (expressing extreme distaste for the argument that false allegations that a wo-
man had been raped are not defamatory); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d
1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1985) (indicating that a claim that the plaintiff is a lesbian could be
the basis for a defamation claim); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 cmt. c (explain-
ing that the implication that a person suffers from a disease may be defamatory because it
will deter others from dealing with her); see also Manale v. New Orleans Dept. of Police, 673
F.2d 122, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding that calling a police officer "little fruit" and "gay"
was defamatory); Schomer v. Smidt, 170 Cal. Rptr. 662, 664-66 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding
that calling a woman a lesbian implied "unchastity and abnormal behavior" and therefore,
if a statement imputed lesbianism, it was to be considered slander per se); Moricoli v.
Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (holding that complaint filed by a night-
club singer sufficiently alleged a cause of action for defamation where defendants had
called plaintiff a "fag"); Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993) (noting
that "homosexuality is still viewed with disfavor, if not outright contempt, by a sizeable
proportion of our population" and false statements alleging it constitute slander per se);
Gray v. Press Communications, L.L.C., 775 A.2d 678, 685-86 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001) (concluding that a false accusation of homosexuality could be defamatory); Mazart
v. State, 441 N.Y.S.2d 600, 604 (1981) (finding that, because homosexual activity was a
crime in New York at the time the words were published, printing a letter indicating that
the plaintiff was gay was slander per se). But see Boehm v. American Bankers Ins. Group,
Inc., 557 So. 2d 91, 94 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that "[t]he modern view.., has
not found statements regarding sexual preference to constitute slander per se") (citing
Moricoli v. Schwartz, 361 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Morrissette v. Beatte, 17 A.2d 464
(R.I. 1941); Boy Scouts of America v. Teal, 374 F. Supp. 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
512. See, e.g., Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135, 1138 (declining to say that a reasonable jury
could not infer that plaintiff was a lesbian and concluding that she had a cause of action
for false light invasion of privacy). The court suggests that "people who are made to seem
pathetic or ridiculous may be shunned, and not just people who are thought to be dishon-
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blameworthiness, in particular with respect to statements regarding
homosexuality:
if a person is falsely accused of belonging in a category of
persons considered deserving of social approbation, i.e.,
thief, murderer, prostitute, etc., it is generally the court's de-
termination as to whether such accusation is considered slan-
der per se so that damages are presumed. A court should not
classify homosexuals with those miscreants who have en-
gaged in actions that deserve the reprobation and scorn
which is implicitly a part of the slander/libel per se classifica-
tions. For a characterization of a person to warrant a per se
classification, it should, without equivocation, expose the
plaintiff to public hatred and contempt." 3
In a similar vein,Judge Posner has written that, to the extent that false
light is distinct from defamation, the distinction "rests on an aware-
ness that people who are made to seem pathetic or ridiculous may be
shunned, and not just people who are thought to be dishonest or in-
competent or immoral." '14 Posner's reference to pathetic and ridicu-
lous is to the portrayal that gave rise to the germinal Supreme Court
decision on false light, Time, Inc. v. Hill.515 The Hill plaintiffs, who
had been held hostage by escaped convicts, sued on the basis of a Life
magazine article that portrayed them being "subjected to various in-
dignities that had not actually occurred. The article did not defame
the family members in the sense of accusing them of immoral, im-
proper, or other bad conduct, and yet many people would be upset to
think that the whole world thought them victims of such mistreat-
ment." '516 The false light injury is thus conceptualized as one to
human dignity, and it expressly recognizes and compensates for emo-
tional injury."' Unlike in defamation law, a finding of false light does
not suggest that the offending statement imputed blameworthy or im-
est or incompetent or immoral." Id. at 1134. This is the distinction between false light and
defamation. Id.
513. Hayes v. Smith, 832 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). The
court noted the lack of empirical evidence to demonstrate that "homosexuals are held by
society in such poor esteem" and observed that "the community view toward homosexuals
is mixed." Id.; see also Boehm, 557 So. 2d at 94-95 n.1 (citing cases that have held imputa-
tions of homosexuality not to be slander per se due to the "changing temper of the
times").
514. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134.
515. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
516. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1134; see also Time, 385 U.S. at 377-79 (detailing the facts of the
case).
517. See Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 250 (5th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the principle
element in an invasion of privacy false light action is mental anguish).
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moral behavior.51 It only indicates that the statement is inaccurate
and highly offensive.5 9
Several cases illustrate the distinction between false light and def-
amation as it plays out in cases regarding statements about women's
sexual behavior and propriety. Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.
520
represents perhaps the most complex of the reported cases. The
plaintiff, a television actress and model of minor fame, had consented
to be photographed for Playboy magazine but sued when the photos
later appeared, without her permission, in Hustler.52 With respect to
her defamation claim, Posner wrote:
It would have been difficult for Douglass to state this claim as
one for libel. For what exactly is the imputation of saying (or
here, implying) of a person that she agreed to have pictures
of herself appear in a vulgar and offensive magazine? That
she is immoral? This would be too strong a characterization
in today's moral climate. That she lacks good taste? This
would not be defamatory.
5 22
Rather, Posner saw her false light claim as stronger, analogizing the
facts to Time, Inc. v. Hill52' and focusing on the nature of the injury.
He wrote that being shown nude "in such a setting before millions of
people-the readers of the magazine-is degrading in much the same
way that to be shown beaten up by criminals is degrading. 52
4
Evaluation of her false light claim necessitated close scrutiny of
and comparison of the respective characters of the magazines Playboy
and Hustler because of the "truth" that Douglass had consented to
have her photos published in the former.5 25 One question, therefore,
was whether sufficient distinction existed between the two so that her
appearance in Hustler in fact cast her in a "false light" or otherwise
constituted a false statement about her for purposes of a defamatory
meaning analysis. 526 As Judge Posner wrote, in order to complete the
518. See Ray, supra note 496, at 715 (noting that false light publicity may improve
reputation).
519. See id. (explaining that undeserved praise, like negative publicity, may be highly
offensive).
520. 769 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1985).
521. Id. at 1132.
522. Id. at 1135.
523. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
524. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135.
525. Id. at 1136-37.
526. Id. The court offered this description of Playboy, noting some distinctions from
Hustler
The cover shows a young woman with partially naked buttocks and thighs but
otherwise clothed. The only (other) suggestion of sex on the cover is the words
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task, "we shall have to enter imaginatively into a world that is not the
natural habitat of judges-the world of nude modeling and (as they
call themselves in the trade) 'provocative' magazines." '527 After dis-
"Ripped Offl A Torrid Nine-Page Pictorial," which by its position on the cover
appears to be a reference to the cover girl. The inside cover is a conventional
advertisement for Scotch whisky. Besides advertisements (none sexual), the issue
contains fiction, a column of sexual advice (more refined than its Hustler counter-
part), book reviews (only one of a book on sex), and articles. None of the stories
or articles is obscene, though one story is erotic (a "Ribald Classic") and there are
many bawdy cartoons and jokes (but not vicious ones, like many of those in Hus-
tler) and four nude pictorials. In one of the pictorials a woman is doing exercises
and being massaged; some of the frames contain an erotic suggestion of a mild
sort. Two of the other pictorials show nude women in various poses but there is
no suggestion that they are engaged in erotic activity. The last nude pictorial is
"Ripped-Off," which turns out to consist of photographs of nude women (some in
erotic poses) by different photographers. Two of the photographs are by Greg-
ory, and one of them is of Robyn Douglass, though she is not identified by name.
Although she is shown removing the slip of the other woman, as in the Hustler
pictures, the text beneath the picture weakens any inference of lesbianism: "How
long since you've seen a girl-let alone two-in lingerie like this? 'I pick very
feminine, almost outdated slips for the girls to wear in this scene,' says photogra-
pher Gregory. 'To me, that made it more of a fantasy, more of a turn-on.'"
Among other pictures in "Ripped-Off," one could be taken to be an (obviously
simulated) photograph of sexual intercourse.
Id. at 1137.
527. Id. at 1134. Other courts' characterizations of the "adult" magazine defendants in
these cases are of some interest. A great deal of ink frequently is spilled on descriptions of
these publications-or, in cases like Geary, the pornographic television program that gave
rise to the suit. Judges ostensibly offer these descriptions not because they are simply fasci-
nated with the genre, but because, in determining whether the false light element is satis-
fied, courts must assess the communicative milieu in which the offending statement was
delivered.
In Braun v. Flynt, for example, Judge E. Grady Jolly of the Fifth Circuit began the
opinion with a two-paragraph description of Chic magazine, stating, among other things,
that the "dominant theme of Chic magazine is 'female nudity.'" 726 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir.
1984). The court also quoted the magazine's editor as saying that it "depicts 'unchastity in
women.'" Id. "Suffice it to say," Judge Jolly concluded, "that Chic is a glossy, oversized,
hard-core men's magazine." Id. Judge Jolly also wrote, regarding the magazine feature in
which the plaintiff appeared:
One of the opening sections of the magazine entitled "Chic Thrills," contains
brief stories about current "events." In the issue of the magazine in question,
twenty-one vignettes were included in "Chic Thrills." Most of these either con-
cerned sex overtly or were accompanied by a photograph or cartoon of an overtly
sexual nature.
Id. Elsewhere, in explaining how the publication portrayed Braun in a false light and may
have defamed her, the court demonstrated the relevance of the magazine's nature to the
harm done:
The pertinent facts and circumstances alleged here are that Mrs. Braun's picture
was placed without her consent in a magazine devoted exclusively to sexual ex-
ploitation and to disparagement of women. Mrs. Braun contends, and the jury
implicitly found, that the ordinary reader automatically will form an unfavorable
opinion about the character of a woman whose picture appears in Chic magazine.
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cussing in detail the Hustler feature in which photographs of the plain-
tiffs were included, Judge Posner went on to discuss other aspects of
the magazines. 52 ' He noted, for example, that Hustler's cover por-
trayed a "naked woman straddling and embracing a giant peppermint
stick" and that one of the titles on the cover was "New Discovery: How
to Give Women Vaginal Orgasms." '529 He distinguished Hustler from
Id. at 254. Chic had argued that "no ordinary reader would assume Mrs. Braun to be un-
chaste or promiscuousness on the basis of its publication of her picture." Id. at 254 n.11.
The court responded that, assuming that were true, the jury might nevertheless have found
that
the publication implied Mrs. Braun's approval of the opinions expressed in Chic
or that it implied Mrs. Braun had consented to having her picture in Chic. Either
of these findings would support the jury verdict that the publication placed Mrs.
Braun in a false light highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Id.
The court fairly ridiculed Chic's argument that "context has no bearing" on whether
the plaintiff had been defamed. Id. at 254. The court characterized the magazine's argu-
ment as being that "we should cut out Mrs. Braun's picture and look solely at it to deter-
mine whether she had been defamed or cast in false light." Id. In rejecting that argument,
the court explained, "Common sense dictates that the context and manner in which a
statement or picture appears determines to a large extent the effect which it will have on
the person reading or seeing it." Id.
528. Douglass, 769 F.2d at 1135-36, 1137.
529. Id. at 1135. In addition, he provided the following lengthy description of Huster.
The inside cover is a full page of advertisements for pornographic video cassettes.
On page 5 there is the 'publisher's [Larry Flynt's] statement'-a call to tax the
churches. This sounds another theme of Hustler: 'irreverence,' which has the
practical meaning in Hustler of hostility to or contempt for racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities. Then there is a 'World News Roundup'-the news is all con-
cerned with sex-and a page of coarse advice to readers who have sexual
problems. Between these two features is a full-page advertisement entitled 'Get
Any Girl Within 5 Minutes or YOU PAY NOTHING!' with subtitles such as 'Turn
Women Into Putty.' The issue contains many similar sexual advertisements, some
with obscene pictures and text. The reader arrives next at a regular monthly
feature, 'Asshole of the Month,' in which a man's head-in this issue the head of
a professor at the Harvard Law School who, in January 1981 was in charge of the
criminal division of the Justice Department-is shown protruding from the rear
of a donkey. The next few pages consist of vulgar photographs, some from por-
nographic movies, plus jokes and cartoons many of which are racially offensive;
all are offensive in one way or another. In one cartoon, a doctor in an abortion
clinic is feeding a foetus to a rat in an alley. Then there is an illustrated feature
on pornographic movies, followed by four book reviews (two of erotic works) and
'How to Achieve Vaginal Orgasms.' The magazine sobers up a little with a sympo-
sium on gun control, punctuated however by tasteless cartoons such s one in
which a black child says to Santa Claus, 'I'd like a new little brother for Christmas.
We could use the extra welfare check!' The symposium is followed by a nude
pictorial, by more tasteless cartoons, and by a mock advertisement for a 'Starving
Cambodian Baby Doll.'
We shall leave off here, on page 51 of a 136-page issue, having sufficiently
indicated the character of the magazine. To be depicted as voluntarily associated
with such a sheet (the Harvard law professor's association is not represented as
voluntary) is unquestionably degrading to a normal person, especially if the de-
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Playboy, noting that the latter publication had a "more refined" sexual
advice column than Hustler, that Playboy included book reviews and
articles but no sexual advertisements, that Playboy does not "ridicule
racial or religious groups and avoids repulsive photographs" and that
none of its stories was "obscene, though one story is erotic . . . and
there are many bawdy cartoons and jokes (but not vicious ones like
many of those in Hustler)."" Posner summarized:
We cannot say that it would be irrational for a jury to find
that in the highly permissive moral and cultural climate pre-
vailing in late twentieth-century America, posing nude for
Playboy is consistent with respectability for a model and ac-
tress but that posing nude in Hustler is not (not yet anyway),
so that to portray Robyn Douglass as voluntarily posing nude
for Hustler could be thought to place her in a false light even
though she had voluntarily posed nude for Playboy.53 1
Posner thus concluded that "the setting is indeed a degrading one"
and, at another point, referred to its "debasement" of Douglass. 3 2
Douglass, therefore, had a claim for false light invasion of privacy be-
cause the truth of her consent to appear in Playboy was not tanta-
mount to consenting to appear in Hustler, a qualitatively different
publication.53
Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,5 34 a Fifth Circuit decision, similarly
illustrates how the false light remedy may provide redress in the so-
called new chastity cases, even when defamation law does not.53 5 The
court explained that the unauthorized appearance of the plaintiffs
nude photograph in the magazine falsely represented that she had
"consented to the submission and publication in a coarse and sex-cen-
piction is erotic (the depiction of the professor is not); for although the magazine
is offensive on several planes, the sexual is the one most emphasized.
Id. at 1135-36.
530. Id. at 1137. The court's summary of the distinctions between the two publications
also said:
Although many people find Playboy, with its emphasis on sex and nudity, offen-
sive, the differences between it and Hustler are palpable. Playboy, like Hustler, con-
tains nude pictorials, but the erotic theme is generally muted, though there are
occasional photographs that an earlier generation would have considered defi-
nitely obscene.
Id.
531. Id.
532. Id. at 1135.
533. Id. at 1138.
534. 736 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1984).
535. The plaintiff in Wood sued for defamation and invasion of privacy, but the statute of
limitations had run on the defamation claim. Id. at 1086.
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tered magazine of a photograph depicting her in the nude.,5 3 6 A
neighbor of the plaintiff, Lajuan Wood, had broken into Wood's
home, stolen a nude photograph of Wood, and submitted it to Hustler
for publication in the regular "Beaver Hunt" feature. 537 This section
included photographs, typically submitted by Hustler readers, of them-
selves, as "non-professional female 'models.'" 53  The photo was pub-
lished with copy reading, "Lajuan Wood is a 22-year-old housewife and
mother from Bryan, Texas, whose hobby is collecting arrowheads.
Her fantasy is 'to be screwed by two bikers.' "519 In the context of ana-
lyzing the standard of fault that should apply, the court reasoned that
the
nature of the material published in the Beaver Hunt section
would obviously warn a reasonably prudent editor or pub-
lisher of the potential for defamation or privacy invasion if a
consent form was forged. The wanton and debauched sex-
ual fantasies and the intimate photos of nude models were of
such a nature that great care was required in verifying a
model's consent.
540
The court thus had no difficulty confirming that the non-consensual
inclusion of nude photographs had portrayed the plaintiff in a highly
offensive false light, and that the magazine had acted negligently in
doing so.
5 1
536. Id. at 1089.
537. Id. at 1085.
538. Id. at 1086.
539. Id. The staff of Hustler, upon receiving this submission from the neighbor of the
plaintiff who stole it, said that they thought Lajuan Wood's name was a play on words. "In
the photograph Lajuan was sitting on a horizontal portion of a tree trunk, creating the
impression that 'Lajuan Wood' was an alteration of 'Lay You on Wood."' Id.
540. Id. at 1092. The consent form sent with the photo did not provide a telephone
number. Id. at 1086. However, it provided that the $50 check, earned if the photo was
published, was to be sent in the name of the photo thief's wife, to an address that pur-
ported to be Lajuan's. Id. Once the photo was selected for publication, Hustler sent the
thief's wife a mailgram addressed to Lajuan. Id. The woman phoned Hustler and a staffer
asked her a "series of leading questions, answerable by 'yes' or 'no,' in a conversation that
lasted only one or two minutes." Id.
541. Id. at 1092. Braun v. Flynt is similarly illustrative. 726 F.2d 245 (5th Cir. 1984). The
plaintiff in Braun worked as an amusement park performer who treaded water as a trained
pig dove into the pool and drank from the bottle she held. Id. at 247. Chic magazine
published a publicity photo, provided by the amusement park under false pretenses, show-
ing the plaintiff with Ralph, the trained pig, "in good form, legs fully extended, tail curled,
diving toward Mrs. Braun, who is shown in profile holding the bottle." Id. The caption
accompanying the reproduced photo said: "SWINE DIVE-A pig that swims? Why not?
This plucky porker performs every day at Aquarena Springs Amusement Park in bustling
San Marcos, Texas. Aquarena staff members say the pig was incredibly easy to train. They
told him to learn quick, or grow up to be ajuicy ham sandwich." Id. at 248 n.2. The photo
appeared on the same page with a number of tasteless stories, such as one about the use of
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One successful false light case is different to these in that it in-
volved a less straightforward assertion about the plaintiff. Like the
new chastity cases involving plaintiffs who lost on a defamation theory,
People's Bank and Trust Co. v. Globe International Publishing, Inc.5 4 2 fea-
tured a statement that arguably would not be taken literally. Nellie
sexual organs of animals being used as a Chinese elixir and another about men having
their breasts enlarged through the use of a synthetic hormone. Id. at 248. Other stories
included one titled "10 Things that P- Off Women," accompanied by a cartoon of a
woman with her breasts partially exposed. Id. The story about male breast enlargement
was entitled "Mammaries Are Made of This." Id.
On the facing page is a picture showing a nude female model demonstrating
navel jewelry and an article on 'Lust Rock Rules' about a 'throbbing paean' to sex
written by 'the Roman Polanski of rock.' The cover of the issue shows a young
woman sitting in a chair with her shirt open so as partially to reveal her breasts,
one hand to her mouth and the other hand in her tightly-fitting, unzipped pants.
Id.
The plaintiff prevailed on her false light invasion of privacy and defamation claims at
trial and was awarded a total of $95,000 in actual and punitive damages. Id. The jury
awarded $5000 for defamation. Id. The remaining damages were allocated $25,000 for
punitive damages arising from the defamation, $15,000 in actual damages associated with
the invasion of privacy, and $50,000 in punitive damages associated with the invasion of
privacy. Id. The appellate court upheld the verdicts, but determined that the plaintiff
should receive only one recovery for these overlapping torts and remanded for a new trial
on damages. Id. at 250-51. The court explained that while the principal element of injury
in defamation is impairment of reputation, and invasion of privacy is founded on mental
anguish, the plaintiff could recover for mental anguish under either theory. Id. at 250.
The court observed that there was "[v] ery little evidence" to show that the plaintiff's "repu-
tation in her community actually was harmed by the publication" nor that she had suffered
"tangible economic damage." Id. at 251. Thus, the court concluded that the jury's award
to her was "primarily compensating her for the embarrassment and humiliation she suf-
fered." Id. The court upheld the verdict, seeing no difficulty with the jury's conclusion
that the publication had created "false impression as to Mrs. Braun's reputation, integrity
or virtue." Id. at 248-49, 252. The plaintiff had an opportunity to avoid remand by ac-
cepting the damages award based on a false light theory. Id. at 251. Certainly her claim fits
more comfortably into the latter theory because Chic's publication of her photo arguably
implied nothing blameworthy, but nevertheless portrayed her in a way that was inaccurate,
highly offensive, and caused her great emotional distress.
Ten years after Braun, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that Texas law does not
recognize the false light variety of invasion of privacy. Cain v. Hearst Corp., 878 S.W.2d
577, 579 (Tex. 1994).
The case of Messenger v. Gruner + Jahr Printing and Publishing illustrates a different ap-
proach to analyzing cases like this. 208 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2000). The plaintiff, a 14-year-old
model, sued the publishers of Young and Modern magazine based on its use of three photos
of her to illustrate a column with the headline or "pull quote": "I got trashed and had sex
with three guys." Id. at 124. The plaintiff argued that the publication created the false
impression that she had written the letter describing the sexual encounter. Id. Applying
New York law, the court stated that "where a photograph illustrates an article on a matter
of public interest, the newsworthiness exception bars recovery unless there is no real rela-
tionship between the photograph and the article." Id. at 125. The court noted that this is
so even where the "photograph, when juxtaposed with an article, could reasonably have
been viewed as falsifying or fictionalizing plaintiff's relation to the article." Id. at 127.
542. 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992).
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Mitchell, a ninety-five-year-old newspaper carrier, sued when the Sun,
a newspaper tabloid, published her photo to accompany an article
with the headline, "'Pregnancy forces granny to quit work at age
101."5"" The story was about an Australian woman who had quit her
paper route at the age of 101 after she became pregnant as a conse-
quence of an extramarital affair with a millionaire client on her
route.544 Mitchell, who was known as the "paper lady" in the small
Arkansas town where she resided, operated a newsstand, and deliv-
ered papers, sued for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.54 She lost the first claim
but prevailed on the latter two in federal district court.5 4 6
The defendant did not dispute that the story was highly offensive
to a reasonable person, but defended on the basis that it was "pure
fiction." '54 7 Specifically, the defendant argued on appeal that readers
could not reasonably believe the story conveyed actual facts about
Mitchell because the biological impossibility for a woman of her age
to become pregnant clearly rendered "the whole story an obvious,
non-actionable 'fiction."' 54"
Nevertheless, the court upheld the jury verdict for Mitchell, not-
ing that every aspect of the story could be proven true or false.549
Showing sensitivity to the story's innuendo, the court noted that some
components of the story-specifically the suggestion of Mitchell's sex-
ual impropriety-could reasonably be believed. "5 ° Calling pregnancy
"a physical condition, not an opinion, metaphor, fantasy, or surreal-
ism," the court refused to say as a matter of law that readers could not
reasonably have believed the story as portraying actual facts.55
The format and style of the Sun suggest it is a factual newspa-
per. Globe advertises the Sun as publishing "the weird, the
strange, and the outlandish news from around the globe,"
and nowhere in the publication does it suggest its stories are
543. Id. at 1067. The photo had been purchased from the Baxter County Bulletin, a local
newspaper in Mitchell's community. Id. The Sun editor who chose the photo for the story
testified that he assumed the person shown in the photo was dead. Id. at 1070.
544. Id. at 1067.
545. Id.
546. Id. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is known as outrage in
Arkansas. Id. The jury awarded Mitchell $650,000 in compensatory damages and $850,000
in punitive damages. Id.
547. Id. at 1068.
548. Id. at 1069.
549. Id. at 1069.
550. Id.
551. Id. Note the similarity to Judge Breitenstein's dissent in Pring. See supra notes 389-
394 and accompanying text.
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false or exaggerated. The Sun also mingles factual, fictional,
and hybrid stories without overtly identifying one from the
other. At trial, even its own writers could not tell which sto-
ries were true and which were completely fabricated.5 2
Noting that the Sun publishes disclaimers above some personal ads to
indicate that these have not been investigated, the court viewed such
disclaimers as implying that other ads and stories had been investi-
gated.553 The court thus concluded that Globe Publishing did not
intend the Sun to be an obvious work of fiction, but rather held it out
as factual and true.554 Finally, the court observed that this was the
"kind of calculated falsehood against which the First Amendment can
tolerate sanctions without significant impairment of its function." '555
Douglass and Wood are, of course, distinguishable from similar
cases relying on defamation law to seek redress for sexually demean-
ing portrayals. Specifically, these false light decisions analyze what is
more clearly a factual assertion. That factual assertion is an implicit
one: that the plaintiff consented to have her photo published in what
the judges characterize varyingly as off-color, vile, vulgar, hard core,
and degrading publications "devoted exclusively to sexual exploita-
tion and to disparagement of women." 556 Globe Publishing is helpful in
a different way. It demonstrates a more technical approach to the
determination of what an offending publication "says." The court
used a combination of interpretive approaches. On the one hand, it
552. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 978 F.2d at 1070. The court also observed that the news-
paper alerted its readers to items that were advertisements with small-print caveats above
the text of those ads. Id. The district court had similarly concluded that if the defendant
wanted its readers to know that the material was fiction, it very easily could have indicated
this. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791, 799 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
The district court cited a survey, which it acknowledged was not scientific, that was con-
ducted in Arkansas at about the time of the Mitchell trial. Id. at 799 n.4. Survey respon-
dents were asked whether they believed the stories in supermarket tabloids are real. Id.
Fifty-three percent responded "yes." Id.
553. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 978 F.2d at 1070.
554. Id.
555. Id. The district court had similarly focused on the part of the article that went to
Mitchell's sexual propriety. The court noted that even if some facts contained in an article
could not reasonably be believed, "the implication of sexual promiscuity" could. Peoples
Bank & Trust Co., 786 F. Supp. at 798. In making that determination, the court considered
the "surrounding circumstances in which the statements were made, the medium by which
they were published, and the audience for which they were intended." Id.
556. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 254 (5th Cir. 1984) This was, of course, similar to the
plaintiffs argument in Geaty v. Goldstein. Supra notes 405-435 and accompanying text.
There the plaintiff argued that she was defamed because of the implication that she had
consented to the use of her image in the Midnight Blue parody. Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F.
Supp. 269, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Geary v. Goldstein, 1996 WL 447776, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
8, 1996).
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was very literal, focusing on the aspects of the communication that
could be proven true or false-whether Nellie Mitchell was pregnant
and whether she planned to cease delivering newspapers.
Nevermind, the court said, that pregnancy was a biological impossibil-
ity; the Sun wanted readers to believe the plaintiff was, in fact, preg-
nant.5 5s In addition to its willingness to take literally some of the
story's assertions, though, the court also discerned the story's subtext:
Nellie Mitchell's sexual impropriety.559
False light cases like these may provide an avenue of escape from
the defamation law conundrum in which a female plaintiff in a new
chastity case may find herself. First, the concept of injury being re-
dressed in these cases permits a woman to achieve legal recourse for
statements that portray her in a highly offensive and inauthentic
way-regardless of whether that portrayal implies blameworthiness on
her part. It thus takes law out of the business of saying what is and is
not sexually proper and leaves it simply adjudicating what is inaccu-
rate and highly offensive. After all, if a woman's sexual practices and
propriety must be the subject of litigation-and it appears they must if
she is to receive redress-it is preferable to do so in a manner that
does not expressly assess blameworthiness or immorality. Finally, all
of these false light cases are helpful in their acknowledgement of the
harms caused by a woman's sexually degrading or ridiculous por-
trayal. 56" These cases help shift the focus away from reputational
harm to emotional distress and other threats to psychological well-
being that are caused by such sexually hateful communications.
2. The Theory.-An understanding of the injury being redressed
by false light invasion of privacy is enhanced by knowledge of its theo-
retical underpinnings. Rather than discuss the tort in relation to the
voluminous literature on the concept of privacy generally, I limit my
discussion to conceptions of this particular variety of the invasion of
privacy tort.561 While some commentators have argued that false light
557. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 978 F.2d at 1069.
558. Id.
559. Id. The court did not note how this assertion also made Mitchell look ridiculous,
both for being a sexually active nonagenarian and for being "caught" at it by getting
pregnant.
560. See, e.g., Braun, 726 F.2d at 250 (recognizing that the plaintiff was entitled to re-
cover damages for mental anguish suffered as a result of her picture being published in a
sexually explicit magazine).
561. In addition to the torts context, issues of privacy arise in many other legal contexts,
including the constitutional right to family privacy, to have an abortion, and to have sexual
relations. Privacy issues also arise in the context of data privacy and many other digital age
scenarios. See David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REv. 527, 532-48
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invasion of privacy is redundant to defamation law because the injury
being redressed is one to reputation, most have viewed the interest
protected by false light as fundamentally different.562 Professor Blous-
tein, for example, writing about the tort at mid-century, called false
light portrayals an "assault on individual personality and dignity" and
argued that the tort protects individual integrity from violation.563 He
analogized the privacy tort to assault, battery, and false imprisonment,
noting that it provides vindication instead of compensation.564 Blous-
tein concluded that "[t]he damage is to an individual's self-respect in
being made a public spectacle. 565
In a related vein, Professor Gary Schwartz has argued that por-
traying an individual in a false light confounds or impugns his identity
in society because of the offensive or disorienting mismatch between
his actual identity and his identity in the minds of others. 56 6 While
such portrayals affect reputation, they may also implicate privacy by
disclosing information related to a private aspect of the person's
life.
5 6 7
A related and highly compelling argument in support of the false
light tort, the argument based on self-determination is similarly per-
(2000) (discussing the uncertain state of the family privacy doctrine); Jed Rubenfeld, The
Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. Rv. 737, 754-61 (1989) (discussing the constitutional right to
privacy as freedom from having one's life dictated by government); Paul M. Schwartz, Pri-
vacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. Rrv. 1, 22-41 (1997)
(advocating for informational privacy in the context of health care); DanielJ. Solove, Con-
ceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087, 1132-41 (2002) (identifying the family, body, and
home as important contexts for privacy). See generally Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of
Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 433 (1980) (discussing the concept of privacy). As one commenta-
tor has observed, "social, psychological, philosophical, linguistic and legal" aspects of
human life all contribute to the meaning of privacy, which doesn't have a "central, reduci-
ble meaning." Ray, supra note 496, at 742.
562. See Flowers v. Carville, 310 F.3d 1118, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (declaring that false
light differs from defamation in that the former does not require injury to reputation).
But see Holt v. Camus, 128 F. Supp. 2d 812, 816 (D. Md. 1999) (noting that, under Mary-
land law, the same legal standards apply to libel and false light claims).
563. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 991 (1964).
564. Id. at 1002-03.
565. Id. at 981, discussed in Ray, supra note 496, at 738-39 (critiquing Bloustein's concep-
tion as too vague to be useful). This conception of injury as linked to invasion of privacy
echoes the dignity theory of reputation in relation to defamation law, which has been
discussed extensively by Professor Robert Post. Post, supra note 49, at 707-19. The dignity
theory of reputation is less prominent in defamation law than the property theory, but
nevertheless present. See supra notes 49-55. Professor Post defines dignity as an individ-
ual's "interest in being included within the forms of social respect." Id. at 711. Post dis-
cusses not only the individual's interest in dignity, but also society's interest.
566. Gary T. Schwartz, Explaining and Justifying a Limited Tort of False Light Invasion of
Privacy, 41 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 885, 897-98 (1991), discussed in Ray, supra note 496, at 741.
567. Schwartz, supra note 566, at 897-98.
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suasive with regard to the cases examined in this Article. Nathan Ray
has asserted that self-determination is a component of human dig-
nity.568 He argues that self-determination is undermined by mislead-
ing portrayals because the person is inappropriately redefined in a
way that leaves her with "different and inferior options" for interact-
ing with others.5 69 The harm is not about reputation, but rather is the
"self-imposed withdrawal or defensiveness" that is a natural conse-
quence of "feelings of humiliation, indignity, helplessness, resent-
ment, nakedness and the like. '5v0 False light thus provides redress not
only for hurt feelings, but also guards against the "consequences of
these inner reactions in the specific setting of the public arena. "571
Law should provide a remedy, Ray argues, because false light publicity
"impairs an individual's involvement with public life and freedom of
decision-making.
5 72
Plaintiffs in the new chastity cases apparently suffer this same hu-
miliation, as well as the consequent withdrawal and defensiveness.
While not often discussed in case reports because it is not at issue on
appeal or summary adjudication, the nature of the false light injury
has been addressed in a few opinions. The evidence offered in these
cases is consistent with the type of injury described by Bloustein, Ray,
and others. For example, one plaintiff testified that, upon learning of
the unauthorized publication of her photo in Chic magazine, she "was
very upset and felt like crawling in a hole and never coming out."573
568. Ray, supra note 496, at 746.
569. Id. at 745-46. Philosopher Stanley Benn has made a related argument. He concep-
tualizes privacy as related to individuals making choices. He explains that being an "object
of scrutiny, as the focus of another's attention, brings one to a new consciousness of one-
self, as something seen through another's eyes." Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Re-
spect for Persons, in PRIvAcy: NoMos XIII, at 1, 7 (J. Ronald Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1971) (discussed in Solove, supra note 561, at 1116-17). He becomes "aware of himself
as an object, knowable, having a determinate character." Benn, supra, at 7. Thus, the
person who is observed is "fixed as something-with limited probabilities rather than infi-
nite, indeterminate possibilities." Id.
570. Ray, supra note 496, at 746. Professor Lu-in Wang has also written about the impact
that hateful speech has on self-worth. She speaks specifically about the diminution of self-
worth that is suffered by those who are victims of violent crime. See Wang, supra note 309,
at 101-04.
571. Ray, supra note 496, at 746.
572. Id. Ray also argues that self-determination is not a new concept in the law, noting
its implicit recognition in First and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 747-48
(citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
573. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1984). She described how she learned
that her picture was in the magazine when a stranger in a convenience store recognized
her from the photo and pointed it out to her. She said,
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The court characterized her injury as "primarily, personal humilia-
tion, embarrassment, pain and suffering."574
In Globe Publishing, the ninety-five-year-old plaintiff testified that
she was mad, upset, embarrassed and humiliated by the article, and
that she had been teased about being pregnant.57 5 The court ob-
served that the outward manifestations of her depression and humilia-
tion included "avoiding other people for a few days and a temporary
loss of a certain blithe cheerfulness, apparently typical of her person-
ality."' 576 The district court was considerably more outraged about the
plaintiffs injury, which it described in graphic terms. It equated her
"heretofore unsullied photograph" with "her very 'being"' and noted
they were "literally buried in . . . muck, mire and slime spewed forth
by defendant. '5 77 The court analogized her injury to being dragged
slowly through untreated sewage, writing
After that person had showered and a few weeks had passed,
there would be little remaining visible evidence of the ordeal
which the person had endured and the resulting damage in-
curred, but few would doubt that substantial damage had
been inflicted by the one doing the dragging.578
To use the words of the very judges who are frequently denying
them a remedy-women who bring these claims are portrayed as
I stood there because I was really really terrified. I thought something is going to
happen, my picture is not in this magazine. My legs were like jelly, I couldn't
untrack. I was petrified. And he was thumbing through these pictures. I was
raised in a private Catholic school and I had never seen anything like this. And I
was terrified, I didn't know what he had in mind. I thought something horrible
was going to happen to me. He flipped through that book and my picture was in
that book. I didn't believe it. I stood there like a dummy.
Id. at 248.
574. Id. at 252. The description of Braun's injury is strikingly similar to the description
of injury in a turn-of-the century case, McFadden v. Morning Journal Ass'n, although the
publication there was seemingly much less offensive. 51 N.Y.S. 275 (App. Div. 1898), dis-
cussed supra at notes 167-175. In terms of other damages suffered, the McFadden plaintiff
said the article had "caused her to cry, and had kept her from sleeping and eating and
going into society, and made her feel as if she were of no account, and that that feeling
had continued until trial." Id. at 279.
575. Peoples Bank & Trust v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1071 (8th Cir.
1992).
576. Id.
577. Id. (quoting opinion of lower court reproduced at Peoples Bank & Trust v. Globe
Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791, 795 (W.D. Ark. 1992)).
578. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 786 F. Supp. at 796. The court refused to reduce the
plaintiff's award, finding that reasonable jurors could conclude that it is "'worth' a great
deal to suddenly find your likeness buried in the slime of which this publication was made,
directly in front of an article describing the relative tastiness of adult human flesh com-
pared to that of children." Id.
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"wanton or debauched,"579 debased, degraded, vulgar, and ridicu-
lous.5"' The publications in which they are featured are similarly de-
scribed as "coarse and sex-centered,"581 "devoted exclusively to sexual
exploitation and to disparagement of women,"58 2 and having "no re-
deeming features whatever."5" 3 It is not surprising that such portray-
als undermine the targeted woman's sense of self, causing her to
withdraw from the public in response to a profound assault on her
dignity, indeed often on her very humanity.584
B. Lessons from Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co.
One case cited by Judge Wood in Geary v. Goldstein585 is the 1936
decision in Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co.58 6 I return to that decision
here because the Burton court's handling of the issue of defamatory
meaning in relation to ridiculous or imaginative speech, as well as in
relation to truth, may enhance our understanding of the constitu-
tional doctrines that evolved a number of years after Burton. The
579. Wood v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 736 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1984).
580. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982) (noting that
the story about the plaintiff "is a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt to ridicule the
[plaintiffl").
581. Wood, 736 F.2d at 1089.
582. Braun v. Flynt, 726 F.2d 245, 254 (5th Cir. 1984).
583. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443.
584. Like the injury that I argue should be recognized in relation to the new chastity
cases, the anti-pornography ordinance proposed by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin in the 1980s was built on conceptions of human dignity to argue for recognition
of causes of action for those who had been injured by the production and distribution of
pornographic materials. ANDtREA DWORKIN & CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Pornography and
Civil Rights: A New Day for Women's Equality 41-52 (1988). One component of that ordi-
nance would have provided a cause of action for defamation. The proposal provided, in
relevant part, "It shall be sex discrimination to defame any person through the unautho-
rized use in pornography of their proper name, image or recognizable persona' likeness."
Id. at 51. The authors justified the need for this cause of action by explaining that some
pornography "turns individual women into pornography against their will, sexualizes
them." Specifically, they argued that pornographers "reduce specific women," especially
those "in the public eye, to 'cunt."' Id. None of the cities that passed the ordinance in-
cluded this provision, but the ordinance, as passed by the City of Indianapolis, was struck
down as unconstitutional. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defama-
tion and Discrimination, 71 B.U. L. REv. 793, 796 (1991); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY
WoRDs (1993) (arguing that pornography defames the women used in its making, and
proposing a theory of group defamation).
Other feminists also have linked pornography to dignitary injuries. Professor Ruth
Colker has linked pornography with privacy in her argument for tort liability based on sex-
based invasion of privacy, including unauthorized sexual portrayals. See Colker, Pornogra-
phy and Privacy, supra note 380.
585. 831 F. Supp. 269, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
586. 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936).
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court's approach to these issues also inspires workarounds to those
doctrines, which have proven stumbling blocks for many plaintiffs in
the new chastity cases.
The plaintiff in Burton was a well-known "gentleman steeple-
chaser" who had contracted with Camel to endorse its cigarettes.58 7
He sued for defamation based on what might have been an ad parody,
but was in fact a straight ad that embarrassed him by including a mis-
leading photo. 58 8 The offending Camel advertisement featured pho-
tographs of the plaintiff and text that quoted him as declaring that
Camel cigarettes "restored" him after "a crowded business day."
589
Additional copy read "Get a lift with a Camel."'59 The basis of the
complaint was a photograph that showed Burton carrying his saddle
in a way that gave the illusion that part of the saddle he carried was his
penis hanging down.591 "So regarded," the court wrote, "the photo-
graph becomes grotesque, monstrous, and obscene; and the legends,
which without undue violence can be made to match, reinforce the
ribald interpretation. That is the libel."
592
Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Burton is an exercise in the
finer points of a defamatory meaning analysis. At various junctures in
his characteristically lyrical opinion, Judge Hand seems to contradict
himself. He rejects out of hand the argument that the ad might be
perceived literally to say
that the plaintiff was deformed, or that he had indecently
exposed himself, or was making obscene jokes by means of
the legends. Nobody could be fatuous enough to believe any
of these things; everybody would at once see that it was the
camera, and the camera alone, that had made the unfortu-
nate mistake.593
Hand goes on to emphasize that the picture clearly doesn't depict the
plaintiff "as he is," and that the photo is "patently an optical illusion"
that "carries its correction on its face as much as though it were a
587. Id. at 154.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id.
591. Id. The court described the scene as the plaintiff "carrying his saddle in front of
him with his right hand under the pommel and his left under the cantle; the line of the
seat is about twelve inches below his waist. Over the pommel hangs a stirrup; over the seat
at his middle a white girth falls loosely in such a way that it seems to be attached to the
plaintiff and not to the saddle." Id.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 155.
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verbal utterance which expressly declared that it was false. 594 Hand
observes that the "obvious mistake only added to the amusement.
595
Acknowledging the paradox, Hand continues, "notwithstanding
all we have just said, it exposed the plaintiff to overwhelming ridi-
cule" '596 and was defamatory on that basis. "Literally, therefore the
injury falls within the accepted rubric; it exposes the sufferer to 'ridi-
cule' and 'contempt."'597
Hand's focus on the aggravation created by the obviousness of
the error-its undisputedly evident literal falsity-presents a sharp
594. Id. While Hand speaks of something "patently" an optical illusion, contemporary
cases speak of offending statements being patently or obviously parodies.
595. Id.
596. Id. By way of explanation of this proposition, the court noted "[t]he contrast be-
tween the drawn and serious face and the accompanying fantastic and lewd deformity,"
which made the plaintiff "a preposterously ridiculous spectacle." Id.
597. Id. (emphasis added). Judge Hand specifically rejected the defendant's argument
that a libel must go to the plaintiffs "character" if "by 'character' is meant those moral
qualities which the word ordinarily includes, the statement is certainly untrue," stating that
many libels "do not affect the reputation of the victim in any such way." Id. Hand then
cited a number of cases in which people have been found to be defamed, even though the
offending statement did not go to their character. These include Totten v. Sun Printing &
Publ'g Ass'n, 109 F. 289 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901) (holding that calling a man insane was
libelous); Southwick v. Stevens, 10Johns. 443 (N.Y. 1813) (same); Stultz v. Cousins, 242 F.
794 (6th Cir. 1917) (noting that plaintiff has "negro blood when he professes to be white);
Snyder v. New York Press Co., 121 N.Y.S. 944 (App. Div. 1910) (that a woman had been
served process in a bathtub); Martin v. Press Publ'g Co., 87 N.Y.S. 859 (App. Div. 1904)
(noting that the plaintiff was "too educated to earn his living"); Simpson v. Press Publ'g
Co., 67 N.Y.S. 402 (1900) (noting that the plaintiff has an infectious, albeit not venereal,
disease); Moffatt v. Cauldwell, 3 Hun. 26 (N.Y. 1874) (noting that the plaintiff is desper-
ately poor); Villers v. Monfley, 2 Wils. 403 (1769) ("Old Villers, so strong of brimstone you
smell, as if not long since you has got out of hell, But this damnable smell I no longer can
bear, therefore I desire you would come no more here, You old stinking, old nasty, old
itchy, old toad .... ).
Still, Judge Hand cautioned, "A man must not be too thin-skinned or a self-important
prig; but this advertisement was more than what only a morbid person would not laugh off;
the mortification, however ill-deserved, was a very substantial grievance." Burton, 82 F.2d at
155 (emphasis added).
One commentator has criticized Judge Hand for "concentrat[ing] on the effect on the
victim" while not considering the nature of the defendant's act or state of mind. Tiersma,
supra note 252, at 308. Tiersma argues that
ridicule often has little to do with the reputational interest of the victim. A vic-
tim's feelings may be hurt if others laugh at him, but damage to reputation is
frequently absent. Furthermore, any effect on reputation is generally transitory.
A false imputation of criminal activity may be almost impossible to overcome, but
a mocking poem or derisive picture will usually have no lasting impact on the
esteem in which the community holds the reputable person.
Id. at 308-09.
Interestingly, Hand noted that if the image had been "deliberately produced," every-
one would agree that the defendant was liable. Burton, 82 F.2d at 155. He argued that the
outcome could be no different when it was inadvertent. Id. Clearly this would not be so
under contemporary constitutional precedents. See supra Section IV.B.
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contrast with the new chastity cases. In those contemporary cases,
courts have found a reverse correlation between the degree of obvi-
ousness of the parody-the magnitude of the joke if you will-and the
injury caused by it.59 The Dworkin court wrote, for example: "Ludi-
crous statements are much less insidious and debilitating than falsities
that bear the ring of truth. We have little doubt that the outrageous
and the outlandish will be recognized for what they are. '599 Because
these contemporary courts found that no reasonable viewer would fail
to perceive the parody or joke, they have concluded that viewers
would not take the statements literally.6 0 0 From this they have
surmised that nothing factual has been asserted and, therefore, no
reputational harm could result.60 1 Hand drew the contrary conclu-
sion: a literal interpretation of the offending statement-the fact it
was an optical illusion-would hold the plaintiff up to ridicule so
great that it was "a very substantial grievance."60 2  He gave no
credence to the argument that the obviousness of the optical illusion
rendered it harmless to the plaintiff and saw that making a person the
butt of ajoke is, in fact, a statement about that person.60 3 While Hand
realized everyone would know the photograph was not an accurate
portrayal of Burton, he nevertheless understood that it disparaged the
plaintiff, playing him for a fool.
6 0 4
As in contemporary cases, Hand's analysis of whether the commu-
nication was actionable was linked to the statement's truth or falsity.
Truth was no defense to the plaintiff's depiction in the photograph,
not because the depiction was false (although it was, of course, false in
the sense of being inaccurate), but because no one would perceive it
598. For example, in Spence v. lynt the court offered these contrasting examples based
on the facts in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell. The court began by noting that the law of defa-
mation is more likely to protect a publication the "more outrageous, vile, vulgar, humiliat-
ing and ridiculous" it is. Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771, 774 (Wyo. 1991). Therefore ifJerry
Falwell had reportedly had sexual relations with a member of his congregation, that would
be defamatory as reasonably believable. Id. However, an assertion that he had engaged in
sex in an outhouse with his mother was not defamatory because it was not believable and
"no mater what the ridicule, hurt and damage," it was merely "'imaginative expression'-
'rhetorical hyperbole."' Id.
599. Dworkin v. L.F.P., Inc., 839 P.2d 903, 916 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Dworkin v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1194 (9th Cir. 1989)).
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Burton v. Crowell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936).
603. Id. (noting that the caricature of the plaintiff "affects a man's reputation, if by that
is meant his position in the minds of others; the association so established may be beyond
repair; he may become known indefinitely as the absurd victim of this unhappy
mischance").
604. Id.
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as asserting literal truth.6 °5 This was not the end of the analysis, how-
ever. Hand realized that the photograph nevertheless made a state-
ment about the plaintiff.6 °6 In a form that a contemporary court
would label rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative expression, Hand
looked for the message that the picture communicated. 60 7 He found
that the photograph effectively "said" that Burton was an absurd and
ridiculous figure. 6°8 This, Hand said, was not true. 60 9 It was false and
therefore the photograph as a statement was technically false. 6 10 Be-
cause the statement was false and because it held the plaintiff up to a
degree of ridicule that no one could be expected to endure, it was
defamatory.611 Hand greatly privileged truth, but not as highly as he
privileged reputation. He wrote,
[T] he common law has so much regard for truth that it ex-
cuses the utterance of anything that is true. But it is a non
sequitur to argue that whenever truth is not a defense, there
can be no libel; that would invert the proper approach to the
whole subject.... The only reason why the law makes truth a
defense is not because a libel must be false, but because the
utterance of truth is in all circumstances an interest para-
mount to reputation .... When there is no such counter-
vailing interest, there is no excuse; and that is the situation
here.612
Not stating any verifiably true facts about the plaintiff, the photo-
graph-as a statement-was not privileged.613
Hand's approach to defamatory meaning provides a brilliant in-
sight into what the portrayals in the new chastity cases "say." He saw
that interpreting a statement-even though it was patently fanciful or
literally implausible-necessitated consideration of subtext.6 14 Fur-
ther, the subtext or suggestion he discerned from the "optical illu-
605. Id. (stating that "[n]obody could be fatuous enough to believe" that the plaintiff
was "deformed," had "indecently exposed himself," or was "making obscene jokes").
606. Id. The picture "exposed the plaintiff to overwhelming ridicule." Id.
607. Id. (noting that "the effect [of the picture] is the same whether it is deliberate or
not").
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id. at 156.
612. Id. (emphasis added).
613. Id.
614. Id. (stating that "the picture taken with the legends.. . was.., actionable...; the
fact that it did not assume to state a fact or an opinion is irrelevant...").
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sion" photo was that Burton was a ridiculous figure, an idiot, a fool.6 15
This, he said, was defamatory. 6 6
Many of the female plaintiffs in the new chastity cases are simi-
larly played for the fool. They are portrayed as ridiculous, and some-
times pitiful, in relation to their sexuality.617 Alternatively, the
portrayals suggest that they are vulgar or sexually inappropriate in
some way. 18 If courts were willing to seek the subtext of such commu-
nications and to interpret a sexually hateful portrayal as communicat-
ing one of those messages, they would then have to consider whether
the statement was true or false. In Section V.C.4 below, I take up
these issues of interpretation and falsity in relation to contemporary
constitutional limits on defamation law.
C. A New Dignitary Tort for Technically False Speech
that Ridicules or Demeans
Like the ridicule the photo communicated about the Burton
plaintiff, the harm caused by highly offensive and sexually degrading
portrayals of women in new chastity cases should receive legal redress.
The most obvious vehicles for accomplishing this are false light inva-
sion of privacy and defamation, even though the latter has consistently
failed women in the constitutional era.6" 9 While the law of defama-
tion is more universally recognized and has a much longer and more
established pedigree, 62° several features of the false light tort make it a
much tidier fit for responding to the injuries suffered by women in
the new chastity cases. It also has the benefit of not suggesting blame-
worthiness or immorality, which is implicit from an adjudication of
defamatory meaning.6 2' Rather, the focus of false light is on inaccu-
racy and the offensiveness of the statement.6 22 In my conceptualiza-
tion and definition of a new communicative tort, I draw on elements
of both torts.
615. Id. at 155.
616. Id. at 156.
617. See supra Part III.C.3 (describing how female plaintiffs were portrayed in the new
chastity cases).
618. See supra Part III.C.3.
619. See, e.g., Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1421 (C.D. Cal.
1987).
620. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAiv 631-48 (1978) (describing
the origin and development of defamation law).
621. Ray, supra note 496, at 735. "Because false light requires no damage to reputation,
a plaintiff can be cast in a false light that reflects positively or even improves reputation."
Id.
622. Id. at 734. False light "requires intentional or reckless disclosure to the public at
large of statements or facts that are false and highly offensive." Id.
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I propose a tort that would provide redress for statements that are
(a) widely published, (b) highly offensive, (c) technically false, and
(d) which cause either emotional distress or reputational harm. In
addition, the law would require a public figure or public official to
show that the defendant acted with knowledge or reckless disregard
for the technical falsity of the statement, while requiring a private fig-
ure to show only that the defendant was negligent with respect to the
statement's technical falsity. While sexually hateful portrayals of wo-
men have led to this proposal, the tort would be available to redress
any communication that fulfills the elements, whatever the gender,
623
race or other characteristics of the plaintiff.
6 24
Only the third element, "technical falsity," requires further expla-
nation and definition. That discussion follows below in Section D.
While each of the other elements is familiar based on its inclusion as
an element in an existing tort, I will explain why each should also be
included in the proposed new tort.
1. Widespread Publication.-False light invasion of privacy re-
quires widespread publication,625 in contrast to defamation law's re-
623. A few men have brought cases based on sexually misleading portrayals. See Solano
v. Playgirl, Inc., 292 F.3d 1078, 1082-84 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the actor's photo on
the cover of Playgirl, surrounded by lurid captions, created false impression that he ap-
peared nude inside the magazine);Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11, 14 (S.D.
Ohio 1983). Three minor males sued on the basis of a photograph that showed a police-
woman assisting them to repair a bicycle; the policewoman was featured in nude photos in
same issue; the court granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell
is, of course, the ultimate male-plaintiff case of the new chastity variety. The parody cer-
tainly ridiculed Falwell in a manner related to sex. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 48 (1988). "The ad[ ] clearly played on the sexual double entendre of the general
subject of 'first times'" and "suggests that respondent is a hypocrite who preaches only
when he is drunk." Id
624. This is consistent with LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which requires
regulation of hateful speech (which my proposal is in some form) to be content neutral.
See supra note 309 and accompanying text. As I have already noted, the proposed tort is
intended to regulate speech on the basis of its falsity rather than on the basis that it targets
one group or another.
625. RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). The cause of action requires
.publicity" of information that places another before the public in a false light. The Re-
statement does not explain why this is required, only what it means:
that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at large, or to
so many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to be-
come one of public knowledge. The difference is not one of the means of com-
munication, which may be oral, written or by any other means. It is one of a
communication that reaches, or is sure to reach, the public.
§ 652D, cmt. a, quoted in Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 132 (E.D. Tenn. 1981);
Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 417 (8th Cir. 1978); see also LaMon v. City of
Westport, 723 P.2d 470, 474 (Wash. App. 1986) ("[B]y definition, false light publicity re-
quires publicity of the falsehood, that is, to a substantial number of people."); Brauer v.
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quirement that the offending statement be communicated to only one
other person.626 Because the concern I have identified is with a digni-
tary injury associated with widespread embarrassment and humilia-
tion, which may have an impact on one's willingness to be in the
public sphere, this "widely publicized" element is an appropriate re-
quirement.627 The injury to be remedied, after all, is one arising from
being made a public spectacle or held up to public ridicule in a sexu-
ally hateful manner. The injury is less about embarrassment among
family and friends, although such embarrassment may necessarily be
attendant to being held up to public ridicule. In addition, including
this element will limit liability, preventing application when the of-
fending statement has been perceived only by the plaintiff and a lim-
ited number of other persons.
Globe Newspaper Co., 217 N.E.2d 736, 740 (Mass. 1966) (noting that false light requires
"acts which are sufficient in themselves to familiarize the public with either the name,
likeness, or other means of identifying the plaintiff); Weinstein v. Bullick, 827 F. Supp.
1193, 1202 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (requiring publicity element to also include showing that the
statement be reasonably understood as referring to the plaintiff).
The tort of publication of private facts similarly requires widespread publication of the
private information. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The information
must be "widely publicized" because an element of the tort requires that the general public
be informed of a private fact; this involves publication at least to a group. SANFORD, supra
note 26, § 11.3.8.
626. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559a (1976).
627. Few cases or commentators discuss the reason for including this requirement in the
false light tort, but those that do generally link it to the goal of guarding that which is
private. A statement that is communicated to only a few persons arguably remains private
and is not truly made public. See Stewart v. Pantry, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1361, 1369-70 (W.D.
Ky. 1988) (stating that publicity in false light context requires "more than the mere act of
firing plaintiffs under circumstances which may result in gossip" and requires a communi-
cation of the plaintiffs' termination "to members of the public"), quoted in Hart v. Seven
Resorts, Inc., 947 P.2d 846, 854 (Ariz. App. Div. 1997); Butler v. Town of Argo, 2003 WL
21489719 (Ala. June 30, 2003) (stating that it is not an invasion of privacy "to communicate
a fact concerning the plaintiffs private life to a single person or even to a small group of
persons" because the distinction is one between private and public communication) (cit-
ing Rosen v. Montgomery Surgical Ctr., 825 So. 2d 735, 739 (Ala. 2001); Johnston v. Fuller,
706 So. 2d 700, 703 (Ala. 1997); ExparteBirmingham News, Inc., 778 So. 2d 814, 818 (Ala.
2000)).
Professor Bloustein wrote of the widespread publicity requirement forty years ago that
"the gravamen of the complaint here is [that] ... in effect, the publicity constitutes a form
of intrusion, it is as if 100,000 people were suddenly peering in, as through a window, on
one's private life . . . . The wrong is in replacing personal anonymity by notoriety, in
turning a private life into a public spectacle .... [P]ublicity concerning those facets of
private life represents an imposition upon and affront to the plaintiff's human dignity."
Bloustein, Answer to Prosser, supra note 563, at 979.
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2. Highly Offensive.-The "highly offensive" element is also bor-
rowed from the false light tort.6 2' This requirement narrows the tort
in order not to deter or punish too much speech. Speech that may be
merely misleading and even moderately unflattering to the plaintiff,
for example, would not give rise to liability. Rather, the goal is to
compensate only for speech that clearly inflicts a dignitary injury by
ridiculing and degrading which, with respect to a woman plaintiff, is
usually on the basis of sex. The portrayals in Pring (performing fella-
tio on her coach on the Miss America stage), Dworkin ("militant les-
bian feminist" and "shit-squeezing sphincter"), and Geary (parody of
commercial suggesting that plaintiff consented to be portrayed in por-
nographic fashion), for example, would easily meet this require-
ment.629 The statements in Seelig (referring to the plaintiff as "skank,"
"chicken butt," and "local loser" in the context of a radio show that
ridiculed her) and Walko (saying plaintiff could be reached on a
"whoreline") would, at a minimum, create jury questions with respect
to this element.
6 30
3. Causing Emotional Distress or Reputational Harm.-I have al-
ready described the dignitary harms caused by sexually degrading por-
trayals. 63 ' Although my description focused on the emotional and
dignitary harms that seem to be dominant in these cases, plaintiffs
may also suffer reputational harm.63 2 More precisely, it is possible
that the offending statement will have economic consequences for the
plaintiff, whether or not on the basis of a traditional reputational in-
jury.633 For example, the plaintiffs in Geary and Douglass focused less
on the psychic injury they may have suffered and more on how the
unauthorized and degrading publications undermined their acting ca-
628. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652D, 652E (1977) (requiring the matter pub-
licized to be "highly offensive to a reasonable person").
629. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1988); Dworkin v. L.F.P.,
Inc., 839 P.2d 903 (Wyo. 1992); Geary v. Goldstein, 831 F. Supp. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Geary v. Goldstein, 1996 WL 447776 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1996).
630. See Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680, 682 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988).
631. See supra Part V.A.2.
632. See supra note 164 (describing plaintiffs who suffered reputational harm).
633. See Geary, 831 F. Supp. at 270 (discussing how a sexually explicit spoof of the com-
mercial starring the plaintiff caused the original commercial to be pulled from national
television, ending the plaintiffs royalties); Douglass v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 769 F.2d
1128, 1132 (7th Cir. 1985) (describing how the plaintiffs commercial acting career was
destroyed by the publication of her nude photographs in Hustler Magazine because "adver-
tisers thought she had voluntarily appeared in ... an extremely vulgar magazine").
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reers.63 4 Thus, the new tort must acknowledge the longer-recognized
injury to reputation as an alternative to the emotional distress injury
that new chastity plaintiffs typically suffer.
4. Actual Malice or Negligence with Respect to Technical Falsity.-The
new tort would retain the constitutionally mandated requirement that
a statement giving rise to liability is false.6 5 The concept of falsity
would be enhanced, however, to include what I call "technical falsity,"
as further explained in Section D. That more sophisticated under-
standing of falsity would necessarily be incorporated into the actual
malice requirement associated with public figures and public officials
in the constitutional era of defamation law: knowledge of or reckless
disregard of technical falsity.6 36 Courts would similarly incorporate it
into the mental state requirement associated with private figures: the
defendant's negligence with regard to the statement's technical
falsity.
63 7
Defamation law draws this distinction between public and private
persons, making it slightly easier for the latter to recover. 63 8 Most
states require false light plaintiffs to prove actual malice, although the
Constitution only mandates it with respect to public persons.639 I opt
for the dichotomy associated with defamation law, in part because it is
likely to make redress more attainable for many of the plaintiffs in
634. Id.; see also Ann-Margret v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 401 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (noting that the plaintiff was embarrassed by reproduction of shot from one of her
movies in which she appeared topless); Russell v. Marboro Books, 183 N.Y.S.2d 8 (Sup. Ct.
Spec. Term 1959). In the latter case, MaryJane Russell described the damage to her pro-
fessional modeling career from being portrayed, without her consent, in a highly sexually
suggestive ad.
[Russell's] high professional standing and concomitant earning power have been
achieved by meticulous adherence to the highest standards of professional con-
duct and good taste for herself and for her clients. The plaintiffs professional
services . . . have never been available for purposes of advertising or trade to
anyone who resorts to bad taste, immodesty, double entendre or similar techniques
in his appeals for the public attention. The use of a photograph of the plaintiff
by an advertiser known to be an adherent of such techniques connotes that the
plaintiff had consented to such use. Such consent, if given by the plaintiff, would
ruin her professional standing and earning power and cause her to be shunned
by family and friends and in the community in which she lives and works.
Id. at 15-16.
635. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) (noting that "there is
no constitutional value in false statements of fact").
636. See BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 200.
637. See id. at 200-01.
638. See id. at 201 (stating that the results of a study showed that private plaintiffs had a
success rate of 17.5%, while public-figure plaintiffs' success rate was 10.2%).
639. See Stohl, supra note 496, at 270-71 (discussing the relationship between false light
and the First Amendment).
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these cases. I also choose it because the traditional justifications for a
higher burden of proof do not seem appropriate for these plaintiffs.
The standard justification for imposing the actual malice stan-
dard with respect to public figures is that they have the power to have
publicized their own message, which will correct the defamatory false-
hood.6 40 Few women, particularly the plaintiffs in the cases I have
discussed, have the power to command such media attention. For ex-
ample, presumably the only public figure in any of these cases is An-
drea Dworkin, based on her long-standing involvement in a campaign
to regulate pornography. 641 Further, because it is difficult to imagine
any speech that will effectively counter the sort of demeaning message
to which these plaintiffs have been subjected, this rationale for a
higher burden of proof seems especially misplaced with respect to the
new chastity cases. As a related matter, I would argue that no person
should be seen as assuming the risk that she will be portrayed so con-
temptuously. If one has assumed such a risk, it should be only on the
basis that she holds meaningful political power.
D. Keeping it Constitutional: Non-Literal Meaning and Technical Falsity
One critical key to the acceptance and success of this new hybrid
tort is keeping it within the existing constitutional parameters for ei-
ther or both defamation and invasion of privacy. The constitutionality
of both of these torts hinges on the falsity of the speech, as reflected in
Justice Powell's statement in Gertz that "there is no constitutional value
in false statements of fact." '64 2 The tort that I propose would therefore
similarly require the offending statement to be false. I reconsider fal-
sity and its relation to defamatory meaning, however, in a more so-
phisticated way than contemporary courts have. I coin the term
"technical falsity" to refer to this concept.
640. TRIBE, supra note 620, at 641.
641. In many of the cases I have discussed, courts never reached the question whether
the plaintiff was a public or private figure. In both Dwoorkin and Walko, the courts specifi-
cally found that the plaintiffs were public figures. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.,
668 F. Supp. 1408, 1418 (C.D. Cal. 1987); Walko v. Kean Coll., 561 A.2d 680, 686 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1988). The Sixth Circuit in Street v. National Broadcasting Co. held the
plaintiff to be a public figure, but I do not consider Street a new chastity case because the
defendant's assertion of the plaintiff's sexual misbehavior was straightforward. See Street v.
Nat'l Broad Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1232, 1236 (6th Cir. 1981).
642. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Judge Friendly observed
that this passage became "the opening salvo in all arguments for protection from defama-
tion actions on the ground of opinion, even though the case did not remotely concern the
question." Cianci v. New York Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 61 (2d Cir. 1980), quoted in
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 18 (1990).
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I chose the term "technical falsity" for three reasons. First, my
analysis shows that the message being communicated is technically or
actually capable of being proven true or false. Second, technical fal-
sity is a candid label because my tort relies on a technicality-falsity-
for its situation within the constitutional jurisprudence on defamation
and false light invasion of privacy. Because speech that is merely hate-
ful receives greater First Amendment protection than does false
speech,643 this technicality is the key to the constitutionality of the
proposed tort. This, in turn, is related to the final reason for the
term. In my analysis, falsity is a technicality because the injury for
which redress is sought does not stem from the statement's falsity. It
stems instead from the dignitary injury inflicted by the communica-
tion's misogynistic message, which ridicules and demeans. The com-
munication's falsity is merely the hook that justifies a lower level of
First Amendment protection.
As demonstrated by the cases discussed above, courts very often
do not reach the issue of falsity in contemporary chastity cases based
on sexually degrading portrayals.644 This is because of the indelible
link between the fact-opinion and truth-falsity inquiries. In particular,
whether a statement is protected "opinion" or unprotected false "fact"
was long determined according to whether a party could prove that
the fact was true or false.64 5 Before Milkovich, courts in these cases
frequently determined that a statement was vague, opinion, or for
some other reason not capable of being proven true or false. 64 6 After
Milkovich, the questions have become whether the court can reasona-
bly interpret the statement as stating actual facts (per Falwell) or
whether it contains a provably false factual assertion (per Hepps).647
This first test is the one that generally looms largest in analysis of the
new chastity cases. It essentially asks whether the statement will be
perceived literally. Whichever question is asked, courts protect the
hyperbolic and imaginative speech, thereby preempting consideration
of whether the statement is true or false.6 48
643. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992) (holding that any regulation
of hate speech must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest).
644. See supra Part III.B.2; see also supra note 302 and accompanying text.
645. See Anderson, supra note 252, at 507 (discussing the fact-opinion dichotomy).
646. See, e.g., Baker v. L.A. Herald Exam'r, 721 P.2d 87, 89 (Cal. 1986) (holding that a
statement was opinion and therefore not libelous).
647. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988); Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986).
648. See Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 108, 116 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating
that rhetorical hyperbole is entitled to constitutional protection).
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The problem is not so much that courts are asking the wrong
questions but that they are answering them superficially. In asking
each of these questions-(1) whether the statement can "reasonably
be interpreted as stating actual facts about the individual," '649 (2)
whether the statement contains a provably false factual assertion, and
(3) if so, whether that assertion is true or false-courts should engage
in a more sophisticated interpretive analysis. Specifically, they must
consider the meaning conveyed by the hyperbolic and imaginative
speech and, in turn, determine the truth or falsity of that message.
Here, I discuss these Falwel-based and Hepps-based aspects of
Milkovich's protection of the sort of speech that is often at issue in the
new chastity cases.
1. Milkovich, Falwell, and the Misunderstanding about Rhetorical
Hyperbole.-While courts have not inquired into the subtext of the
statements that give rise to the new chastity cases-a prerequisite to
the technical falsity inquiry-they could do so without violence to the
First Amendment and while remaining consistent with the holdings of
both Milkovich and Falwell. Again, Falwell dictated the protection of
speech that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating facts about the
plaintiff.65° Milkovich embraced this test and established a dichotomy
between statements that will be perceived literally and those that will
not.651 Those statements that will not be taken literally are protected
by the First Amendment because they are viewed as not asserting
facts. 652 Courts, both before and after Milkovich, have presumed that
statements employing rhetorical hyperbole or imaginative expression
are protected because they are seen as the quintessential statements
"that cannot 'reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts' about
the individual."653 Such unthinking protection of speech that takes
this form, however, has obscured the message that is conveyed by the
hyperbolic or imaginative language.
Professor Robert Post has challenged the taxonomy that always
designates rhetorical hyperbole as a form of protected speech.6 54
While Post advanced this argument prior to the decision in Milkovich,
the Milkovich Court did nothing to undermine his argument, as it es-
sentially re-named what had been protected as "opinion" and affirmed
649. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (quoting Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 485 U.S. at 50).
650. Falwel4 485 U.S. at 56.
651. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. Post, supra note 252, at 650-52.
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the value of rhetorical hyperbole and imaginative expression.6 5
"Strictly speaking," Post argues, rhetorical hyperbole "has nothing to
do with the distinction between fact and opinion.
656
Post explains how the Supreme Court has been perceived to have
made rhetorical hyperbole synonymous with constitutionally privi-
leged opinion.657 Specifically, Post asserts that the Supreme Court, in
a case decided the same day as Gertz, Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
National Letter Carriers v. Austin,6 51 left a legacy of misunderstanding by
implying that rhetorical hyperbole was synonymous with protected
opinion. 6 "9 The case, which arose from a labor dispute in which the
union had identified three plaintiffs as "scabs," misled by contrasting
"representations of fact" with that which was "merely rhetorical hyper-
bole. 66° Post characterizes the Court as going "out of its way" to cite
Gertz and Bresler in a decision that actually turned on federal labor law
rather than on First Amendment principles, thereby implying that
rhetorical hyperbole was tantamount to opinion.661
Having explained the misunderstanding created by Letter Carriers,
Post argues that the inquiry should be whether the "actual meaning
made visible by the concept of rhetorical hyperbole is fact or opin-
ion." '662 In other words, instead of concluding that rhetorical hyper-
bole is protected because it is opinion, the meaning conveyed by the
rhetorical hyperbole should be discerned and a determination made
regarding whether that meaning constitutes fact or opinion. Post,
then, would presumably forego Milkovich's test of whether a statement
can "reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts"66 3 because it
implies that only literal interpretations matter and therefore, if a state-
ment will not be read literally, it cannot give rise to liability for defa-
mation. For Post, it does not follow that if a literal reading reveals a
statement to be imaginative expression or hyperbole, the statement is
necessarily protected on that basis.6 64 His analysis would include addi-
655. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
656. Post, supra note 252, at 650.
657. Id. at 651-52 (discussing Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974)
and Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)).
658. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
659. Post, supra note 252, at 651-52.
660. Id. (discussing Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 268).
661. Id. at 652.
662. Id.
663. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1989).
664. See id.
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tional steps, specifically determining what message is conveyed and
whether that message gives rise to liability for defamation.665
Post illustrates his point by reference to the ad parody that gave
rise to the litigation in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.66 6 The item
purported to quote Falwell as describing his first sexual encounter,
with his mother in an outhouse.66 7 Post observes that the Falwell
Court's analysis of the matter only created confusion by simply label-
ing the offending publication rhetorical hyperbole and, on that basis,
protected.668 Post notes that Larry Flynt, Hustler's publisher, explicitly
stated what he intended the parody to mean: "that Falwell's message is
'b.s.'. . . that this formidable public figure's teachings are non-
sense." 669 Assuming that was a reasonable interpretation, Post asserts
that the next question should have been whether that message was
opinion or fact.6
70
Although Post's argument relies primarily on Letter Carriers, his
conclusion that rhetorical hyperbole is not synonymous with pro-
tected fact is also supported by a close reading of Greenbelt Cooperative
Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler,6 7 1 which Letter Carriers cited.6 72 More even
than Letter Carriers, courts have long relied on Greenbelt Publishing for
the proposition that rhetorical hyperbole is not actionable in defama-
tion.6 73 The offending statement in Greenbelt Publishing characterized
the plaintiff businessman's negotiating position regarding a city zon-
ing matter as "blackmail,"6 74 and the plaintiff argued that it thereby
communicated that he had been accused of the crime of blackmail.675
The Court rejected that argument, explaining that the statement was
not actionable because:
It is simply impossible to believe that a reader who reached
the word 'blackmail' . .. would not have understood exactly
665. For application and explanation of Post's extended analysis, see infra notes 666-670
and accompanying text.
666. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). For a perspective that goes beyond the legal to the human
interest elements of the case, see RODNEY A. SMOLIA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT (1988).
667. Falwell 485 U.S. at 48.
668. Post, supra note 252, at 652.
669. Id. (citing Reply Brief of Petitioner at 20, Falwell (No. 86-1278)). Laurence Tribe
had described the magazine as "a mix of eroticism, violence, and misogyny." TIBE, supra
note 620, at 668.
670. Post, supra note 252, at 652. Post concludes that it was protected opinion because it
was making a judgment about Falwell's teachings. Id. at 652-53.
671. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
672. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 282 (1974).
673. See, e.g., Milkovich v. LorainJournal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1990).
674. Greenbelt Coop. Publ'gAss'n, 398 U.S. at 13-14.
675. Id. at 13.
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what was meant: it was Bresler's public and wholly legal nego-
tiating proposals that were being criticized. No reader could
have thought that either the speakers at the meetings or the
newspaper articles reporting their words were charging Bres-
ler with the commission of a criminal offense.67 6
Significantly, the Supreme Court in Milkovich read Greenbelt simi-
larly, looking beyond the literal meaning of "blackmail. '67 7 Given its
subtext, which suggested an unreasonable bargaining position, the
Court held that it did not carry defamatory meaning.67 The Milkovich
Court wrote of Greenbelt.
Noting that the published reports "were accurate and full,"
the [Greenbelt] Court reasoned that "even the most careless
reader must have perceived that the word was no more than
rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who
considered [the developer's] negotiating position extremely
unreasonable.6 79
As this passage illustrates, reading Greenbelt for the broad proposition
that hyperbolic and imaginative speech cannot be actionable in defa-
mation fundamentally misunderstands the case. Rather, Greenbelt pro-
vided protection for the word "blackmail" because the meaning it
conveyed-its subtext if you will-regarding a tough negotiating
stance, did not necessarily carry defamatory meaning and, indeed, ap-
peared to be true.68°
Contrary to Greenbelt's implication and Post's argument, most
courts give hyperbolic statements a literal reading and conclude on
that basis that no reasonable person would believe that the statement
is intended to be read literally.6"' In so holding, courts fail to con-
sider what meaning is being perceived by those reasonable persons.
Thus, while courts appear to speak in terms of literal readings or inter-
pretations by considering only the literal, they are in fact engaging in
superficial interpretations. As Post argues, they should be considering
the substance conveyed-the subtext-of the hyperbolic and imagina-
tive speech.68 2
676. Id. at 14.
677. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17.
678. Id. at 17.
679. Id. (quoting Greenbelt Coop. Publ' Ass'n, 398 U.S. at 13-14).
680. Greenbelt Coop. Publ' Ass'n, 398 U.S. at 14.
681. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (finding that the
ad parody "could not reasonably be understood as describing actual facts" about Falwell).
682. Post, supra note 252, at 652-57.
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In Pring, for example, Kimerli Pring argued for a literal reading
that she could prove false: that she had not, in fact, performed the
acts of fellatio suggested.6 8 3 The court was dismissive of her argu-
ment, however, concluding that the story could not be perceived as
describing actual facts or events.6 8 4 In essence, the court concluded
that no one would take it literally.68 5 On that basis, it was not actiona-
ble, and her ability to prove its literal falsity was irrelevant. 68 6 Having
concluded that the offending publication would not be read literally,
however, the court failed to consider how it might be read, including
the meaning a reasonable reader might perceive. Thus, the court
never reached the argument made by Pring's expert, that the Pent-
house story's "subliminal meaning" was that she was a woman with
questionable sexual morals.6 8 7 The court also never considered the
possibility that it conveyed a different message-that Pring was a fool,
a person to be ridiculed.
Courts make the same error in the post-Milkovich world. The
court in Seelig, for example, like that in Pring, insisted on a literal read-
ing of the offending communication. 68  That literal reading was su-
perficial, however, and led to a superficial analysis of defamatory
meaning. Read literally the statement included only one statement of
fact that was "provably false" 6 8 9 -that the plaintiff was a "local
loser"6 90 -and that allegation was not necessarily defamatory.6 9 1 As
for the other problematic elements of the broadcast, the court held
them not actionable because the plaintiff could not literally be the
butt of a chicken and because "skank" was vague and had no ascertain-
683. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982).
684. Id.
685. Id. (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ'gAss'n, 398 U.S. at 6). "[If] it could not be so understood [as describing actual
facts], the charged portions could not be taken literally." Id. at 442.
686. See id. at 443 (holding that "the incidents charged were impossible" and dismissing
Pring's case).
687. See id. This apparent oversight may have been an intentional omission. It may have
been because of Pring's trial strategy to focus on the specific allegations of fellatio and not
on the general imputation of sexual impropriety. See supra notes 288-292 and accompany-
ing text (discussing Pring at length).
688. See Seelig v. Infinity Broad. Corp., 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 108, 116-17 (Ct. App. 2002).
689. Id. at 116 (citing Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990)).
690. Id. at 117. "Loser is a description applied to persons in many contexts," the court
wrote, "that bears no potential defamatory inference, particularly if, like plaintiff in this
case, the person was unsuccessful in some contest." Id.; see supra notes 436-461 (discussing
Seelig).
691. See Seelig, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (stating that "referring to someone as a loser.., is
more appropriately characterized as a school yard taunt than an actionable defamation").
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able meaning.69 The statements were therefore deemed not
actionable.693
There were several problems with this analysis. First the court was
wrong to consider only the literal meaning of "chicken butt." In com-
bination with the other statements, it carried meaning, if only mean-
ing as simple and base as that conveyed by the photograph in Burton:
that the plaintiff was a fool, an idiot worthy of ridicule. Second, the
court was wrong about "skank" having no ascertainable meaning. Re-
call that the dictionary defines skank as "a prostitute or a dirty, repul-
sive, or immoral person. '"694 If spoken in isolation it might be
considered a verbal slap or epithet. Collectively with the other re-
marks, however, skank was no more vague than the Milkovich Court's
example of a provably false statement-calling someone a liar. Skank
clearly suggested sexual scandal, and it arguably "impl [ied] a provably
false factual assertion." '695 In its conclusion, the court failed to look
beyond the literal assertions to the readily perceived nuance of the
entire broadcast segment.
In their literal readings of statements-readings characterized by
a sort of tunnel vision that parody, hyperbole, and imaginative expres-
sion carry no subtextual meaning-contemporary courts deviate from
the practice of their predecessors, who were quick to consider a state-
ment's innuendo.696 These late twentieth-century judges' interpretive
practices stand in particularly sharp contrast with those of judges at
the turn of the century. Recall, for example, judges considering the
offerings of the period of yellow journalism. These judges took as
clear inputations of unchastity suggestions of "unladylike" behavior
such as rowing a boat until one's palms were pink, or appearance on a
Coney Island stage.6 9 7 Even further back, early and mid-nineteenth-
century judges rarely hesitated to interpret less-than-straightforward
imputations of unchastity for what they were.698 Recall the earlier
cases that found defamatory meaning in statements calling a woman
692. Id. at 117-18.
693. Id. at 119.
694. The entry indicates that the term originated between 1980-85 in America. RANDOM
HOUSE WEBSTER'S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1229 (2001).
695. Seelig, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
696. See supra notes 107-125 and accompanying text (exploring turn-of-the-century
courts' willingness to consider a statement's perceived innuendo).
697. For specific examples ofjudicial language and discussion of cases, see supra notes
174-189 and accompanying text.
698. See supra notes 117-125 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases from
this period).
524 [VOL. 63:401
Two CENTURIES OF TALK ABOUT CHASTITY
"low" or "bad" or saying she had gone into the woods under suspicious
circumstances.699
These judges interpreted the statements consistent with the social
expectations of their respective times. At the turn of the twentieth
century, courts were also responding to the realities of salacious media
coverage. I am admittedly uncomfortable with many of these courts'
motives in seeking defamatory meaning because I believe they sought
to keep women on their proverbial pedestals. I am also uncomforta-
ble with the long-term consequences of the law's assessment of what
constitutes sexual propriety and with its reinforcement of the signifi-
cance of women's sexual virtue. I nevertheless acknowledge that these
earlier courts were at least realistic about the power of a statement
that impugned chastity to undermine a woman's standing in her
community.
Contemporary courts, in sharp contrast, often appear oblivious to
current realities regarding sex and meaning.70 0 Rare is the woman at
the turn of the twenty-first century who suffers serious reputational
injury by virtue of a statement accusing her of adultery, yet the law
provides redress when such a statement is provably false. 70 1 The com-
munications with real power to injure a woman now rely on a vulgar
and vituperative wit that degrades. Too clever for mundane assertions
about adultery or venereal disease, these statements instead demean
in relation to sex. Yet, with interpretive blinders on, courts consider
only the literal meaning of statements that clearly are not intended to
be read literally. 70 2 They typically fail to look beyond facial meaning
to subtext, to a determination of what the offending statement is
saying.
A few judges, of course, have deviated from this trend and ap-
plied more realistic interpretations to the offending statements that
have given rise to these cases. The approach of Judge Breitenstein,
dissenting in Pring, along with the district and appellate judges who
decided Globe Publishing, stand Out.7 0 3 Considering the communica-
tions in those cases, both of which were admittedly parodic and fanci-
ful, the judges focused nevertheless on specific elements of the
699. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing cases where less straightfor-
ward language was still found to be defamatory).
700. See supra Part III(c) (3) (discussing new chastity cases).
701. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (discussing successful actions for state-
ments alleging adultery).
702. See supra notes 497-499 and accompanying text (examining courts' consideration of
literal meaning instead of subtext or innuendo).
703. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982); Peoples Bank &
Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065 (8th Cir. 1992).
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respective statements that were real.7" 4 In this sense, they sought out
the literal from amidst the fanciful as a basis for their ultimate conclu-
sions that the statements asserted facts about the respective plain-
tiffs.705 Judge Breitenstein distinguished between details of the
levitation, dreams, and public performance, which were fiction, and
fellatio, which is not.70 6 Writing that it "is a physical act, a fact, not a
mental idea," and that it was "not used as hyperbole or epithet, ' 70 7 he
also observed that fellatio has long been considered sexually devi-
ant.70  On this basis, he concluded that Pring was defamed.
70
Similarly, in Globe Publishing, the Eighth Circuitjudges focused on
the reality of pregnancy,710 embracing literality with respect to at least
part of the offending story. Calling pregnancy "a physical condition,
not an opinion, metaphor, fantasy, or surrealism, "v1 the court re-
fused to say as a matter of law that readers could not reasonably have
believed the story as portraying actual facts. 7 12 The court specifically
found the "circumstances in which the statements were made, the me-
dium by which they were published, and the audience for which they
were intended" relevant to this determination, suggesting that con-
sumers of tabloid magazines may not be the most discerning peo-
ple.713 On the other hand, the court acknowledged the nuances,
noting that the implication of sexual impropriety, as well as some of
704. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting); Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 978
F.2d at 1069.
705. Pring, 695 F.2d at 444 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting); Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 978
F.2d at 1069.
706. Pring, 695 F.2d at 443-44 (Breitenstein, J., dissenting).
707. Id. He went on to say that
Responsibility for an irresponsible and reckless statement of fact, fellatio, may not
be avoided by the gratuitous addition of fantasy. Penthouse does not claim that
the fact statement was truthful. Moral standards may have changed since the First
Amendment was adopted but that change has not gone so far as to protect a
publisher which defames [a person] by relating commission of an act of sexual
deviation and perversion.
Id. at 444. Breitenstein also pointed out that "nothing in Greenbelt or National Association of
Letter Carriers applies a 'reasonably understood' test to defamation actions generally." Id.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publ'g, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1069 (8th Cir.
1992).
711. Id.
712. Id.
713. Id. (citing Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 668 F. Supp. 1408, 1416 (C.D. Cal.
1987)).
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the express assertions (the report that the plaintiff was leaving her
long-time paper delivery), were reasonably believable.714
These judges' approach leads to a result more consistent with
that of Judge Hand in Burton v. Crowell Publishing Co. in that all would
provide redress for statements that ridicule-even if they are, in some
sense, so outrageous and unbelievable as to "carry [their] corrections
on [their] face." '715 Judge Hand's approach, however, differed from
that of these other judges; he acknowledged the absurdity of taking
such statements literally and nevertheless recognized the harm
done.716 Contemporary judges, on the other hand, stretch to identify
elements of a statement that might possibly be reasonably believed.71 7
They then hinge the defamatory or highly offensive meaning on the
technical falsity of that assertion. 71' For example, Kimerli Pring did
not perform fellatio on her coach, and Nellie Mitchell, at 95, was not
pregnant.719 Judge Hand was less circuitous, more candid, about the
harms wrought by such statements.720
Judge Hand's approach also differs from that of modern judges
because Hand's analysis relied on a dichotomy different to Milkovich's
legacy of fact versus non-fact. Hand advocated privileging only state-
ments that are verifiably true. 7 21 Accordingly, statements that are ver-
ifiably false-or what I call technically false-are not privileged.
Hand's dichotomy makes sense in the context of the new chastity
cases because it would permit a woman who has been sexually ridi-
culed to prove that she is not whatever the statement effectively repre-
sents her to be.7 22 This means the Seelig plaintiff should have had an
opportunity to prove the falsity of what the broadcast really "said":
that she was sexually promiscuous or inappropriate. It would ensure
that Kimerli Pring could have chosen to prove not only that she had
not performed fellatio on either her baton twirling coach or a football
714. Id. The district court had similarly focused on the part of the article that went to
Mitchell's sexual propriety. There,Judge Waters wrote that even if some facts contained in
the article could not reasonably be believed, "the implication of sexual promiscuity" could.
Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 791, 798 (W.D. Ark. 1992).
715. Burton v. Cromwell Publ'g Co., 82 F.2d 154, 155 (2d Cir. 1936).
716. See id. at 155.
717. See Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
the story could not describe "actual facts" because the "setting was impossible").
718. See id.
719. Id. at 441-43; Burton, 82 F.2d at 155.
720. See Burton, 82 F.2d at 155 (noting that "such a caricature affects a man's reputa-
tion . . . he may become known indefinitely as the absurd victim of this unhappy
mischance").
721. Id. at 156.
722. See id. (noting that the "plaintiff has been substantially enough ridiculed to be in a
position to complain").
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player-the literal assertions of the story-but also that she was not
the sexually promiscuous woman that the Penthouse article suggested.
Alternatively, if a court found a hyperbolic statement conveyed the
meaning that the plaintiff was a foolish, ridiculous person, the plain-
tiff would have had an opportunity to prove the inaccuracy of that
portrayal.
Hand's opinion in Burton also offers insight regarding the dam-
age done by speech that ridicules, even when its facial or superficial
message will not be taken literally by those perceiving it.723 As Hand
noted regarding the embarrassing photo of the plaintiff in Burton, it
"carries its correction on its face." '724 He thus understood, just as con-
temporary courts do in analogous cases, that viewers of the ad would
not literally believe that the plaintiff is grotesquely endowed.725 Un-
like contemporary courts, he was frank about the fact that the harm
does not arise from a literal interpretation, but rather from a portrayal
that makes the plaintiff the object of ridicule, the butt of ajoke that is
publicly displayed and consumed. 726
In analogous contemporary cases, courts are halfway to this solu-
tion. They realize that the parody "carries its correction on its face" in
the sense that its literal meaning will not be taken seriously. 7 2 7 For
example, the Pring court realized that readers would not believe that
Miss Wyoming could cause a man to levitate by performing oral sex on
him.72 8 The court also realized that no one would believe that Miss
Wyoming had actually performed fellatio on a man at the edge of the
stage as the contest proceeded a few yards away.729 What courts like
Pring have not acknowledged is that offending publication still con-
veys meaning; indeed, it often conveys multiple messages. One of the
messages conveyed by the Penthouse story was that Pring was sexually
improper. Another was that she was a fool, a ridiculous figure. Yet
the court never acknowledged these alternate interpretations of the
messages conveyed, nor did it take up their truth or falsity. 730
723. Id. at 155.
724. Id.
725. See id. at 154.
726. Id. at 155; see also supra Part 1V.C.3 (discussing the contemporary courts' focus on
the literal interpretation of the offending statement or portrayal).
727. Burton, 82 F.2d at 155.
728. See supra notes 384-404 and accompanying text (discussing the facts of the story at
issue in Pring as well as the court's holding).
729. See supra text accompanying notes 399.
730. This failure or oversight may have been due to the plaintiff's strategic litigation
decision to focus on the alleged acts of fellatio rather than on the general imputation of
sexual impropriety. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text.
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2. Milkovich, Hepps, and Proving Truth.-Any agreement that it
is appropriate to consider subtext, innuendo, and non-literal meaning
by no means renders Milkovich meaningless. Recall that Milkovich also
endorsed Hepps' protection of speech on matters of public concern
that cannot be proven false."' Thus, even if a statement clears the
Falwell hurdle (a reasonable person would believe it), it must also
clear the Hepps hurdle in order to be actionable.7"2 This Hepps limita-
tion applies, however, only in cases that involve both media defend-
ants and speech about matters of public concern. Although most of
the new chastity cases involve media defendants, they rarely regard
statements about matters of public concern.733 Indeed, they regard
quintessentially private matters, an individual's sexuality. Hepps
would, therefore, have no relevance to most of the new chastity cases,
meaning the objectionable statement's characterization as fact or non-
fact would likely be irrelevant for purposes of a constitutional
analysis.734
In the event that a statement ridiculing a woman on the basis of
sexuality were deemed to be a matter of public concern,73 5 the Hepps-
based part of Milkovich would be relevant. Speech protected by Hepps
is what commentators have closely associated with the opinion side of
what was once the fact-opinion dichotomy, now essentially the divide
between unprotected false facts and protected non-fact. 736 In the new
chastity cases, the question thus becomes whether the subtext or im-
plication that the plaintiff is sexually improper (or a fool deserving of
ridicule, depending on the interpretation) is fact or non-fact.
First, the Milkovich Court made clear that cloaking a statement in
opinion language did not make it opinion.737 The Court then offered
some guidelines in this regard, illustrating an actionable "fact" by ref-
erence to a general assertion, one of dishonesty.
738
[U]nlike the statement "In my opinion MayorJones is a liar,"
the statement, "In my opinion, Mayor Jones shows his abys-
mal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and
731. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990).
732. Id.
733. Id.
734. Instead of the constitutional analysis, the common law fair comment privilege
might be invoked. See supra notes 253-256 and accompanying text.
735. This is at least conceivable in a case such as Dworkin because of the plaintiffs in-
volvement in the anti-pornography campaign.
736. See supra notes 271-274 and accompanying text (discussing the almost unassailable
conclusion that opinions are protected speech).
737. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
738. Id. at 19-29.
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Lenin," would not be actionable. Hepps ensures that a state-
ment of opinion relating to matters of public concern which
does not contain a provably false factual connotation will re-
ceive full constitutional protection.7"9
Milkovich, therefore, suggests that the more general statement-that
"Mayor Jones is a liar"-would be actionable because it contains a
provably false factual connotation. The more detailed statement,
somewhat paradoxically, is not actionable even though it suggests reli-
ance on facts as the basis for the opinion expressed. A statement gen-
erally imputing sexual impropriety-or one imputing foolishness or
idiocy, an alternate interpretation of many of the statements in the
new chastity cases-is more akin to the former of Milkovich's illustra-
tions and therefore would probably be considered actionable fact. As
a statement with a "provably false factual connotation," the statement
would then become subject to an inquiry into its truth or falsity.74 °
The conclusion that a statement imputing to a woman general
sexual impropriety is factual thus leads to an uncomfortable inquiry:
Is she, in fact, "unchaste"? The technical falsity solution, therefore,
739. Id. (citing Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986)). Other
contemporary cases suggest that calling someone a liar constitutes a defamatory statement.
See, e.g., Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 195 (4th Cir. 1989) (holding that a statement that a
female police officer was a "liar" did not constitute defamation only because there was no
publication).
740. The Hepps conclusion that calling the mayor a liar carries a "provably false factual
connotation" raises as many questions as it answers. What evidence, as a practical matter,
would be necessary to establish the falsity of the statement? Would proof that the mayor
had ever, in his entire life, lied about anything make the statement true? Or would proof
of a falsehood related to the role as mayor be required? Would the recency of the mayor's
last lie matter? The Milkovich court gives no guidelines regarding what would constitute
sufficient proof, yet the same questions would arise in the new chastity cases. For example,
if the subtext of a hyperbolic statement is that the plaintiff is sexually promiscuous, how
would the truth or falsity of the statement be established? If the plaintiff bore the burden
of proof of falsity, would she have to prove that she had never had sexual relations outside
of wedlock? What would be required to establish one's sexual propriety?
Milkovich does not answer these questions, but implicit in finding that a statement
accusing someone of being a "liar" or "slut" is actionable in defamation is the establish-
ment of a dichotomy. One is either a liar or one is not. One is either a slut or one is not.
This is problematic because reality is more nuanced than that dichotomy accommodates,
particularly with regard to sexual practices. The logical conclusion of the Milkovich analy-
sis, however, would reinforce a sort of Madonna-whore dichotomy, suggesting that women
are either one or the other. This illustrates, once again, how inadequate defamation law is
for purposes of redressing the sort of communicative injuries that many women suffer.
Bezanson, Cranberg, and Soloski, in their 1987 book, discuss the ambiguous role of
falsity in contemporary libel litigation. They observe that reputation, whether deserved or
not, tended to be protected at common law. BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 191-93.
This would seem to be a likely outcome if the truth or falsity of a general assertion of
sexual impropriety were adjudicated, in particular if the burden of proof of truth rested
with the defendant.
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has the consequence of actually progressing the analysis to the ques-
tion of the statement's truth or falsity. While I am uncomfortable with
this consequence, it should allay any concerns about runaway litiga-
tion of a new dignitary tort. It would necessarily suppress frivolous
litigation because women will not lightly choose to expose themselves
to such disclosures.741 In addition, because Hepps shifts the burden of
proof with respect to falsity to the plaintiff only in cases involving me-
dia defendants speaking about matters of public concern, the Consti-
tution does not mandate that other plaintiffs must bear the burden of
proof regarding falsity.742 Because the statement at issue in a new
chastity case rarely involves any matter of public concern, the defen-
dant should still bear the burden of proving its falsity. Most plaintiffs
would accordingly enjoy a presumption of sexual appropriateness.
VI. CONCLUSION
Some have argued that defamation law is obsolete at the turn of
the twenty-first century.743 Constitutional protections, and those asso-
ciated with the common law, are said to be so stringent that contem-
porary libel law is not a "general remedy with exceptions, but a
general scheme of nonliability that permits a remedy only in excep-
tional cases. 744 It has become merely a "residual remedy.
745
The hypothesized obsolescence of defamation law may be partic-
ularly poignant for women plaintiffs seeking redress for statements re-
lated to them as sexual beings. For many years, judges altered their
approaches to defamatory meaning in response to the changing na-
ture of statements regarding a woman's chastity, as well as to society's
741. See supra note 299 and accompanying text (discussing the plaintiff's strategic deci-
sion in Pring to focus on the defamatory meaning of the acts in question to avoid question-
ing about her sexual history).
742. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19-29 (endorsing the Hepps holding).
743. See, e.g., Logan, supra note 34, at 519 (noting that the volume of libel litigation has
fallen dramatically in the past twenty years, especially when compared to other types of tort
litigation). Professor Robert Sack has written, in this vein:
The few plaintiffs who succeed resemble the remnants of an army platoon caught
in an enemy crossfire. Their awards stand witness to their good luck, not to their
virtue, their skill or the justice of their cause. It is difficult to perceive the law of
defamation, in this light, as a real "system" for protection of reputation at all.
BEZANSON ET AL., supra note 17, at 199 (quoting ROBERT SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED
PROBLEMS (1980)). But see SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS, supra note 36, at ch. 1; Smolla, Let the
Author Beware, supra note 36 (discussing, respectively, the proverbial "thinning American
skin" and the proliferation of litigation against the press).
744. Anderson, supra note 252, at 509-10.
745. Id. Professor David Anderson, a long-time scholar of libel law, has gone as far as to
say that "a world in which reputation is not a legally protected interest is no longer incon-
ceivable." Id. at 551.
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expectations of women.7 46 For example, during the era of yellowjour-
nalism, courts were so attuned to society's resistance to women's in-
creasing freedoms that they reinforced that resistance.747 They did so,
for example, by inferring assertions of sexual impropriety even from
depictions of women in public places, engaging in pursuits thereto-
fore strictly male, e.g., working as ajournalist (Ervin)74 s or the "muscu-
lar" pursuit of rowing a boat in the park (McFaddin) .74 As I have
already discussed, this phenomenon was not altogether a good thing
for women.
Defamation law's adaptive capacity has been strained in recent
decades. Contemporary courts show little unease at not providing a
remedy to women who have been injured by what is arguably a pre-
sent-day successor to sexual slander. Even when they do express angst
over sexually demeaning portrayals, courts are now constrained by
constitutional doctrines. As the cases demonstrate, these doctrines
have made it especially difficult for women to prevail in the contem-
porary lawsuits I call the new chastity cases. On the other hand,
among the suits women still win with considerable frequency are those
in which they seek redress for straight forward assertions that they are
unchaste. 750 Between these two categories of cases are the epithet-
based cases, in which courts have shown some sensitivity to the fact
that hateful words and phrases containing sexual content are injuri-
ous.7 11 When courts have recognized the harms from these state-
ments, however, they have done so on the basis that the epithets-
most often taken in context with other assertions capable of being
interpreted as regarding sexual behavior-undermine a woman's rep-
utation for chastity.
75 2
This hierarchy of success among these three categories of chastity
cases is somewhat ironic given the diminished power of the most suc-
746. Compare supra Part III (discussing the reaction of courts to the era of yellowjournal-
ism, often issuing verdicts for women in cases dealing with offensive statements or portray-
als and idealizing the notion of chastity), with supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing the failure of
womens' suits in the new chastity cases).
747. See supra text accompanying notes 167-208 (discussing cases in which courts ideal-
ized the chastity of women during the era of yellow journalism).
748. See supra notes 196-208 and accompanying text (discussing the Ervin court's deci-
sion to uphold the jury finding that an article describing a female journalist's relationship
with a prize fighter was defamatory).
749. See supra notes 167-175 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of McFad-
den, which found that an article describing a rowing race between two women was
defamatory).
750. See supra Part IV.C.1 (discussing contemporary cases stemming from straight for-
ward statements of unchastity).
751. See supra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the epithet-based cases).
752. See supra text accompanying note 377.
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cessful of these types of statements to undermine a woman's reputa-
tion in contemporary society, and therefore to harm her.75 3 In sharp
contrast, sexually hateful portrayals of women are highly injurious to
the individual woman's dignity, identity, and sense of self. The trends
reflected in the disposition of all three types of cases are disturbing
because all relegate women, at least symbolically, to the private
sphere.15 ' The new chastity cases do so by failing to provide redress
for sexually hateful portrayals that associate women, involuntarily and
crudely, with sex and the broader private sphere. The traditional
chastity cases, along with the successful epithet cases that are inter-
preted as being of the traditional variety, do so with the normative
authority of law by reviving and reinforcing society's attention to wo-
men's sexual nature, which also symbolically aligns women with the
private and all it encompasses. As Professor Nancy Levit has observed,
"[t] ort law is quintessentially normative. '7 5' By recognizing a cause of
action, the law says, effectively, "this matters.7 51 6 By denying recogni-
tion, it effectively denies the injury.757
The analysis dictated by prevailing defamation doctrines obscures
the very real dignitary injuries suffered by women who have been sex-
ually ridiculed and demeaned. The harm the statements inflict is un-
acknowledged by our legal and social culture, both in terms of its
complexity and its potency. Thus, as courts discuss concepts of fact,
opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, epithet, truth, and falsity, they fail to
753. This is not to assert that such statements have no capacity to injury women socially.
While an allegation of unchastity might have "undone" a woman as recently as a century
ago, see Friedman, Name Robbers, supra note 23, at 1094-96, that is rarely so today. Never-
theless, some courts arguably over react to these statements about sexual behavior and, in
so doing, signal that society does and should view such statements very seriously. One
court wrote, regarding a statement that alleged both adultery and homosexuality:
[T]he "unchastity" category of slander per se has been generalized . . . to make
actionable any false allegation of "serious sexual misconduct." We agree with this
approach. Matters of sexuality and sexual conduct are intensely private, intensely
sensitive, and a false public statement concerning them is particularly harmful.
Nazeri v. Mo. Valley Coll., 860 S.W.2d 303, 312 (Mo. 1993) (citation omitted). The court's
conclusion suggested that, in fact, an allegation of adultery sets a standard of damage
against which other types of arguably defamatory statements are measured: "In this society,
an untruthful declaration concerning homosexual orientation must be considered as dam-
aging to reputation as one concerning adulterous conduct." Id. at 312.
754. See Bowman, supra note 19, at 526 (arguing that street harassment conveys to wo-
men the message that they belong in the private sphere "by intruding upon a woman's
privacy as she enters the public sphere").
755. Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 178 (1992).
756. See id. at 193 (noting that legal recognition of interests elevates the importance of
the injury).
757. See id. at 174 (arguing that the diminishment of emotional injury makes the injury
unreal).
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give due to the harm caused, both in terms of its character and its
magnitude. This injury is not solely-and sometimes not at all-a
reputational injury, even though a traditional defamation concept
(that the statement holds the subject up to ridicule or humiliation) is
present. Rather, the abusive and degrading nature of the communica-
tion-not the factual or semi-factual assertion that the plaintiff has
done something improper-is what inflicts the injury. That commu-
nication arguably has many consequences, not least for the woman
targeted. As Professor Robin West has written, sexually degrading
statements "teach [ ] girls that their sexuality implies their vulnerabil-
ity. It is damaging to be pointed at,jeered at, and laughed at for one's
sexuality."7 ' These communications also wound because they funda-
mentally undermine a woman's ability to construct her own identity;
they undermine her autonomy. Finally, being protected from such
hateful portrayals is arguably more critical to women than to some
others because women generally enjoy little social power, including
limited access to the media, in our patriarchal society.7 5 9
To be clear, prudery is not my motive for advocating recognition
of and redress for the injuries caused by sexually degrading and
demeaning statements, nor would it be a good reason for doing so. As
I have already observed, reinforcing and playing to society's sensibili-
ties about female sexual propriety is a way in which adjudication of
traditional chastity cases has ultimately disserved women. Because ad-
judicating a woman's sexual respectability limits and undermines wo-
men collectively over the long run, it is one of the drawbacks to my
proposal. My proposal to rely on a statement's technical falsity not
only keeps us talking about women's sexual behavior and per-
sonhood, if courts interpret these statements as suggesting sexual im-
propriety, it also has courts litigating the truth or falsity of those
suggestions. 7
60
758. Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of
Feminist Legal Theory, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 149, 175 (2000); see also Wang, supra note 309, at
90-91, 97-99 (discussing the psychological effects of vulnerability felt by victims).
759. As Susan Moller Okin has written, women are "handicapped by being deprived of
any authority in their speech. As one recent feminist analysis has diagnosed the problem,
it is not 'that women have not learned how to be in authority,' but rather 'that authority is
currently conceptualized so that female voices are excluded from it."' MOLLER O~iN, supra
note 15, at 132 (quoting Kathleen Jones, On Authority: Or, Why Women are Not Entitled to
Speak, in AUTHORITY REVISITED (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1987)).
760. Of course, the ultimate interpretive coup in these cases would acknowledge that
the statement is not about sexual propriety, but rather an assertion of the plaintiffs fool-
ishness or idiocy. An inquiry into the truth or falsity of such a statement would be some-
what less sensitive.
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There are, however, greater problems with the present legal re-
gime. By concluding that these offending statements and portrayals
do not really assert information about the plaintiff because they are
imaginative, vague, or fanciful, or that a reasonable person would not
take them literally, most courts fail altogether to discuss what the state-
ments do, in fact, say and mean. This is a critical oversight because
these communications do convey information about the individual
women whose identities they use, ridicule and debase. If the offend-
ing statement is 'just ajoke," the plaintiff is the butt of the joke. Even
while courts use words such as coarse, degrading, vile, and vulgar to
refer to the publications, and terms such as scornful, debasing, and
derisive to refer to the message about the targeted woman, courts con-
clude that the statements are not actionable.76i
Although the constitutional basis articulated for the different out-
comes among the chastity cases are comprehensible, they are not nec-
essarily constitutionally mandated. As I have demonstrated, Falwell
mistakenly read Greenbelt Publishing as protecting all rhetorical hyper-
bole as that which "cannot 'reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts' about an individual. 762 Milkovich, in turn, failed to correct this
misunderstanding.7 6' As my analysis has demonstrated, however, it
does not necessarily follow that a statement in the form of rhetorical
hyperbole cannot be actionable in defamation law. The blanket pro-
tection for rhetorical hyperbole can be circumvented by a more so-
phisticated inquiry into defamatory meaning, which I have called
technical falsity. 76 4
Having dealt with this Falwel-based part of Milkovich, the Hepps-
based protection remains. The Milkovich Court endorsed Hepps' pro-
tection of media speech about a public controversy when the state-
ment is not provably false.765  As I have shown, however, most
communications that give rise to the new chastity cases carry a prov-
ably false connotation.766 Further, speech about a woman's sexual
761. See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing courts' findings in cases dealing with offensive
statements and portrayals); see also Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Inc., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th
Cir. 1982) (classifying the offensive article as "a gross, unpleasant, crude, distorted attempt
to ridicule" the plaintiff, but not finding for the plaintiff).
762. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1989) (quoting Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1987))
763. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.
764. See supra Part V.C (discussing technical falsity in relation to a new dignitary tort for
demeaning false speech).
765. See supra notes 268-269, 731-732 and accompanying text (discussing Milkovich's en-
dorsement of Hepps).
766. See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing courts' failure to put the non-literal meaning of
offending statements and portrayals at issue in the new chastity cases).
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personhood rarely implicates a public controversy, also rendering ir-
relevant Hepps' shift in the burden of proof regarding truth or
falsity.
7 6 7
The technical falsity of a statement provides a basis for limiting
the First Amendment protection it receives, rendering constitutional
my proposal for tort liability based on such speech.7 6' This concept of
technical falsity could be the cornerstone of a new communicative tort
for technically false speech that degrades or demeans. That tort
would draw the most fitting elements from defamation and false light
invasion of privacy to provide an option for legal redress in the new
chastity cases.
Of course, hinging a plaintiffs tort victory-a defamation or false
light victory for all practical purposes-on a technicality may be at-
tacked as deceptive. This focus on technical falsity, after all-particu-
larly under a defamation theory-makes it appear that the injury
being redressed is primarily a reputational one that arises from the
woman's portrayal as sexually unrespectable. In fact, reputational in-
jury is not the primary concern. Further, granting redress for the dig-
nitary injury inflicted should have nothing to do with assessing or
commenting upon what is or is not sexually proper. Rather, it should
hinge on recognition that being ridiculed, particularly in relation to
sex, is demeaning and degrading and that a woman who is involunta-
rily so portrayed is injured. The nature of the injury is linked to the
right to self-determination, identity, and dignity as reflected in the
tort of invasion of privacy. That right should include redress for being
portrayed in a highly offensive, derisive, and inauthentic way. Hing-
ing liability on falsity is therefore misleading. It is, admittedly, a
technicality.
Although granting legal relief based on a technicality may seem a
disingenuous solution, tort law is no more a stranger to legal techni-
calities than it is to dignitary torts.7 69 Consider the example of offen-
sive battery. Offensive battery, a dignitary tort, evolved from harmful
battery based on the implicit recognition that offensive touchings, like
767. See supra Part LV.C.3 (discussing private nature of offending statements and portray-
als in new chastity cases).
768. See supra Part V.D (discussing the importance of technical falsity in making the new
tort constitutional).
769. The protection of human dignity is an important function of tort law. This may be
accomplished, as Professor Smolla has written, by recognizing torts that deter "the viola-
tion of an individual's personal or psychological integrity." Smolla, Let the Author Beware,
supra note 36, at 19 (quoting Stanley Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between Reason and De-
cency, 65 VA. L. REv. 785, 791 (1979)); see also supra Part V.A.2 (discussing the harm recog-
nized by the tort of false light invasion of privacy).
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harmful ones, are injurious in ways that should be legally cogniza-
ble. vT° Cases such as Fisher v. Carousel Motor Hotel, Inc.,771 illustrate the
law turning a metaphorical corner in its recognition that redress
should be available not only for intentional contact that physically
harms, but also for intentional contact that offends "a reasonable
sense of personal dignity. "772
The Fisher litigation arose from the racist action of a Texas restau-
rant manager in the 1960s. 77' The manager "snatched" from an Afri-
can-American patron, Fisher, the plate upon which he was about to be
served lunch, shouting that Fisher could not be served at that estab-
lishment.774 Even though Fisher admitted that the manager never
touched his body, but rather only his dinner plate, he testified that he
was "highly embarrassed and hurt" by these actions, occurring as they
did in the presence of his business associates. 775 Ajury found that the
manager's actions and words subjected Fisher to "humiliation and in-
dignity. "776 In upholding the jury verdict, the court went on to note
that it is well settled that "actual physical contact is not necessary to
constitute a battery, so long as there is contact with clothing or an
object closely identified with the body."777 The court continued:
The intentional snatching of an object from one's hand is as
clearly an offensive invasion of his person as would be an
actual contact with the body ....
... Damages for mental suffering are recoverable with-
out the necessity for showing actual physical injury in a case
of willful battery because the basis of that action is the unper-
mitted and intentional invasion of the plaintiffs person and
not the actual harm to the plaintiff's body. Personal indig-
770. See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits
ofFreedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1275, 1320-21 (1998) (discussing the dignitary harm
caused by offensive battery and explaining the relationship between harmful and offensive
battery).
771. 424 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. 1967) (recognizing that harm can be caused by offensive
touching and finding the defendant liable for such).
772. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 19 (1977). The comment elaborates:
In order that a contact be offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity, it
must be one which would offend the ordinary person and as such one not unduly
sensitive as to his personal dignity. It must, therefore, be a contact which is un-
warranted by the social usages prevalent at the time and place at which it is
inflicted.
Id. at cmt. a.
773. 424 S.W.2d at 628-29.
774. Id.
775. Id. at 629.
776. Id.
777. Id.
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nity is the essence of an action for battery; and consequently
the defendant is liable not only for contacts which do actual
physical harm, but also for those which are offensive and in-
sulting. We hold, therefore, that plaintiff was entitled to ac-
tual damages for mental suffering due to the willful battery,
even in the absence of any physical injury.7 78
The tort that I propose is analogous to what the Fisher court did
in recognizing offensive battery on a technicality. Fisher used the plate
snatching as the physical contact required for a battery, in order that
relief might be granted for what was entirely a dignitary injury. I ar-
gue that the technical falsity of the highly offensive statements in the
new chastity cases can be the hook with which to the hold the defen-
dant liable for a dignitary injury. Relying on this technicality is a way
of making the law work for individual women who have been injured
by sexually hateful statements. It is a strategy for gaining recognition
for their heretofore largely invisible injuries, even while relying on ex-
isting legal categories.779
Also like the step taken in Fisher, what I propose is only an incre-
mental change in existing law. Yet it is a change that will provide an
option to women who have suffered dignitary injuries as a conse-
quence of sexually contemptuous depictions. As has proven the case
with Fisher, this solution might be viewed as a stop-gap remedy. Fol-
lowing Fisher and similar cases, courts ultimately recognized the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, which has largely replaced
offensive battery in providing a remedy for dignitary injuries in cases
where the touching was only a technicality.7 10 Similarly, we can hope
that a new constitutional window will ultimately open, thereby permit-
ting courts to provide a remedy based on a more candid assessment of
both what a sexually hateful statement says and the harms it does.
Were this to happen, technical falsity would be rendered obsolete in
the same way that the technicality of the contact largely has been.
Professor Cynthia Grant Bowman has observed that a recurring
complaint of feminist legal scholars is the law's failure "to take seri-
ously events that affect women's lives. '78 ' The history of tort law is a
778. Id. at 629-30 (citations omitted).
779. Professor Bowman made the same argument with respect to her proposed cause of
action to redress street harassment. See Bowman, Street Harassment, supra note 19, at 577-79
(arguing that the torts of assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion
of privacy should be expanded to encompass harassment).
780. See Heyman, supra note 770, at 1331 (noting the judicial shift from providing dam-
ages for psychological damage under the tort of battery to compensating victims under
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
781. Bowman, supra note 19, at 518.
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history of failure to acknowledge the injuries that women suffer, even
when those injuries profoundly affect women's well-being.78 2 Bow-
man has argued that men's street harassment of women is "the quin-
tessential moment of femininity in our culture."7 3  While not
disagreeing with that assertion, I would argue that being the butt of a
misogynistic joke is similarly such a quintessential moment. So, too, is
being portrayed in a sexually derisive way. Such communications cata-
pult women back to the realm of the private-the sexual, natural
world, the realm of disempowerment, and frequently, degradation
and debasement. They tell women, in the cruelest fashion, that the
private or domestic sphere is their "proper place."7 84
As Warren and Brandeis appeared to realize in their germinal
1890 article on privacy,785 the concept they presented was "deeply en-
trenched in culture, evolving over time, fundamental to the wholeness
of the individual, and reflecting the social environment in which peo-
ple exist. '786 The time has surely now come to acknowledge that this
long-recognized right to privacy has evolved in a way that it reflects the
fundamental personhood of women. The concept of privacy, which is
indelibly linked to human dignity, implicates a right to construct and,
within some limits, control our own identities and personas. Surely a
key component of that right is the opportunity for redress in tort for
highly offensive communications that are technically false and which
degrade or ridicule.
782. See generally Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Woman, Mothers, and the Law of
Fright: A History, 88 Micti. L. REv. 814 (1990) (tracking the evolution of the tort of negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress and arguing that the injury's association with women
contributed to law's hesitation to embrace it earlier).
783. Bowman, supra note 19, at 518.
784. In a similar vein, Bowman has observed that society has an expectation of women's
association with the private or domestic. Accordingly, men are less likely to challenge or
harass women when they are in places associated with women and their domestic responsi-
bilities. Id. at 526, 530. The same might be said of the new chastity cases. Women who
work inside the home are not subjected to demeaning portrayals in the way that those who
work outside the home are.
785. Warren & Brandeis, Privacy, supra note 46.
786. Bezanson, supra note 143, at 1134.
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